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LEARNING ABOUT PREFERENCE
Evan Piermont, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2017
This dissertation includes three essays, each investigating the formation and evolution of
preference, with particular attention paid to epistemological concerns, dynamics, and learn-
ing. Loosely speaking, each chapter provides a different approach to modeling how a Decision
Maker (DM) might learn about her own preference. The work as a whole adheres to the
classical notions of revealed preference and utility maximization. The first chapter considers
DM who learns by observing the environment in which decisions must be made. The second
chapter, written jointly with Roee Teper, considers a DM who learns by observing the con-
sequences of her prior choices. Finally, the third chapter considers a DM who learns novel
information of which she previously had no conception.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
I am writing this, the introduction, in transit from tlv to pit via atl. I have never written
a dissertation, nor will I likely ever again, and so, I am not entirely sure what an introduction
to one comprises. There are three chapters, pairwise unrelated except at a very general level
where they are all decision theory and all contemplate how a decision maker might behave
when she expects her ignorance to diminish. In other words, when she expects to learn.
I have imposed an strict artificial time limit: whatever introduction is written upon my
arrival at pit is what stands as the final cut.1 In the modern fashion, the work presented here
was not written with the intention of being a dissertation, per say—rather as three stand
alone works, notationally self contained and intended for publication in academic journals.
The first chapter was my second year paper, echoes of which, residing in bygone digital
folders, were written near half a decade ago. Nonetheless, all three parts are still evolving,
mutating in response to a chorus of referees and seminar participants. A dissertation as a
snapshot rather than a capstone.
While in Israel, I presented the second and third chapters of this dissertation, at the
University of Haifa and Tel Aviv University, respectively. The chapters are ordered, loosely
speaking, by their level of abstraction. Each adheres to the paradigm of revealed preference
and utility theory. I ascribe to such principals almost religiously—not in the sense that they
contain some deep insight, but because to deny them is to deny any foundation to human
behavior.
Definition. A decision maker satisfies the revealed preference paradigm if at each in-
stance, she chooses the action that she believes will afford her the most pleasing outcome.
1So any unchecked pretentious flourish and malapropistic usage errors can be chocked up to jet-lag and
a lack of internet.
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Many people outside neoclassical decision theory point to the cacophony of bad decision
taken more or less constantly as a damning counterexample to utility theory. However,
such a superficial criticism misses, or misunderstands, the inclusion of “she believes” from
the definition above. Humans are computationally constrained, myopic, altruistic, addicted,
indecisive, and psychologically biased in sundry, ad hoc ways. We make the best possible
choices subject to this immense set of constraints. It is, in part, the decision theorist’s job2
to understand, when given a set of choices, how to identify the constraints which effected
these choices.
The work contained in this dissertation is devoted to understanding one constraint in par-
ticular: that we are currently ignorant of the (Platonically) optimal choice, but acknowledge
the possibility that we will shortly become less ignorant. We make choices today antici-
pating the arrival of better information tomorrow—information that is often a function of
our present decisions. The following three chapters provide different prospectives on (i) how
such anticipation shapes behavior, and (ii) how, by looking at choices, one might be able to
identify what the decision maker expects she might learn.
The trip to Israel was for the purpose of visiting Roee, his family, and his alma mater,
and had been discussed intermittently for years. The idea that such a trip would follow the
acquisition of a job: after the myriad cover letters, the pacing in hotel hallways, the JMP,
the spiel, the dinners with only one in formal attire. In contrast to popular notions of Ph.D.
candidacy, it was these events, and not the preparation of this document, that were both the
principal source of apprehension and marker of end of my tenure as a student. It ended well;
I got a job; I got to go to Israel and present the second and third chapters of my dissertation.
I would like to thank: my friends and family for putting up with my insufferable chatter;
my fellow core members; my always enlightening professors (heck, even the only occasion-
ally enlightening ones); my letter writers; my committee members; Sum for putting up with
my insufferable chatter and everything else; and, of course, my wonderful advisors, Luca and
Roee. Y’all have made the last six years an absolute delight.
2I think?
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2.0 CONTEXT DEPENDENT BELIEFS
In which Katya discovers the quality of a restaurant—not to men-
tion of her date—by reflecting on its offerings.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Both intuition and psychological evidence insist that a decision maker’s (DM’s) preference
over alternatives is affected by the environment in which the decision is made (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1984; Simonson and Tversky, 1992; Sen, 1993). While there are many external
factors that potentially exert influence on the decision making process, this paper examines
a model in which the set of alternatives that is currently available acts as a frame –a process
often differentiated from general framing effects under the moniker context dependence. I
identify the behavioral conditions for context dependent beliefs, when the DM’s subjective
assessment of the likelihood of events depends on the available alternatives (the menu) from
which he must choose, and consider additional restrictions that correspond to particular
subjective information structures.
Context dependence is often associated with notions of bounded rationality or psycholog-
ical heuristics (Tversky and Simonson, 1993). This paper, however, interprets menu-induced
framing as rational, exploring how and when such behavior exists within the subjective ex-
pected utility paradigm. If the DM believes the menu itself contains information regarding
payoff relevant uncertainty, conditioning his preference on such information is a rational ac-
tion. Specifically, the model assumes the payoff associated with each alternative is ex-ante
uncertain. The DM’s utility from consumption depends not only on the chosen outcome,
but also on which state of the world is realized. The DM, before consumption, is uncertain
3
about the state of the world, but holds a belief (a probability distribution) over the state
space; in a given decision problem, the DM maximizes his expected utility according to his
belief. When the DM interprets the current selection of alternatives as a signal about the
state of the world, his preferences will change across different decision problems in response
to his updated beliefs.
Before expounding the finer points of the model, it is worth considering two examples
to better illustrate why menu-dependent preferences are indeed necessary to explain many
decision making scenarios.
Example 2.1.A (Luce’s diner). On a first date, Katya finds herself in a restaurant at which
she has previously never eaten, and which offers chicken (c) or steak (s). She states her
strict preference for chicken (c  s). However, upon seeing the restaurant also serves frog
legs (f), she now states her strict preference for steak (s  c  f).
While Katya’s preference reversal in the face of a (seemingly) irrelevant alternative can-
not be accommodated by the standard theory (as it violates the weak axiom of revealed
preference (WARP)), it has a simple, intuitive explanation. She prefers steak when the food
is well prepared, but considers chicken more resilient to the inept chef. In the typical restau-
rant, she believes it is unlikely the food will be well cooked, and hence, has a preference for
chicken. However, in the presence of an exotic dish, she deems it is more likely the restaurant
employs an expert chef and so, reverses her preference.
Example 2.2.A (Sen’s date). After dinner, Katya’s date, Mitya, asks whether she would
like to end the date and go home (h) or go next door and get a drink (d). Thinking the date
a success, Katya strictly prefers getting a drink (d  h). However, before she can respond,
Mitya offers a third option: the acquisition and consumption of crystal methamphetamine
(m). Katya now strictly prefers going home (h  d  m).
Here, again, Katya’s rather intuitive behavior cannot be explained by standard theory.
She understands the offer of methamphetamine as a signal regarding Mitya’s character. So,
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while she would prefer to continue the date as long as it is likely Mitya is reputable, his
proposition is sufficient to sway her beliefs away from such a outcome.
These vignettes exemplify two main behaviors of the model. First, it is only the DM’s
perception of uncertainty that is changing; ex-post tastes are fixed. In other words, if the DM
knew with certainty which state of the world was to be realized, he would exhibit a constant
preference across menus. Second, the uncertainty is local. The realization regarding the
quality of the food in one restaurant is not informative about the quality in a different
restaurant; that a previous date was incorruptible is not evidence that a future date will be.3
The first part of this paper axiomatizes a particular type of context-dependence which
adheres to these two restrictions. As in Anscombe and Aumann (1963), I examine a DM who
ranks acts (i.e., functions) from a state space, S, into lotteries over consumption, ∆(X).4
Naturally, given the motivation, not all of X will always be available. The DM’s entertains
a family of preferences over acts, indexed by the subset of X that is currently available.
Therefore, for each A ⊆ X, we see the decision maker’s preference, <A over {f : S → ∆(A)}.
Then, a menu-induced belief representation (MBR) is a single utility index, u : S ×X → R,
and a menu-indexed family of beliefs {µA}A⊆X ⊆ ∆(S) such that
UA(f) =E
µA
(
E
f(s)
(u(s, x))
)
(MBR)
represents <A, where Epi(ϕ) denotes the expectation of the random variable ϕ with respect
to the distribution pi. Fixing the menu, the DM acts as a subjective expected utility maxi-
mizer. The utility index, u, is the same across menus. This is the consequence of the main
axiom, menu consistency . Menu consistency dictates, conditional on the realization of a
particular state, the DM’s preference for alternatives is fixed across menus. Therefore, the
context effect is entirely characterized by the change in the DM’s beliefs regarding the state
space. This places clear limits on the type of context effects that can be accommodated by
a MBR. Since any change in preference is the consequence of shifting beliefs, context depen-
dence cannot reverse preference over outcomes for which the resolution of the state is payoff
3Of course, one could tell a different story where there is a dynamic component by which the DM learns
about the likelihood of states from experience. This is well outside of the current model.
4For a set Y , ∆(Y ) is the set of distributions thereover.
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irrelevant (note, because the tastes are state-dependent, constant acts are not necessarily
certain outcomes).
Although the general model imposes a continuity condition5 –if two menus differ only
slightly, then so do their associated beliefs– it does not otherwise specify any restriction
relating menus with their associated beliefs. The second part of this paper, therefore, explores
how menus might correspond to the beliefs they induce. In particular, what restrictions
correspond to the DM who, acting in Bayesian manner, interprets each menu as a collection
of signals regarding the relative likelihood of each state. And, what further restrictions allow
us to identify the structure of these signals. Following the anything goes result of Shmaya
and Yariv (2015), any MBR can be rationalized by some prior and set of signals. Thus,
without imposing any additional structure, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that
the DM is acting in a Bayesian fashion.
I consider two more restrictive signal structures and their corresponding behavioral re-
strictions. In the first, a partitional signal structure, the DM entertains a partition of the
state space and a prior belief over the likelihood of each state. Each menu induces a belief
whose support coincides with some cell of the partition, and any two menus which induce
beliefs with the same support carry the same informational content. In other words, the
DM believes each menu can only occur in a particular subset of the state space, but, given
a state and the menus possible in that state, the realized menu is chosen uniformly. This
signal structure is of particular interest, as it could be seen as arising from endogenously
from a separating equilibrium in a game between buyers and sellers (see Section 2.4).
In the second signal structure I consider, an elemental signal structure, the DM takes the
elements of the menus as signals rather than the menus themselves. Specifically, he assumes
that in each state, s, the inclusion or exclusion of an element x is decided according to the
toss of a (potentially biased) (s, x)-coin. Therefore, the collection of included elements (the
menu) is the result of a series of conditionally-independent coin tosses.
Revisiting the examples, we can see that MBR preferences and these various information
structures can rationalize the choice patterns.
5This is a vacuous assumption when X is a discrete space.
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Example 2.1.B (Luce’s diner, revisited). Katya’s has MBR preferences and the following
utility index:
u(h, c) = 8 u(h, s) = 16 u(h, f) = 8
u(m, c) = 8 u(m, s) = 6 u(m, f) = 4
where S = {h,m} indicates high and medium quality food, respectively. She initially believes
it equally likely the food is high quality as it is mediocre: µ(h) = 1
2
and µ(m) = 1
2
. She also
believes only (and all) high quality restaurants offer frog legs.
So the menu {c, s} indicates with certainty the food is mediocre, so U{c,s}(c) = 8 > 6 =
U{c,s}(s), while the menu {c, s, f} indicates with certainty the food is good, so U{c,s,f}(s) =
16 > 8 = U{c,s,f}(c).
So a MBR and partitional signal structure can rationalize Katya’s choices over entrees.
Likewise, we can see that an elemental information structure could explain her preferences
regarding Mitya.
Example 2.2.B (Sen’s date, revisited). Katya’s has MBR preferences and the following
utility index:
u(r, h) = 1 u(r, d) = 5 u(r,m) = −10
u(d, h) = 1 u(d, d) = −5 u(d,m) = −10
where S = {r, d} indicates reputable and depraved characters, respectively. She initially
believes µ(r) = 9
10
and µ(b) = 1
10
. She also believes that, while all dates will offer going
home and getting a drink, depraved characters offer meth with probability 1
10
, with reputable
characters with only probability 1
100
.
After updating upon seeing the menu {h, d}, she holds the beliefs µ(r) = 891
981
and µ(d) =
90
981
; her preference is given by U{h,d}(d) =
5(801)
981
> 1 = U{h,d}(h). After the menu {h, d,m},
she holds the beliefs µ(r) = 9
19
and µ(d) = 10
19
; her preference is given by U{h,d,m}(h) = 1 >
−5
19
= U{h,d,m}(d).
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2.1.1 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. The general model is presented in Section 2.2, with the
representation theorem for the main result contained in Section 2.2.3. Section 2.2.1 discusses
the shortcomings of a variant model with state-independent utilities. Section 2.3 explores the
additional restrictions necessary to capture particular signal structures. Section 2.4 infor-
mally explores how menu-dependent beliefs could arise naturally in a strategic environment.
Finally, a survey of relevant literature is found in Section 2.5. All proofs are contained in
the appendix.
2.2 GENERAL MODEL
2.2.1 Structure And Primitives
Let X be a compact and metrizable topological space, representing the grand set of consump-
tion alternatives, and with typical elements x, y, z. Define x? and x? to be two distinguished
elements of X, referred to as universal alternatives, and set F = {x?, x?}. Let P(X) denote
the set of compact subsets of X; endow P(X) with the hausdorff metric (thus, a compact
metric space). Let K(X) denote the subset of P(X) whose elements contain F.6 Typical
elements are A,B,C. Elements of K(X) are called menus, with the interpretation that they
represent the set of currently available consumption alternatives.
For any topological space Y , let ∆(Y ) denote the set of all probability measures on
(Y,B(Y )), where B(Y ) denotes the Borel σ-algebra on Y , endowed with the topology of
weak convergence. If µ ∈ ∆(Y ), and ϕ is a continuous and bounded function ϕ : Y → R,
then
E
µ
(ϕ(y)) =

∫
Y
ϕ(y) dµ(y) whenever Y is infinite, and,∑
Y
ϕ(y)µ(y) whenever Y is finite,
denote the expectation of ϕ with respect to µ.
6I will interpret F as a set of outside options, which explains their universal availability.
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Notice, for all A ∈ K(X), A is compact, (hence separable), so ∆(A) is metrized by
the Le`vy–Prokhorov metric. In the standard abuse of notation, identify x ∈ X with the
degenerate distribution on x. Typical elements of ∆(X) are denoted pi, ρ, τ .
Let S denote a finite state space. Endow ∆(X)S with the product topology. The objects
of choice will be menu-induced acts: for each A ∈ K(X) define FA = ∆(A)S ∼= {f : S →
∆(X)|f(s)[A] = 1}. An act is a commitment to a particular consumption conditional on the
realization of the type space, and so, FA corresponds to the acts available given the menu
A (which put probability 1 on an outcome that is available from A). For each act, f(s) is
the distribution over X obtained for realization s. Again, abusing notation, identify each
pi ∈ ∆(X) with the degenerate act such that pi(s) = pi for all s.
For any f, g ∈ FX , and event E ⊆ S, let f−Eg be the act that coincides with f everywhere
except on E, where it coincides with g. Further, for some α ∈ (0, 1) let αf + (1 − α)g be
the point-wise mixture of f and g (i.e., (αf + (1 − α)g)(s) = αf(s) + (1 − α)g(s) for each
s ∈ S). It is immediate that if f ∈ FA and g ∈ FB then f−Eg and αf +(1−α)g both belong
to FA∪B (in particular, note the case when A = B).
The primitive of the model is the family of preference relations {<A ⊂ FA×FA}A∈K(X).
That is, the DM’s preference over the acts which are available given each possible menu.
With regards to notation, it is assumed whenever ‘f <A g’ is written both f and g belong
to FA. For any relation <, let  and ∼ denote the asymmetric and symmetric components,
respectively.
2.2.2 Axioms
The goal of the most general representation is to provide the basic framework in which a
DM might condition his beliefs regarding the state space on the menu at hand. That is,
the DM treats the set of currently available consumption alternatives as a signal regarding
the likelihood of different states. Given the menu, the DM acts as a subjective expected
utility maximizer, with respect to his menu-induced beliefs. Clearly, each menu-dependent
preference should satisfy the expected utility axioms:
[AX.2.1: EU] For each A ∈ K(X), <A satisfies the expected utility axioms, namely,
9
1. Weak Order. <A is a non-trivial weak order.
2. Independence. For all f, g, h ∈ FA and α ∈ (0, 1), f <A g ⇐⇒ αf +(1−α)h<A αg+
(1− α)h.
3. Continuity. For all f ∈ FA, the sets {g ∈ FA|g<A f} and {g ∈ FA|f <A g} are closed
in FA.
The following well known result (so well known in fact, that it is included only to fix
notation for expositional purposes) shows EU provides the expected utility structure for
each menu-dependent preference.
Proposition 2.1 (Expected Utility). {<A ⊂ FA × FA}A∈K(X) satisfies EU if and only if
for each A ∈ K(A) there exists some continuous and bounded w : S ×X → R such that
UV NMA (f) =
∑
s
(
E
f(s)
(wA(s, x))
)
,
represents <A. Moreover, if wA(s, x) and wˆA(s, x) both represent <A, then wA(s, x) =
aAwˆA(s, x) + bA(s) where aA ∈ R++ and bA(s) ∈ R for all s ∈ S.
Recall that f(s) and g(s) are given, objective probability measures. The index w(·) can
be decomposed into tastes (the utility of consuming an object given the state) and beliefs (the
subjective likelihood of each state). Indeed, choose some probability distribution µ ∈ ∆(S)
such that µ(s) > 0 and let uA(s, x) =
wA(s,x)
µ(s)
; it is clear that
E
µ
(
E
f(s)
(uA(s, x))
)
represents <A. Of course, this creates the classic problem of multiple rationalizing beliefs:
if we consider some other ν ∈ ∆(S) such that ν(s) > 0, then ν and u′A(s, x) = wA(s,x)ν(s) also
represent the same preference. We cannot identify the DM’s tastes for ex-post outcomes or
his beliefs; the two are jointly determined.
The motivation for expanding our data to include the family of menu-induced preferences
is to understand how the menu can alter the beliefs of the DM. In light of this, it becomes
obvious further structure is needed to separate the effect on the perception of uncertainty
(i.e., menu induced changes in belief) from other internal changes in preference (i.e., a change
in tastes).
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The first novel axiom, menu-consistency, is the first step towards such a disentanglement,
and, captures the main behavior behind menu-induced beliefs. It states that the DM’s tastes
for outcomes do not depend on the menu at hand. This implies, any difference in preferences
across menus must be the result of a change in perception of the underlying uncertainty.
Of course, the DM only cares about the assignment to state s if he believes there is a
possibility s will be realized. Therefore, menu-consistency should only hold after realizations
assigned positive probability according to the DM’s subjective assessment. To make such
ideas precise, I first need to consider null events.
Definition. An event, E ⊂ S, is null for menu A (hereafter, null-A) if for all f, g ∈ FA,
f−Eg ∼A f.
Let NA denote the set of states that are null-A, and N denote the set of everywhere null
states: N =
⋂
A∈K(A) NA.
7
Null events, in general, have two indistinguishable interpretations. First, that the DM is
indifferent between all available options conditional on the realization of the null event, E;
second, that the DM places zero probability on E occurring. However, assuming the DM’s
tastes are consistent across different menus (the assumption that will be formalized shortly),
it is possible to differentiate these two interpretations of null events. If a state, s, is null-A,
but there exists a different menu, B, for which the DM displays a strict preference over
elements of A (given realization of s), it must be that s was assigned zero probability when
facing A. This is because the DM cannot be indifferent to all elements of A (contingent on
s) since he displays strict preference in the menu B. This is formalized by evidently-null
events, first considered in Karni et al. (1983).
Definition. An event, E ⊂ S, is evidently null for menu A (hereafter, e-null-A) if E
is null-A and for all s ∈ E there exists some menu B such that
(f−sg) B f
for some f, g in FA∩B. Let EA denote the union of all e-null-A events.8
7Notice, the set of null-A events form a lattice with respect to set inclusion, with NA the maximal element.
8Notice, the set of e-null-A events form a sub-lattice of the lattice of null-A events, with EA the corre-
sponding maximal element.
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With this definition in mind we can now define menu consistency.
[AX.2.2: MC] For all A,B ∈ K(X) and s ∈ S with s /∈ EA ∪EB, and all f ∈ FA, g ∈ FB,
h ∈ FA∩B, and such that f(s) = g(s),
f−sh<A f ⇐⇒ g−sh<B g.
If {<A}A∈K(X) is menu-consistent, the DM’s tastes for outcomes are identical across menus.
To see this, let pi = f(s) = g(s) and ρ = h(s). Then MC states that the DM’s preference
between ρ and pi, in state s, does not depend on the context in which the decision is made
(i.e., does not depend on the menu from which the acts were constructed). Behaviorally,
this indicates that any context effect does not alter the DM’s preferences conditional on
the realization of a particular state. In other words, if the DM knew the true state, there
would be no context effect. It is this restriction that differentiates this model from a more
general interpretation of context effects as psychological biases without foundation in rational
behavior. The change in behavior across menus is not the result of a change in the state-
dependent preference for outcomes (objects about which the DM is ostensibly certain) but
of a change in his perception of the between-state-tradeoffs (the domain of uncertainty).
By the very nature of the problem at hand, we are losing structure in comparison to
the standard model and so the axioms are weaker in comparison. As such, MC does not
characterize a new behavior that is the result of context dependent beliefs, but rather places
limits on how much structure is lost. What structure is retained by MC guarantees we can
find a family of representation for {<A}A∈K(X) that shares a common utility index. In other
words, the primitive is represented by a single utility index and a family of menu-induced
beliefs. It is important to note that this does not rule out preference reversals, even over
constant acts. Each menu carries with it a perception of uncertainty, and can therefore
change the DM’s preferences for acts. However, given menu-consistency, any preference
reversal is due entirely to the change in beliefs, and not because of changes in ex-post tastes.
Setting f = g in the definition, consistency guarantees that the ordering between f−sρ and
f−spi hold regardless of the ambient menu.
Under the definition of a frame as (seemingly irrelevant) information which alters the
DM’s perception of uncertainty, then EU and MC exactly capture the behavior where the
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DM uses the menu as a frame. Unfortunately, from a practical vantage, this is insufficient,
as the problem of non-uniqueness of beliefs persists. When tastes and beliefs cannot be
separated, we cannot identify the avenue by which context effects alter the DM’s choice
process.
To overcome the issue of multiple rationalizing beliefs, Anscombe and Aumann (1963)
restricted preferences to be state independent (i.e., in every non-null state, the ranking over
distributions is the same). State dependency is a very restrictive assumption; it interprets
states as abstract probabilistic events that have no meaning outside of their use as betting
devices. Beyond this philosophical issue, state-dependence is a necessary requirement to
capture the full gamut of context effects (this necessity is made precise in Remark 2.4).
For these reasons, this model weakens state-independence to apply only over F. UV plays
the same roles as state independence (equivalently, monotonicity). By ensuring, over the
relatively small domain F, that preferences in each state coincide, beliefs can be uniquely
recovered from choice data. Under the interpretation of universal elements as outside options,
it is natural that the ranking of these elements does not change across different menus.
[AX.2.3: UV] For all A ∈ K(X) and s ∈ S with s /∈ NA
f−sx? A f−sx?.
for all f ∈ FA.
It is also of interest (when X is infinite) to understand when the context effect acts in a
continuous manner.
[AX.2.4: CC] If {An}n∈N converges to A in K(X), then for all α ∈ (0, 1),
{{g ∈ F? | g<An αx? + (1− α)x?}}n∈N , and{{g ∈ F? | αx? + (1− α)x?<An g}}n∈N
converge to {g ∈ F?|g<A αx? + (1− α)x?} and {g ∈ F?|αx? + (1− α)x?<A g}, respectively,
in P(X).
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In other words, the menu-induced contour sets, when restricted to universal acts, converge
whenever the menus converge. Because CC applies only to universal acts, it restricts only
that beliefs converge (and has nothing to say about the change in tastes across menus).
Convergence, of both the menu and the contour sets, is with respect to Hausdorff metric
in the respective ambient spaces. So, CC states that as menus become close, the relative
weights placed on each state must also converge. Notice, while the sufficiency of CC is
clear, the necessity relies on the fact that the utility derived from the set of universal acts is
bounded.
2.2.3 Menu Induced Belief Representation
Theorem 2.2 (Menu Induced Belief Representation). (a) {<A}A∈K(X) satisfies EU, MC,
UV, and CC if and only if there exists a state-dependent utility index, u : S × X → R,
such that u(·, x?) ≡ 1 and u(·, x?) ≡ 0, and such that the projections u|A are bounded and
continuous for all A ∈ K(X), and a continuous function,9 {µA ∈ ∆(S)}A∈K(X), such that
for all A ∈ K(X),
UA(f) =E
µA
(
E
f(s)
(u(s, x))
)
(MBR)
represents <A, and µA(s) = 0 if and only if s ∈ EA ∪N .
(b) Moreover, the family of beliefs {µA ∈ ∆(S)}A∈K(X) is unique and the utility index, u(·),
is unique up to null states.
Proof. In appendix A.2.
The proof is quite straightforward. First, EU provides a linear representation for each
<A. By UV these representations can be decomposed uniquely into a tastes (over A) and
beliefs, where the utility index is normalized as in the statement of the theorem. Then, these
utility indexes can be stitched together to provide a single u over the whole of X. Finally,
MC ensures that this common index will jointly represent each <A and CC that beliefs will
change continuously.
9i.e., µ(·) : K(X) → ∆(S) is continuous with respect to ∆(S) when endowed with the topology of weak
convergence.
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Because the utility index is fixed across decision problems, the shifting of probabilities is
the only avenue for preferences to change. Thus, if an act f is preferred to g on a state-by-
state basis, then it is preferred to g in every menu (this is, of course, precisely the content of
MC). It is through the menu-dependent beliefs that this structure allows for framing effects,
were by the DM’s preferences change in the face of new alternatives. It follows that the
types of preference reversals that are allowable is limited.
2.2.4 State Independence
In light of axiom UV, it may seem parsimonious to quit worrying about the distinguished
elements, x? and x?, and require state independence outright. This can, in fact, be accom-
plished by strengthening MC.
[AX.2.2∗: SMC] For all A,B ∈ K(X) and s ∈ S with s /∈ EA and s′EB, and all f ∈ FA,
g ∈ FB, h ∈ FA∩B, and such that f(s) = g(s′),
f−sh<A f ⇐⇒ g−s′h<B g.
SMC states that tastes are consistent, not only across menus (if A 6= B) but also across
states (if s 6= s′). As such, it implies the canonical form of state independence for each <A.
When MC is replaced by SMC in Theorem 2.2, the resulting representation coincides except
the utility index, u : X → R is state-independent :
USIA (f) =E
µA
(
E
f(s)
(u(x))
)
, (SI-MBR)
represents <A.10 The existence of the family of beliefs, their uniqueness, and the uniqueness
of the utility index are all the same as in Theorem 2.2. While this approach is only a small
deviation from the general representation, it implies that there is no uncertainty regarding
the preference of constant acts. As discussed before, in order for context effects to have
observable content, it must be that the underlying uncertainty is payoff relevant. Together,
these facts imply that SMC prohibits the DM from changing his preference over constant
acts between different menus.
10Notice, UV is somewhat redundant in the presence of SMC. In fact, if we are willing to entertain a bit
of notational juggling, we can forego it entirely.
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Remark 2.3. Let {<A}A∈K(X) be represented by (SI-MBR). Then for all A,B ∈ K(X),
and pi, ρ ∈ ∆(A ∩B), pi<A ρ ⇐⇒ pi<B ρ.
Remark 2.3 can be seen by noting that USIA (pi) = Epi(u(x)), which does not depend on A.
2.3 BAYESIAN FRAMES
The general representation, (MBR), allows for context effects by which the DM’s preferences
over acts depends on the menu of currently available outcomes. It does not, however, offer
any insight into the connection between the menu at hand and the effect it exerts on decision
making. This section provides an exploration into the behavioral implications of particular
context effects.
It is of interest to identify the restrictions on behavior that ensure the DM is acting
rationally with respect to some information structure that gives rise to the family of menu-
induced beliefs. Consider the interpretation that the DM entertains a prior belief over the
state space, µ ∈ ∆(S), and observes, along with the menu, some signals, drawn from a (finite)
signal space, Θ. The DM also entertains a likelihood function that specifies the likelihood of
a given signal, contingent on the true state, l : Θ× S → R+. Under this interpretation, we
say the information structure (µ, l,Θ) generates {µA|A ∈ K(X)}, if the DM’s menu-induced
beliefs are the posteriors generated by observing the signals. To keep things notationally
clean, through this subsection, I assume that X is finite and N = ∅. I always assume the
prior, µ, has full support. These assumptions ensure the updating procedures are binding
everywhere, as it alleviates the concern regarding 0 probability events.
Of course, for the posteriors to be indexed by menus there must be a connection between
the signals and the menu. At the most general level, the two coincide: Θ = K(X).
Definition. An information structure based on menus, (µ, l,K(X)), generates {µA|A ∈
K(X)}, if
µA(s) =
µ(s)l(A, s)
Eµ(l(A, s′))
(2.1)
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and
∑
K(X) l(A, s) = 1,
∑
s l(A, s) > 0 for all A ∈ K(X) and s ∈ S.11
Unfortunately, the requirement that the DM entertains some generating (µ, l,K(X)),
provides no testable implications. In other words, every MBR can be described by some
prior and likelihood function over menu realizations. The ability to choose both the signals
and the prior provides enough degrees of freedom such that bayesianism can never be ruled
out.
Proposition 2.4. Let {<A}A∈K(X) be represented by some (MBR), with beliefs {µA|A ∈
K(X)}. Then there exists some (µ, l,K(X)) that generates {µA|A ∈ K(X)} as in (2.1).
Proof. In appendix A.2.
This result is a corollary of Lemma 1 in Shmaya and Yariv (2015). Setting Θ = K(X)
assumes no relation between the signals associated with different menus, and it is this gener-
ality that renders behavior wholly unconstrained. However, under more specific assumptions
regarding the structure of the signals, there are falsifiable restrictions on observable prefer-
ence. Thus, while we can never rule out the possibility that the DM is acting in a Bayesian
manner with respect to some signal space, we can rule out particular models of information.
First, consider a partitional information structure. Under this model of information,
each menu obtains only on a cell of a partition of the state space, and any menu that obtains
on the event E contains the same informational content. That is, we set Θ = K(A)/∼˙ for
some equivalence relation ∼˙ (with the equivalence class containing A, denoted by [A]).
Definition. A partitional information structure, (µ, l,K(X)/∼˙), generates {µA|A ∈ K(X)}
if
µA(s) =
µ(s)l([A], s)
Eµ(l([A], s′))
(2.2)
and l([A], s) ∈ {0, 1} for all ([A], s) ∈ K(X)/∼˙ × S, and ∑
s∈S
(l([A], s) · l([B], s)) > 0 implies
[A] = [B].
11The first requirement is equivalent to
∑
K(X) l(A, s) > 0, and is included in the current form only for its
interpretational content. Under this normalization, we can think of l(A, s) as the probability of seeing menu
A in state s. The second requirement states that all menus are ex-ante possible. This ensures that 2.1 is
always well defined.
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The requirement that the likelihoods are binary is indicative of the fact that within
equivalence classes all menus have the same informational content. Hence, any two menus
that have the same support, must induce the same beliefs (and therefore, we can normalize
the likelihood functions to 1). The requirement that l([A], s) · l([B], s) = 0 for any [A] 6= [B]
ensures that the supports of the distributions are disjoint, and hence, form a partition of S.
[AX.2.5: PS] For all A,B ∈ K(X), such that N cA ∩N cB 6= ∅, and f, g ∈ FA∩B, we have
f <A g ⇐⇒ f <B g.
PS dictates that any two menus sharing a non-null state must induce the same preference
over acts. Because the general representation fixes tastes across different menus, PS implies
that if the two menus induce beliefs with a overlapping supports, those beliefs must coincide
completely. It is clear that this captures the behavior generated by a partitional signal
structure.
Theorem 2.5. Let {<A}A∈K(X) be represented by some (MBR), with beliefs {µA|A ∈
K(X)}. Then, there exists some (µ, l,K(X)/∼˙) that generates {µA|A ∈ K(X)} as in (2.2)
if and only if {<A}A∈K(X) satisfies PS.
Proof. In appendix A.2.
An even more restrictive signal structure would be Θ = X with signals that are condi-
tionally independent. Under this interpretation, the element x is made available (in state s)
according to the flip of an (s, x)-coin. Conditional on the state, the coins are independent
of one another, although their bias can vary with both the element and the state.
Definition. An information structure based on elements, (µ, l,X), with conditionally inde-
pendent signals generates {µA|A ∈ K(X)} if
µA(s) =
µ(s)
∏
x∈A l(x, s)
∏
y/∈A(1− l(y, s))
Eµ
(∏
x∈A l(x, s
′)
∏
y/∈A(1− l(y, s′))
) , (2.3)
and l(x, s) ∈ (0, 1) for all (x, s) ∈ X \F× S, and l(x?, s) = l(x?, s) = 1 for all s ∈ S.
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The requirement that likelihoods lie in the interior of (0, 1) is tantamount to assuming
there are no null states, and ensures that (2.3) is well defined for all menus and states. To
include null states in such a set up adds little intuition and greatly increases the level of
attention to technical detail that needs to be paid. The requirement regarding x? and x?,
stems from the fact that they are necessarily realized in every state, and hence, uninformative.
A menu, A, acts as the frame induced by the relative probabilities of inclusion on each
x-coin with x ∈ A and exclusion for each y-coin with y /∈ A. The fact that signals are
independent, indicates that the inclusion or exclusion of a particular element carries the same
informational content regardless of the composition of the menu. Of course, even though
the informational value is the same, the effect of this information on beliefs is relative to
the information provided by the other elements included (or excluded) from the menu. This
behavior is captured by the following axiom.
[AX.2.6: IID] For all x ∈ X, and A,B ∈ K(X), such that x /∈ A∪B, and states s, s′ /∈ NA∪
NB, if for some distributions pi
A, ρA,∈ ∆(A) and piB, ρB,∈ ∆(B): (x?)−spiA ∼A (x?)−s′ρA
and (x?)−spiB ∼B (x?)−s′ρB, then for all α ∈ (0, 1),
(x?)−spiA<A∪x(x?)−s′(αρA + (1− α)x?) ⇐⇒ (x?)−spiB <B∪x(x?)−s′(αρB + (1− α)x?).
(2.4)
IID states that the proportional change in belief, in response to the inclusion of an
element x, is the same across all menus. Without x, obtaining piA in state s and ρA in
state s′ (and x? everywhere else) are equally appealing, given menu A. When x is included,
the beliefs change (i.e., the observation of the x-coin switches from exclude to include), and
therefore, so do preferences. IID states that the same proportional change in preferences
must occur, regardless of the initial menu. So if the change in preferences is such that, piA in
state s is now indifferent to αρA+(1−α)x? in state s′ (and x? everywhere else) given A, then
the same α proportional shift preserves indifference when moving from B to B ∪ x. This
behavior, along with the general representation, exactly captures the updating procedure
given by (2.3).
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Theorem 2.6. Let {<A}A∈K(X) be represented by some (MBR), with beliefs {µA|A ∈
K(X)}, all of which have full support. Then, there exists some (µ, l,X) that generates
{µA|A ∈ K(X)} as in (2.3) if and only if {<A}A∈K(X) satisfies IID.
Proof. In appendix A.2.
2.4 FROM EQUILIBRIUM TO MBR
This section briefly (and informally) describes how a MBR could arise as the natural con-
sequence of a game between buyers and sellers (i.e., the observed behavior of the buyer
in equilibrium satisfies the MBR axioms). Consider the environment where, first, a seller
constructs a menu of goods to offer the buyer at posted prices, and then, the buyer decides
whether or not to buy any of the offered goods. In other words, the sellers act as stores,
who can curate their selections. Sellers are privately endowed with a type (read: the seller’s
quality or ability), and this type governs both the cost of stocking a particular good, and
also, the utility a buyer derives from its consumption. In this environment, under standard
single-crossing conditions, different types of sellers might differentiate themselves in equilib-
rium by offering different menus of goods. Hence, in such an equilibrium, the sellers beliefs
regarding the type of seller, and hence the value of the offered goods, is dependent on the
offered menu. Specifically, if the equilibrium is in pure strategies, this induces a MBR with
partitional signal structure.
Example 2.1.C (Luce’s diner, one last time). There are three types of restaurants, high
(h), medium (m), and low (l) quality. Each can offer any selection of chicken (c), steak (s),
or frog legs (f). The cost for a particular restaurant to keep an item on the menu (train the
chef, provide a wine pairing, keep fresh ingredients, etc), is given by the following matrix:
ch(c) = 1 ch(s) = 2 ch(c) = 6
cm(c) = 1 cm(s) = 4 cm(c) = 10
cl(c) = 2 cl(s) = 6 cl(c) = 10
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A patron, given that the quality of the food is known, has preferences (in dollar terms)
according to
u(h, c) = 8 u(h, s) = 16 u(h, f) = 8
u(m, c) = 8 u(m, s) = 6 u(m, f) = 4
u(l, c) = 4 u(l, s) = 1 u(l, f) = 0
Each type of restaurant can select any subset of the main courses (along with posted prices)
to offer potential diners. Given the observed menu and the subsequently updated beliefs, a
diner will select the course that maximizes her utility (her expected utility from consumption
less the posted price). All diners can take an outside option with utility 0.
Assume, initially, the diner has a uniform prior over the different types of restaurants.
Then the following is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The high type offers {〈c:8〉, 〈s:16〉, 〈f :8〉},
the medium type offers {〈c:8〉, 〈s:6〉} and the low type offers {〈c:4〉}. As this is a separating
equilibrium, after observing any of these menus, the diner places probability 1 on the cor-
responding type, and chooses s, c, c, respectively. When seeing any other menu, she places
probability 1 on low, and takes the outside option.
Notice that in this example, both the utilities for outcomes and the beliefs after the
observation {c, s, f} and {c, s} map exactly to Katya’s tastes and beliefs given the same
observations. As such, the behavior of buyers in such a separating equilibrium would corre-
spond exactly to the MBR with the partitional information structure described in Example
1.B.
2.5 LITERATURE REVIEW
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) developed the notion of framing –the idea that a decisions
are influenced by their surrounding context. Framing has a large literature, both in the
theoretical, experimental, and psychological settings Kahneman and Tversky (1984); Rubin-
stein and Salant (2008); Tversky and Shafir (1992). A particular type of framing concerns
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the consideration of menu, or currently available alternatives, referred to in the literature
as context dependence. In contrast to this model, context dependence is often associated
with particular psychological heuristics such as a basing choice on the difference between
the attributes of outcomes or reluctance to choose extreme outcomes Simonson and Tversky
(1992).
That a menu may contain information relevant to the DM’s choice over the objects it
contains was first articulated by Luce and Raiffa (1957) and expounded upon by Sen (1993,
1997). Sen describes the notion of the epistemic value of a menu with more tact than I could
hope to achieve: “What is offered for choice can give us information about the underlying
situation, and can thus influence our preference over the alternatives, as we see them. For
example, the chooser may learn something about the person offering the choice on the basis
of what he or she is offering.” It is by paraphrasing/formalizing the vignettes in Luce and
Raiffa (1957) and Sen (1997) that I constructed the examples that run throughout this paper.
There have been several decision theory papers which deal with characterizing framing
effects that stem from informational sources. Ahn and Ergin (2010) considers a DM whose
beliefs, and hence preferences, depend on the description of the state space. There a depiction
of the state space is a partition of it, and preferences are defined over all acts measurable
with respect to the partition. The interpretation is that different descriptions of the state
space might alter the DM of contingencies which he would otherwise be unaware. Bourgeois-
Gironde and Giraud (2009) construct a model of “rational” framing in the domain of Bolker–
Jeffrey decision theory. They take as motivation, and provide an axiomatic foundation for,
the observation of Sher and McKenzie (2006) that (seemingly) logically equivalent statements
might in fact contain different information because the choice to use one description over
another might itself impart information. As such, Bourgeois-Gironde and Giraud (2009)
consider a set of frames and allow two different, but logically equivalent, statements that
belong to different frames to induce different beliefs of the DM.
The epistemic aspect of decision problems has been studied by Kochov (2010) in a model
that shares many philosophical motivations with this one. Kochov’s model defines a decision
problem as a collection of menus, and imposes the canonical axioms (i.e., Dekel et al. (2001))
on a preference relation over each decision problem to back out a problem-specific subjective
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state space. The primary mechanism by which epistemic content alters the decision makers
preference in Kochov’s model is by changing the composition of the subjective state-space
(i.e., the difference in preference is mitigated through a change in tastes, rather than beliefs).
The interpretation of menus revealing different unforeseen contingencies is problematic from
the modelers point of view: it is impossible to observe a decision maker who is both aware
and unaware of a particular contingency. This paper, on the other hand, explains the same
behavior by confining the context effect to be a local one.
The appeal to a DM who holds multiple beliefs has been explored in the literature on state
dependent preferences. Karni et al. (1983) propose a DM who ranks alternatives after some
hypothetical event with a known probability. Like this paper, there is an imposed consistency
in ex-post tastes across different decision problems. Also related, is Karni and Safra (2014),
which takes a somewhat converse approach. There, the decision maker has beliefs regarding
his state dependent preferences, or states of mind which induce a preference over menus,
rather than the menu inducing the belief about the state space. As such, it is the DM’s
beliefs regarding a subjective state space (his state of mind) that is invariant across decision
problems.
It is also worth noting that models of endogenous reference dependence can be interpreted
as context dependence. In these models the decision problem is associated with a reference
level of utility by which the DM evaluates each outcome Koszegi and Rabin (2006); Ok et al.
(2015). As such, adding outcomes that will effect the reference point will thereby change the
DM’s preferences. These models can be thought of as a specific case of epistemic concerns;
the reference point is information about some underlying state variable. A decision problem
associated with reference point, r, is an indicator that the state-of-the-world is sr.
Finally, this paper is related to the decision theoretic literature on identifying the con-
ditions under which a decision maker is Bayesian updating with respect to subjective (and
hence unseen) signals, for example, Lehrer and Teper (2015). In particular, the general
model can be seen as a special case of the subjective signal structure discussed in Shmaya
and Yariv (2015).
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3.0 PLANS OF ACTIONS12
In which Ivan, in trying to make an investment, learns, simul-
taneously, that (i) AAPL and GOOG move more or less in
tandem, and, having only enough capital for a single share, that
(ii) such information is of no value.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Exploration models capture a common trade off between an immediate payoff and new
information, which can potentially impact future decisions and payoffs.13 In such models an
agent has to choose, every period, one project out of several in which to invest. By observing
the outcome of an investment, the agent learns both about the chosen project and, in case
the outcomes across different projects are correlated, about other projects as well. Each
decision is predicated on the tradeoff between the immediate value of the investment and
the future value of the information obtained by observing the outcome. Therefore, the
agent’s optimal investment strategy is a function of the history of observed outcomes, the
projects that will be feasible in the future, and her beliefs over the true joint distribution
of the outcomes of each project. While it is the correlation between projects that allows
the agent to extrapolate her observations to future outcomes of the different projects, we
show in this paper that contemporaneous correlations (i.e., the likelihood of an outcome of
12ROEE TEPER IS A COAUTHOR OF THIS CHAPTER.
13Exploration models were introduced by Robbins (1952) and have been extensively studied in the statistics
literature (as bandit problems), and widely incorporated in economic models (as search problems, stopping
problems, research and development, experimentation, portfolio design, etc). See Berry and Fristedt (1985)
for an overview of classic results within the statistics literature. For a survey of economic applications see
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2008).
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project a in a period given the outcome of project b in the same period) carry no economic
content in such exploration problems. In other words, when solving an exploration problem,
contemporaneous correlations can be ignored without changing the set of optimal strategies.
Consider, for example, a scenario in which Ivan has to invest each period in one of two
projects. The outcome of each project depends on the state of the economy, which could
be either high or low with equal probabilities, independently across periods. In case the
state is high, both projects yield high outcomes, and if the state is low, low outcomes.
In particular, the projects are (fully) correlated. Note, each project yields high and low
outcomes with equal probabilities. Alternatively, consider another scenario in which the
projects are independent (that is, the outcomes do not depend on the state of the economy)
and both yield each outcome with equal probabilities. Since Ivan needs to commit to exactly
one project in each period, his investment strategy will depend on the marginal probabilities
of each project. Thus, Ivan’s investment strategy will be the same in these two scenarios.
Putting differently, only the process of marginal distributions affect the optimal investment
strategy; we need not worry about the effects of contemporaneous correlations on the optimal
strategy.
This example is stylized; the specified projects are fully correlated and there is no learning
(that is, the agent knows exactly what is the underlying distribution governing the state of
the economy). We show, however, that the example can be generalized to any exploration
problem where the outcome generating distribution (the object which the agent is attempting
to learn) is stationary.14 In particular, any such problem can be represented as another
exploration problem in which the Bayesian model dictates that projects are not correlated,
without affecting the agent’s preferences over strategies, and hence the optimal strategy.
While this result allows an agent to simplify her decision problem, it also has a down-
side from the modeler’s vantage. We show there is an inherent limitation on the type of
beliefs that can be identified by observing an agent’s preferences in such decision making
environments; the general stochastic process governing beliefs can only be partially identi-
fied. Given an agent’s preference over investment strategies in the two scenarios discussed
14We believe similar issues will arise for Markovian transitions. This seems to require different tools and
we expect the characterizations to be different than in the stationary case.
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above, there is no behavior that would identify which of the two scenarios the agent has
in mind. Fortunately, even under the partial identification, we show there are meaningful
behavioral restrictions allowing the modeler to test whether the agent is acting according to
some Bayesian model.
Because in exploration environments the agent can chose only one project in each pe-
riod, her preferences over the different strategies depend only on the margins of her beliefs.
And vice versa, the agent can only reveal—through choice or preference over investment
strategies—her history dependent beliefs over each project separately. To show this, we pro-
vide a decision theoretic model, where we introduce a new dynamic and recursive framework
capturing the exploration-exploitation tradeoffs faced by a decision maker (henceforth, DM).
Our primitive is a preference relation over the different strategies that can be implemented
by an agent facing a bandit problem. In this framework we first provide the behavioral (ax-
iomatic) restrictions of subjective discounted expected utility maximization. The principal
observation arising from our result is that the representation pins down only the processes
of marginal beliefs of the different projects separately.
To better understand the economic relevance of this identification, we proceed with an
analysis of a statistical framework. Here we consider stochastic processes that are determined
by observing the outcome of a single project in each period, where potentially different
projects are chosen across periods. We refer to these processes as observable, in light of the
fact that they are precisely the output of our decision theoretic result. If, to the contrary,
we had been able to observe the process over the joint realizations of all experiments, then
the classic exchangeability property (or symmetry, as referred to in the decision theoretic
terminology) would characterize Bayesianism. Given the limits of what can been observed, we
cannot resort directly to such classical results. We provide instead a necessary and sufficient
condition, Across-Action Symmetry (AA-SYM), for the observable processes to be consistent
with an exchangeable process over the collection of all projects. It is not surprising, we obtain
only a partial identification; a consistent exchangeable process, when it exists, need not be
unique. We show however, that whenever our condition is met, there exists an exchangeable
process, consistent with the observables, wherein there is no (contemporaneous) correlation
across the different actions. Moreover, such a consistent exchangeable process is unique.
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Finally, we show AA-SYM can be written in terms of the decision theoretic primitive.
Combining these results, we conclude that the DM’s subjective joint distribution is not
fully identified. Put differently, contemporaneous correlations across actions do not affect
preferences and optimal strategies in bandit problems. Nonetheless, capitalizing on the
sufficiency of AA-SYM for the marginals to be consistent with an underlying exchangeable
model, we obtain an axiomatization for classic Bayesianism in any bandit problems.
In this framework a DM is tasked with ranking sequential and contingent choice objects:
the action taken by the agent at any stage depends on the outcomes of previous actions.
Formally, our primitive is a preference over plans of action (PoAs). Each action, a, is
associated with a set of consumption prizes the action might yield, Sa. Then, a PoA is
recursively defined as a lottery over pairs (a, f), where a is an action and f is a mapping
that specifies the continuation PoA for each possible outcome in Sa. Theorem 3.2 shows
that the construction of PoAs is well defined. So, a PoA specifies an action to be taken each
period that can depend on the outcome of all previously taken actions.
The actions in our model is in direct analogy to the arms of bandit problem (or actions
in a repeated game). PoAs correspond to the set of all (possibly mixed) strategies in these
environments. Note, however, the DM’s perception of which outcome in Sa will result form
taking action a is not specified. This is subjective and should be identified from the DM’s
preferences over PoAs. As discussed above, the main question is to what extent these beliefs
can be identified and what are the economic implications of belief identification in this
framework?
Theorem 3.3 axiomatizes preferences over PoAs of a DM who at each history entertains
a belief regarding the outcome of future actions. That is, at each history h and for every
action a, the DM entertains a belief µh,a over the possible outcomes Sa; µh,a(x) is the DM’s
subjective probability that action a will yield outcome x, contingent on having observed the
history h. Given this family of beliefs, the DM acts as a subjective discounted expected
utility maximizer, valuing a PoA p, after observing h, according to a Subjective Expected
Experimentation (SEE ) representation:
Uh(p) = Ep
[
Eµh,a [u(x) + δUh′(f(x))]
]
, (SEE)
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where h′ is the updated history (following h) when action a is taken and x is realized. All
the parameters of the model –the consumption utility over outcomes, u, the discount factor,
δ, and the history dependent subjective beliefs, {µh,a}h∈H,a∈A– are identified uniquely.
Our setup requires a formulation of a novel axiom termed proportionality (PRP): at
any given history, the manner in which the DM evaluates continuation problems must be
proportional to the manner in which she evaluates the consumption utility. Indeed, in order
to ensure that the DM is acting consistently with a family of beliefs it must be that she
assesses the value of each action according to the expectation of the consumption utility and
discounted continuation utility it induces. Furthermore, it is necessary that the probabilistic
weight she places on a given consumption utilities is the same as the weight she places on
the corresponding continuation value.
Theorem 3.3 shows that PRP, along with (some of the) standard behavioral conditions
for discounted expected utility, is necessary and sufficient for an SEE representation. While
the axiomatization does not point to the optimal strategy in general strategic experimenta-
tion problems, which is known to be a hard problem to solve when actions are correlated, it
provides (like most axiomatization theorems) a unifying guidance as to what might or might
not be ruled out.
The identification result accompanying the representation concerns the marginal beliefs,
{µh,a}h∈H,a∈A, and not a stochastic process over all actions, as is the starting point in the
standard approach to bandit problems. To be clear, this is not a limitation of the current
setup any more than of bandit problems in general: observing a single pull of an arm each
period simply does not provide sufficient data to identify the joint distribution. As such,
we would like to know when the family of identified beliefs is consistent with an underly-
ing exchangeable process. Further, given consistency, what are the limits of identification
regarding this exchangeable model. To answer these questions we turn to the statistical
model.
The Statistical Model. As above, there is a set of actions, A, each element of which, a,
is associated with the outcome space Sa. We are considering a family of processes over the
outcomes of the different actions—where each period one and only one action is observed.
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Let T = (T1, T2, ...), where Ti ∈ {Sa}a∈A for every i. Let T denote the set of all such
sequences. For any T in T , let ζT be a distribution over T = (T1, T2, ...). We refer to these
distributions as our observables; and, denoting S =
∏
a∈A Sa, we assume a distribution, ζ,
over SN is not observable.
We are motivated by the decision theoretic identification of {µh,a}h∈H,a∈A. While a
process ζ over SN specifies each µh,a (as the ζ-probability that following history h, action a
will yield outcome x), it conveys strictly more information. For example, the ζ-probability
that action a yields outcome x at the same time that action b yields outcome y has no
counterpart in the identified family of marginals. The family of processes {ζT}T∈T , on the
other hand, contains exactly the same information as {µh,a}h∈H,a∈A. In both models, we do
not have direct access to the probability of joint realizations of different actions. We only
have access to the marginal distributions. Therefore, the exercise at hand concerns a direct
translation of the decision theoretic observables into the statistical language.
In this framework, we introduce a condition referred to as Across-Action Symmetry (AA-
SYM) and Theorem 3.5 shows that it is necessary and sufficient for the observables to be
consistent with an exchangeable process over the joint realizations of all actions in every
period (that is, SN). Informally, AA-SYM states that the probability of obtaining outcome
x when taking action a followed by outcome y when taking action b, is the same as the
probability of obtaining outcome y when taking action b followed by outcome x when taking
action a. This is reminiscent of the symmetry (exchangeability) property, but note, in each
period the outcome space may change as different actions can be taken.
The inherent observability constraint in this framework bears a cost; the exchangeable
process with which our observables are consistent is typically not unique. Bearing in mind
this generic non-uniqueness, we introduce what we term strongly exchangeable processes –a
subclass of the widely studied exchangeable processes. We elaborate. Assume there is an
underlying distribution governing the joint realization of actions that is inter-temporally i.i.d.
This distribution is not known exactly, but there exists a prior probability over what it might
be. The prior is updated every period upon the observation of the realization of actions. Due
to de Finetti (1931); Hewitt and Savage (1955), these classical Bayesian updating processes
are referred to as exchangeable. In a strongly exchangeable process, where the periodic
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state-space takes a product structure, the set of possible underlying distributions are such
that outcomes across actions are independent. Thus, a strongly exchangeable process is one
in which, conditional on the distributional parameter, outcomes are both inter-temporally
and contemporaneously independent.
Despite strong exchangeability having more structure than classic exchangeability, it
imparts no additional restrictions in our statistical model. Theorem 3.7 shows that a family
of observables satisfying AA-SYM is consistent with a strongly exchangeable process, and
this process is unique. We conclude, strong exchangeability is the full characterization of
Bayesianism in our statistical framework and the lack of contemporaneous correlations carry
no constraints beyond AA-SYM.
Finally, returning to our decision theoretic model, we show that AA-SYM can be rep-
resented as an axiom over the primitives. Proposition 3.8 states that the additional axiom
is both necessary and sufficient for the beliefs of an SEE representation to follow an ex-
changeable processes. This, of course, implies that two decision makers whose beliefs (as
exchangeable processes) induce the same family of observable processes, will have the same
preferences over strategies in any Bandit problem. In other words, Proposition 3.8 implies
that contemporaneous correlations across actions do not impose any additional restrictions
beyond classic Bayesianism when analyzing bandit problems, and no behavior can identify
them in such an environment.
Organization. The paper is broadly broken into the two halves outlined above; Section
3.2 contains the decision theoretic framework, and Sections 3.3 and 3.4 the statistical one.
Within Section 3.2, we first formally introduce the environment and the construction of
plans of action (Sections 3.2.1). Next, we provide the axioms and representation result for
an SEE structure (Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3). Section 3.3 introduces the observable processes
that represent SEE belief structures. Here, we provide a statistical condition on observable
processes, AA-SYM, so that the SEE belief structure is consistent with an exchangeable
process. Section 3.4 introduces the notion of strong exchangeability and presents our (non)
uniqueness result. The translation of AA-SYM back into decision theoretic terms is pre-
sented in Section 3.4.1. Section 3.5.1 discusses the related literature. An informal discussion
30
regarding how a decision theoretic model would incorporate exogenous information appears
in Section 3.5.2. Lastly, Section 3.5.3 discusses the point of disagreement among Bayesians
in environments of experimentation. All the proofs are in the Appendices.
3.2 THE DECISION THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
3.2.1 Choice Objects
The purpose of the current section is to construct the different choice objects, termed plans
of action (PoAs). The primitive of our model, as presented in the subsequent section, is a
preference relation over all PoAs.
Let X be a finite set of outcomes, endowed with a metric dX . Outcomes are consumption
prizes. For any metric space, M , let K(M) denote the set non-empty compact subsets of
M , endowed with the Hausdorff metric. Likewise, for any metric space M , denote ∆B(M)
as the set of Borel probability distributions over M , endowed with the weak*-topology, and
∆(M) the subset of distributions with denumerable support.
Let A be a compact and metrizable set of actions. Each action, a, is associated with a
set of outcomes, Sa ∈ K(X), which is called the support of the action. We assume the map
a 7→ Sa is continuous and surjective. For any metric space M , let A ⊗M = {(a, f)|a ∈
A, f : Sa → M} = {(a, {(xi,mi)}i∈I) ∈ A × K(X ×M)|
⋃
i∈I{xi} = Sa and xi 6= xj,∀i 6=
j ∈ I)}, endowed with the subspace topology inherited from the product topology. By the
continuity of a 7→ Sa we know that the relevant subspace is closed and hence the topology
on A⊗M is compact whenever M is. We can think of f as the assignment into M for each
outcome in the support of action a. For any f : X → M we will abuse notation and write
(a, f) rather than (a, f |Sa).
With these definitions we can define PoAs. A PoA is a tree of actions, such that each
period the DM receives a lottery (with denumerable support) over actions conditional on the
outcomes for each of the previous actions.
We begin by constructing slightly more general objects. Set R0 = ∆
B(A); a 0-period
31
plan is a lottery over actions. Given an action, an element of its support is realized and the
plan is over. Then a 1-period plan, r1, is a lottery over actions, and continuation mappings
into 0-period plans: r1 ∈ ∆B(A⊗ P0). Given the realization of an action-continuation pair,
(a, f), in the support of r1, and the realized element of the support, x ∈ Sa, the DM receives
a 0-period plan, as given by f(x). Continuing in this fashion, we can define recursively,
Rn = ∆
B(A⊗Rn−1).
Define R∗ =
∏
n≥0Rn. R
∗ is the set of all PoAs (including inconsistent plans and plans
whose support is arbitrary). We first restrict ourselves to the set of consistent elements of
R∗: those elements such that, the (n − 1)-period plan implied by the n-period plan is the
same as the (n−1)-period plan. To see why this is important, consider an element, rn, of Rn.
The plan rn specifies an action to be taken in period 0 and, conditional on the outcome, the
plan rn−1 which itself specifies the action to be taken in the next period and the continuation
plan rn−2 for the next, etc. If we stop this process at any period m < n, ignoring whatever
continuation plans are assigned, the output is an m period plan. Hence, each n period plan
specifies a (unique) m period plan for each m < n. Moreover, an element r ∈ R∗ specifies an
n period plan for each n ∈ N. Intuitively, we would like to view each r as an infinite plan,
by considering the sequence of arbitrarily large, and expanding, finite plans. Consistency is
the requirement that makes this work, that for rn = projnr, the first m < n periods specify
exactly rm = projmr. Let R denote the set of all consistent plans.
15
Proposition 3.1. There exists a homeomorphism, λ : R→ ∆B(A⊗R)) such that
margA×K(X×Rn−1)(λ(r)) = projnr. (3.1)
Proof. In appendix B.1.
15Precisely specifying the m < n period plan implied by rn requires a more cumbersome notation than we
wish to introduce in the text; for the formal definitions see Appendix B.1.
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Next we want to consider plans whose support is denumerable. It is easy enough to set
P0 = ∆(A) ⊂ R0, and define recursively Pn = ∆(A ⊗ Pn−1) ⊂ Rn. Of course, there is a
potential pitfall still lurking: for a given
∏
n≥0 Pn, although each pn is a denumerable lottery,
the associated element, λ(p) might live in ∆B(A ⊗ P ) rather than ∆(A ⊗ P ). Indeed, we
need also to restrict our attention to the set of plans that have countable support not just
for each finite level, but also “in the limit,” and whose implied continuation plans are also
well behaved in such a manner. Fortunately, this can be done:16
Theorem 3.2. There exists maximal set P ⊂ R such that for each p ∈ P , projnp ∈ Pn, and
λ is a homeomorphism between P and ∆(A⊗ P ).
Proof. In appendix B.1.
The set P is our primitive.17 As a final notational comment, we would like to consider a
further specification of objective plans, denoted by Σ ⊂ P . Σ denotes the set of plans which
contain no subjective uncertainty; in every period, every possible action yields some outcome
with certainty. Recall, for each x ∈ X there is an associated action, ax such that Sax = {x}.
Associate this set of actions with X. Then Σ0 = ∆(X) and, recursively, Σn = ∆(X×Σn−1).
Finally Σ = P
⋂∏
n≥0 Σn. That is, these plans specify only actions with deterministic
outcomes at every stage. It is straightforward to show λ takes Σ to ∆(X × Σ).
PoAs are infinite trees; each node, therefore, is itself the root of a new PoA—a distribution
over action-continuation pairs. Each action-continuation, (a, f), in the support of a node
contains branches to new nodes (PoAs). The branches emanating from an action coincide
with the outcomes in the support of that action, x ∈ Sa. The node that follows x is the PoA
specified by f(x). Each node, therefore, is reached after a unique history: the history specifies
16One can also consider measurable lotteries (instead of lotteries with countable support). In fact, the
construction of the homeomorphism in Appendix B.1 considers measurable lotteries. In the paper we focus
on discrete support for notational cleanliness (see footnote 18) and tractability (to avoid measurability issues
in proofs). We justify our focus by noting that ∆(A ⊗ P ) is dense in ∆B(A ⊗ R) and so, given continuity
(Axiom vNM), preferences over the more general objects are recoverable.
17One might consider an alternative framework of “adapted processes” of Anscombe-Aumann acts (see,
for example, Epstein and Schneider (2003)), modified to our multi-action environment. In such a setup there
is a distinction between exogenous states and outcomes (of the different actions). However, in a classical
exploration problem, an outcome of an action is simultaneously an object from which the agent derives utility
and from which the agent learns regarding the uncertainty underlying the (different) action(s). Similar results
to those presented here would be obtained had we adopted the framework of adapted processes, but it seems
conceptually appropriate to resort to plans of actions.
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the realization of the distribution of each pervious node, and outcome of the action realized.
Thus, for a given PoA, p, each history of length n is an element of
∏n
t=1 P × [A ⊗ P ] × X
such that p1 = p and
(at, f t) ∈ supp(pt)
xt ∈ Sat
pt+1 = f t(xt)
Define the set of all histories of length n for p as H(p, n) and the set of all finite histories as
H(p). Let H(n) = ⋃p∈P H(p, n) and, H = ⋃n∈NH(n). For each h ∈ H(p, n), h corresponds
to the node (PoA) defined by fn(xn). Lastly, for any p, q ∈ P and h ∈ H(p) define p−hq as
the (unique!) element of P that coincides with p everywhere except after h in which case
fn(xn) is replaced by q. Note that the n period plan implied p and p−hq are the same. For
any p, q ∈ P and n ∈ N, let p−nq ≡
⋃
h∈H(p,n) p−hq.
For any h = (p1, a1, f 1, x1 . . . pn, an, fn, xn) and hˆ = (pˆ1, aˆ1, fˆ 1, xˆ1 . . . pˆn, aˆn, fˆn, xˆn) both
in H(n), we say that h and h′ are A-equivalent, denoted by h A∼ h′ if ai = aˆi and xi = xˆi
for i ≤ n. That is, two histories of length n are A-equivalent, whenever they correspond to
the same sequence of action-realization pairs, ignoring the objective randomization stage of
each period and the continuation assignment to outcomes that did not occur. It will turn
out, we are only interested in the A-equivalence classes of histories. Technically, this is the
consequence of the linearity of preference and indifference to the resolution of uncertainty
(as shown in Lemma 7); conceptually, this is because all uncertainty in the model regards
the realization of actions, and so, observing objective lotteries has no informational benefit.
3.2.2 The Axioms
The primitive in our model is a preference relation < ⊆ P ×P over all PoAs. When specific
PoA and history are fixed, the preferences induce history dependent preferences as follows:
for any p ∈ P , and h ∈ H(p) define <h ⊆ P × P by
q<h r ⇐⇒ p−hq< p−hr.
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The following axioms will be employed over all history induced preferences.18 A history is
null if <h is a trivial relation. This first four axioms are variants on the standard fare for
discounted expected utility. They guarantee the expected utility structure, non-triviality,
stationarity and separability (regarding objects over which learning cannot take place), re-
spectively.
[AX.3.1: vNM] The binary relation, <h satisfies the expected utility axioms. That is: weak
order, continuity (defined over the relevant topology, see Appendix B.1) and independence.
We require a stronger non-triviality condition that is standard, because of the subjective
nature of the dynamic problem. We need to ensure the DM believes some outcome will
obtain. Therefore, not all histories following a given action can be null.
[AX.3.2: NT] For any non-null h, and any (a, f), not all h′ ∈ h×H((a, f), n) are null.
Of course, the nature of the problem at hand precludes stationarity and separability in full
generality. Since the objective is to let the DM’s beliefs depend on prior outcomes explicitly,
her preferences will as well. However, the DM’s beliefs do not influence her assessment of
objective plans (i.e., elements of Σ), and so it is over this domain that stationarity and
separability are retained. This means, the DM’s preferences in utility terms are stationary
and separable, but we still allow the conversion between actions and utils to depend on her
beliefs which change responsively.
[AX.3.3: SST] For all non-null h ∈ H, and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ,
σ<σ′ ⇐⇒ σ<h σ′.
[AX.3.4: SEP] For all x, x′ ∈ X, ρ, ρ′ ∈ Σ and h ∈ H,
(1
2
(x, ρ) +
1
2
(x′, ρ′)
) ∼h (1
2
(x, ρ′) +
1
2
(x′, ρ)
)
.
18It is via the use of this construction that our appeal to denumerably supported lotteries provides tractabil-
ity. If we were to employ lotteries with uncountable support, then histories would, in general, be zero proba-
bility events; under the expected utility hypothesis, <h would be null for all h ∈ H. This could be remedied
by appealing to histories as events in H, measurable with respect to the filtration induced by previous res-
olutions of lottery-action-outcome tuples. We believe that this imposes a unnecessary notational burden.
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Because of the two-stage nature of the resolution of uncertainty each period (first, the
resolution of lottery over A⊗ P , and then the resolution of the action over X), we need an
additional separability constraint. From the point of view of period n, and when considering
the continuation problem beginning in period n+ 1, the DM should not care if uncertainty
is resolved in period n (when the action-continuation pair is realized), or in period n + 1.
That is, we also assume the DM is indifferent to the timing of objective lotteries given a
fixed action.
[AX.3.5: IT] For all a ∈ A, h ∈ H, α ∈ (0, 1), and (a, f), (a, g) ∈ Pˆ ,
α(a, f) + (1− α)(a, g) ∼h (a, αf + (1− α)g),
where mixtures of f and g are taken point-wise.
Thus far the axioms introduced are somewhat standard. However, in our particular
framework these assumptions do not guarantee that the value of the action is in any way
related with its realization of consumption alternatives. This is because, unlike other envi-
ronments, the set of outcomes, X, plays a dual role in exploration models: representing both
the space of outcomes and the state space regarding future actions.
The realization of an outcome x delivers utility according to both of these roles, and, to
ensure consistency between them requires two steps. First, construct a subjective distribution
over each action by treating X as a state space. This will be done by looking at the ranking
of continuation mappings for each action (i.e., (a, f) compared to (a, g)). Interpreting X as
the periodic state space, these continuation mappings are analogous to “acts” in the standard
subjective expected utility paradigm–and so, standard techniques allow for the identification
of such a subjective belief. Second, we need to ensure that the value assigned to arbitrary
PoAs is the expectation according to these beliefs. Towards this, the following notation is
introduced.
Definition. For any function f : X → P, define p.f ∈ P as p.f [(a, g)] = p[{(b, h)|b = a}]
if g = f , and p.f [(a, g)] = 0 if g 6= f .
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Take note, because we are dealing with distributions of denumerable support, we have no
measurability concerns. The plan of action p.f has the same distribution over actions in the
first period, but the continuation plan is unambiguously assigned by f , as shown in Figures
?? and ??. If the original plan is in A⊗ P , then the dot operation is simply a switch of the
continuation mapping: (a, g).f = (a, f). This operation is introduced because it allows us
to isolate the subjective distribution of the first period’s action.
Definition. p, q ∈ P are h-proportional if for all f, g : X → Σ.
p.f <h p.g ⇐⇒ q.f <h q.g
Since the images of f and g are in Σ, there is no informational effect from observing the
outcome of p. Hence, f and g can be thought of as objective assignments into continuation
utilities. The ranking ‘p.f < p.g’ is really a ranking over f and g as functions from X → R.
Thus, h-proportionality states that the DM’s subjective uncertainty regarding X is the same
when faced with p or with q.19
[AX.3.6: PRP] For all p, q ∈ P , and f : X → Σ if p and q are h-proportional then
p.f ∼h q.f .
The outcomes of an action represent not only the uncertainty regarding continuation,
but also the utility outcome for the current period. So, when p and q are h-proportional,
and thus induce the same uncertainty regarding X, the DM’s uncertainty about her current
period utility is the same across the plans. Therefore, if we replace the continuation problems
with objectively equivalent plans, the DM should be indifferent between p and q.
3.2.3 A Representation Result and Belief Elicitation
The following is our general axiomatization result. It states that the properties above char-
acterize a DM who, when facing a PoA, calculates the subjective expected utility according
to a collection of history dependent beliefs over action-outcome pairs, and among different
PoAs contemplates the benefits of consumption versus learning.
19To see this, note that the relation R on RX ×RX defined by fRg if and only if p.f < p.g is a preference
relation over acts that satisfies the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) axioms, and therefore encodes the DM’s
subjective likelihood of each E ⊂ X. From a functional standpoint, h-proportionality states the subjective
distribution over X induced by p is the same as that induced by q.
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Theorem 3.3 (Subjective Expected Experimentation Representation). <h satisfies vNM,
NT, SST, SEP, IT and PRP if and only if there exists a utility index u : X → R, a
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and a family of beliefs {µh,a ∈ ∆(SA)}h∈H,a∈A such that
Uh(p) =E
p
[
E
µh,a
[
u(x) + δUh′(a,x)(f(x))
]]
, (SEE)
jointly represents {<h}h∈H, where h′(a, x) = (h, p, (a, f), x). Moreover, u is cardinally
unique, δ is unique, the family of beliefs is unique, and µh,a = µh′,a whenever h
A∼ h′.
Proof. In Appendix B.3.
The theorem states that we can (uniquely) elicit the beliefs, following every history, over
the outcomes of each action separately. We will henceforth refer to such beliefs as an SEE
belief structure. The axioms do not impose any restrictions on the dynamics of such beliefs.
More importantly, the theorem shows that, when ranking the different strategies in a bandit
problem, the decision maker does not reveal her beliefs over the joint realizations of the
different actions.
3.3 THE STATISTICAL FRAMEWORK
In order for a modeler to understand the DM’s updating process, and whether it follows
Bayes rule, we need to construct her beliefs regarding not only each action individually but
also her beliefs regarding the correlation between actions. As we will see, in the generic case
we have insufficient data to uniquely identify a (subjective) joint distribution. We will still,
however, be able to identify a representative with unique properties.
Consider the family T of all sequences of individual experiments (alternatively, indi-
vidual actions), where different experiments can be taken in the different periods. Let
T = (T1, T2, ...) where Ti ∈ {Sa : a ∈ A} for every i ≥ 1; so, each Ti corresponds to
taking an action, say a, and expecting one of its outcomes, Sa. (Like before Sa corre-
sponds to the set of possible outcomes.) T is then the collection of all such T’s. For each
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T = (T1, T2, ...) let ζT ∈ ∆B(T) be a process over T; a distribution over all possible out-
comes when taking action T1, followed by T2, followed by T3, etc. For a given history of
outcomes h ∈ (T1, T2, ..., Tn), we denote h ∈ T if T = (T1, T2, ..., Tn, Tn+1, ...). Lastly, for
a sequence of experiments T = (T1, ..., Tn, Tn+1, ...) and a permutation pi : n → n, denote
piT = (Tpi(1), ..., Tpi(n), Tn+1, ...).
We consider a family of processes, {ζT}T∈T , indexed by the possible sequences of exper-
iments, T . For a given family, we require that for sequences of experiments T,T′ ∈ T , if
there is some history, h ∈ T ∩ T′, then ζT(h) = ζT′(h). This condition imposes that the
probability of outcomes today do not depend on which experiments are to be conducted in
the future. The set of all families of processes that meet this condition is in bijection to
the set of all SEE belief structures,20 which is exactly the output of Theorem 3.3. Thus, in
case there is no confusion, we will refer to a family of processes {ζT}T∈T as an SEE belief
structure as well.
Let SA ≡
∏
a∈A Sa, and S ≡
∏
n≥0 SA. S represents the grand state-space; a state, s,
determines the realization of each action in each period –an entity which is unobservable to
the modeler.
Definition. An SEE belief structure {ζT}T∈T is consistent with ζ ∈ ∆B(S) if ζ|T = ζT
for every T ∈ T .
That is, {ζT}T∈T is consistent with some process ζ over S if for every sequence of
experiments T, the marginal of ζ to T coincides with ζT. In such a case the processes ζ,
which we cannot observe, explains all our data.
20Indeed, fix a family of history dependent beliefs {µh,a}h∈H,a∈A and consider a sequence T =
(Sa1 , Sa2 , ...). Let h = (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ T and define
ζT(h) = µ∅,a1(x1) · µ(a1,x1),a2(x2) · · ·µ(a1,x1,...,an−1,xn−1),an(xn).
Then ζT is defined as the unique (continuous) processes over T that is consistent with ζT(h) for every history
h ∈ T. This procedure can be inverted: Fix, {ζT}T∈T and some history h = (a1, x1) . . . (an, xn). Let T be
any sequence such that Ti = Sai for i ≤ n and Tn+1 = Sa. Then define
µh,a(x) = ζT(Tn+1 = x|T1 = x1 . . . Tn = xn).
From here it is clear why we need to impose the condition that the probability of an event is not affected by
future experiments: this condition arises naturally in the conditions of the SEE representation (see, Theorem
3.3). Recall that µh,a = µh′,a whenever h
A∼ h′. Further, it is easy to check the above maps are continuous
so that the bijection is in fact a homeomorphism.
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Because it forms the basis subjective Bayesianism and for the statistical literature on
bandit problems, we will pay particular attention to the class of exchangeable processes.
Definition. Let Ω be a probability space and Ωˆ =
∏
n≥1 Ω. The process ζ ∈ ∆B(Ωˆ) is
exchangeable, if there exists probability measure θ over ∆B(SA), such that
ζ(E) =
∫
∆B(Ω)
Dˆ(E)dθ(D), (3.2)
where for any D ∈ ∆B(Ω), Dˆ is the corresponding product measure over Ωˆ.
Remark 3.4. If ζ is exchangeable, then θ is unique.
Exchangeable processes were first characterized by de Finetti (1931, 1937) and later
extended by Hewitt and Savage (1955). Their fundamental result states that a process
ζ ∈ ∆B(Ωˆ) is exchangeable if and only if for any finite permutation pi : N → N and event
E =
∏
n∈NEn, we have
ζ(E) = ζ(
∏
n∈N
Epi(n)). (3.3)
Exchangeable processes are of clear statistical importance, in particular within the subjec-
tivist paradigm (see, for example Schervish (2012)). From the economic vantage, a DM who
understands there to be an exchangeable process governing the outcome of actions would be
considered Bayesian.21 This is because, given the representation in Eq. 3.2, the DM (acts as
if she) entertains a second order distribution, which she updates following every observation.
We would like to understand under what circumstances an SEE belief structure is a result
of Bayesian updating. If we could infer from preferences the beliefs over the joint realizations
of all actions, that is
∏
a∈A Sa, then our questions would boil down to verifying whether this
process satisfies exchangeability. However, we can only infer the beliefs over each action
separately, and thus, our task remains. We need to find a condition on the family of ζT’s
that determines whether it follows Bayes rule.
21It is possible to consider more general Bayesian models than exchangeable processes. At least for the
case of independent actions, for example, it is not hard to adapt a local consistency axiom as in Lehrer and
Teper (2015) that will imply that beliefs follow a general martingale process.
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Definition. An SEE belief structure {ζT}T∈T is Across-Arm Symmetric (AA-SYM)
if
ζT(h) = ζpiT(pih)
for every T ∈ T , h ∈ T and a permutation pi : n→ n.
Intuitively, AA-SYM requires that if we consider a different order of experiments, then
the probability of outcomes (in the appropriate order) does not change.
The next theorem states that across-arm symmetry is a necessary and sufficient condition
for an SEE belief structure to be consistent with Bayesian updating of some belief over the
joint realizations of all actions.
Theorem 3.5. An SEE belief structure {ζT}T∈T satisfies AA-SYM if and only if it is con-
sistent with an exchangeable process ζ ∈ ∆B(S).
Theorem 3.5 is stated without proof. Necessity is trivial and sufficiency will be a straight-
forward application of Theorem 3.7.
3.4 STRONG EXCHANGEABILITY AND CONTEMPORANEOUS
CORRELATIONS
Unfortunately, AA-SYM is not sufficient to obtain a unique exchangeable process consistent
with an SEE belief structure. This lack of identification stems directly from the inability
to observe the DM’s beliefs regarding contemporaneous correlations. Consider two coins, a
and b, which can both take values in {H,T}. Both coins are flipped each period. Consider
the following two governing processes, which are i.i.d. across time periods. (1) the coins are
perfectly correlated (with equal probability on HH and TT ), or (2) the coins are identical
and independent (and both have equal probability on H and T ). Notice, the two cases
induce the same marginal distributions over each coin individually. Thus, if the modeler has
access only to the DM’s marginal beliefs, the two processes are indistinguishable.
In this section we introduce a strengthening of exchangeability, which we aptly call
strongly exchangeable, under which stochastic independence is preserved both intertemporally
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(as in vanilla exchangeability) and contemporaneously.22
Definition. A process ζ ∈ ∆B(S) is strongly exchangeable if there exists a probability
measure θ over ∆IN ≡∏a∈A∆(Sa), such that
ζ(E) =
∫
∆IN
Dˆ(E)dθ(D),
where for any D ∈ ∆IN , Dˆ is the corresponding product measure over S.
Under a strongly exchangeable process the outcomes of actions that occur at the same
time are independently resolved. Of course, this does not impose that there is no informa-
tional cross contamination between actions. Information regarding the distribution of action
a is informative about the underlying parameter governing the exchangeable process, and
therefore, also about the distribution of action b. Since exchangeable processes were first
characterized as being invariant to permutations, for the sake of completeness we provide a
similar characterization of strongly exchangeable processes.
Theorem 3.6. The process ζ ∈ ∆B(S) is strongly exchangeable if and only if for any set of
finite permutations {pia : N→ N}a∈A and event E =
∏
n∈N
∏
a∈AEn,a, we have
ζ(E) = ζ(
∏
n∈N
∏
a∈A
Epia(n),a). (3.4)
Proof. In Appendix B.3.
Following the intuition above, it should come as no surprise that under AA-SYM strong
exchangeability can never be ruled out. In other words, there is no SEE belief structure,
therefore no preferences over PoAs, that distinguishes exchangeability from strong exchange-
ability. Strongly exchangeable processes are ones where each dimension can be permuted
independently. If pia = pib for all a, b ∈ A, the condition is exactly exchangeability. Strongly
exchangeable process are especially relevant with respect to the current focus because they
act as representative members to the equivalence classes of exchangeable processes consistent
with the same SEE belief structure.
22We feel reasonably certain that strong exchangeability must have been studied previously in the statistics
literature. However, we have found no references.
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Theorem 3.7. An SEE belief structure {ζT}T∈T satisfies AA-SYM if and only if it is consis-
tent with a strongly exchangeable process. Furthermore, such a strongly exchangeable process
is unique.
Proof. In Appendix B.3.
3.4.1 AA-SYM as a Behavioral Restriction
In this section we introduce the axiomatic counterpart of AA-SYM, and so we can identify
Bayesianism in exploration environments directly from preferences over the strategies.
Definition. Let pi be an n-permutation and p, q ∈ P . We say that q is pi-permutation of p
if for all h ∈ H(p, n), h′ ∈ H(q, n), projAnh = pi
(
projAnh
′).
If p admits any pi-permutations it must be that the first n actions are assigned un-
ambiguously (i.e., it does not depend on the realization of prior actions nor the objective
randomization).
[AX.3.7: AA-SYM] Let pi be an n-permutation and p, p′ ∈ P with p′ a pi-permutation of
p. Then, for all a ∈ A, τ, σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, and h ∈ H(p, n), h′ ∈ H(p′, n), if h is a permutation of
h′ then
p−nτ <(p−nσ)−hσ′ ⇐⇒ p−nτ <(p−nσ)−h′σ′.
After n periods the plan p−nτ provides τ with certainty, while the plan (p−nσ)−hσ′
provides σ unless the history h occurs. Hence, the DM’s preference between the plans
depends on their ex-ante subjective assessment of how likely h is to occur. Similarly to the
logic behind h-proportionality, AA-SYM states that the DM’s assesses h to be exactly as
probable as h′. In other words, the DM’s likelihood of outcome realizations is invariant to the
order in which the actions are taken. The intuition behind the next result is correspondingly
straightforward.
Proposition 3.8 (Correlated Arms, Exchangeable Process). Let < admit an SEE represen-
tation with the associated observable processes {ζT}T∈T . Then, the following are equivalent:
1. <h satisfies AA-SYM;
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2. {ζT}T∈T satisfies AA-SYM;
3. {ζT}T∈T is consistent with an exchangeable process; and
4. {ζT}T∈T is consistent with a (unique) strongly exchangeable process.
Proof. The proof that condition 1 is equivalent to condition 2 is provided Appendix B.3.
Conditions 2, 3, and 4 are equivalent due to Theorem 3.7.
The proposition implies that strong-exchangeability carries no additional restrictions,
beyond those of exchangeability, on agents’ preferences over the different strategies in bandit
problems, and in particular on their optimal strategies.
3.5 FURTHER DISCUSSION
3.5.1 Related Literature
Within decision theory, the literature on learning broadly considers how a DM incorporates
new information, generally via notions of Bayesianism and Exchangeability, and often in the
domain of uncertainty: see Epstein and Le Breton (1993); Epstein and Seo (2010); Klibanoff
et al. (2013); Lehrer and Teper (2015). Recently, there has been an interest in subjective
learning, or, the identification of the set of possible “signals” that the DM believes she
might observe. At it’s most simple, this is the elicitation of the set of potential tastes (often
referred to as subjective states) the decision maker anticipates, accomplished by examining
the DM’s preference over menus of choice objects: see Kreps (1979); Dekel et al. (2001). By
also incorporating consumption goods that contract on an objective state space, the modeler
can interpret the DM’s preference for flexibility as directly stemming from her anticipation
of acquiring information regarding the likelihood of states, as in Dillenberger et al. (2014);
Krishna and Sadowski (2014).
There is also a small but highly relevant literature working on the identification of respon-
sive learning. Hyogo (2007) considers a two-period model, with an objective state space, in
which the DM ranks action-menu pairs. The action is taken in the first period and provides
information regarding the likelihood of states, after the revelation of which, the DM choose
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a state-contingent act from the menu. The identification of interest is the DM’s subjective
interpretation of actions as signals. Similarly, Cooke (2016) entertains a similar model with-
out the need for an objective state-space, and in which the consumption of a single object
in the first period plays the role of a fully informative action. Cooke, therefore, identifies
both the state-space and the corresponding signal structure. Piermont et al. (2016) consider
a recursive and infinite horizon version of Kreps’ model, where the DM deterministically
learns about her preference regarding objects she has previously consumed. Dillenberger et
al. (2015) consider a different infinite horizon model where the DM makes separate choices
in each period regarding her information structure and current period consumption. It is
worth pointing out, all of these models, unlike the this paper, capitalize on the “preference
for flexibility” paradigm to characterize learning. We are able to identify subjective learn-
ing without appealing to the menu structure because of the purely responsive aspect of our
model. In other words, flexibility is “built in” to our setup, as a different action can be taken
after every possible realization of the signal (action).
3.5.2 Subjective Learning with Endogenous and Exogenous Information
As witnessed the literature covered above, there seems to be a divide in the literature re-
garding subjective learning. In one camp, are models that elicit the DM’s perception of
exogenous flows of information (as a canonical example, take Dillenberger et al. (2014)), and
in the other are models that assume information is acquired only via actions taken by the
DM (where this paper lies). Realistically, neither of these information structures capture the
full gamut of information transmission in economic environments.
Consider the following example within the setup of the current paper. A firm is choosing
between two projects (actions), a and b. Assume that each project has a high-type and
a low type. The firm believes (after observing h) the probability that each project is the
high-type is µh,a and µh,b, respectively. By experimenting between a and b the firm’s beliefs
and preferences will evolve.
But, what happens if the firm anticipates the release of a comprehensive report regarding
project a just before period 1? This report will declare project a high quality with probability
45
αh > 1
2
if the projects true type is high and with probability αl < 1
2
if it is low. Hence, the
report is an informative signal. Now, if the firms belief after observing h in period 0 is
given by [µh,a, µh,b] then, according to Bayes rule, the firms belief regarding project a being
the high-type, at the beginning of period 1 will be µ+h,a =
αh·µh,a
αh·µh,a+αl(1−µh,a) , if the report is
positive, and µ−h,a =
(1−αh)·µh,a
(1−αh)·µh,a+(1−αl)·(1−µh,a) if the report is negative.
Unfortunately, however, the ex-ante elicitation of preferences in our domain cannot cap-
ture the anticipation of information. The firm is ranking PoAs according to its aggregated
belief from the ex-ante perspective, and thus, so as to maximize its expected belief:
(
αhµh,a + α
l(1− µh,a)
)
µ+h,a +
(
(1− αh)µh,a + (1− αl)(1− µh,a)
)
µ−h,a = µh,a.
Because of the Bayesian structure, the DM’s beliefs must form a martingale, so her expec-
tation of her anticipated beliefs are exactly her ex-ante beliefs. This fact, coupled with the
linearity of expected utility, imply that the DM’s ex-ante preference over PoAs is unaffected
by her anticipation of exogenous information arrival.
All hope is not lost, however, of fully characterizing the DM’s subjective information
structure. The approach of Dillenberger et al. (2014) is orthogonal to our’s, leading us to
conjecture that the two models can co-exist and impart a clean separation between exogenous
and endogenous information flows. Going back to the example, imagine there are two PoAs,
p and q such that p is preferred to q under beliefs µ+h , and q to p under µ
−
h . The DM
would therefore strictly desire flexibility after period 0, even after she is able to condition
her decision on h. Of course, because the report is released after period 0, irrespective of
the action taken by the DM, for any 0-period history h′, there must exist some other PoAs,
p′ and q′, for which flexibility is strictly beneficial (after h′).
3.5.3 A Comment on Bayesianism in Environments of Experimentation
The results in Section 3.4 have two related implications to Bayesianism in general models
of experimentation. First, it is well known that the beliefs of two Bayesians observing
the same sequence of signals will converge in the limit. Our results imply that in a setup
of experimentation, different Bayesians obtaining the same information, might still hold
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different views of the world in the limit. Their beliefs over the uncertainty underlying each
action will be identical, but they can hold different beliefs over the joint distribution.
The second point has to do with the possible equivalence with non-Bayesian DMs. The-
orem 3.7 states that AA-SYM is necessary and sufficient for an SEE belief system to be
consistent with some exchangeable process. As discussed in the Introduction, AA-SYM pro-
jected to stochastic processes is weaker than the standard symmetry axiom applied in the
literature, because the standard assumption requires that histories fully specify the evolution
of the state, while in our setup, histories can only specify cylinders. Because AA-SYM is a
weaker assumption, de Finetti’s theorem implies that processes satisfying such an assumption
need not be exchangeable and have a Bayesian representation as in Eq. (3.2).
Consider the following example of a stochastic process. In every period two coins are
flipped. In odd periods the coins are perfectly correlated (with equal probability on HH
and TT ), and in even periods the coins are identical and independent (and both have equal
probability on H and T ). The associated observable processes satisfy AA-SYM, but the
process itself is clearly not exchangeable. Nevertheless, Theorem 3.7 guarantees that there
is a (unique) strongly exchangeable process that is consistent with the SEE belief structure.
In this case it is easy to see that that process would be the one in which every period we toss
two coins that are identical and independent (and both have equal probability on H and T ).
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4.0 INTROSPECTIVE UNAWARENESS AND OBSERVABLE CHOICE
In which Alyosha, cognizant of his own limitations, and, not
wanting to appear desultory, resolves to take things as they come.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
There is a marked difference between being unaware of one’s preferences and not knowing
(also referred to as being uncertain about) one’s preferences. While certainty and uncer-
tainty (about some piece of information, ϕ) together constitute awareness of ϕ, unawareness
describes total ignorance –a complete lack of perception of, or ability to reason directly about
ϕ.23 This paper explores the behavioral (i.e., observable) identification between unawareness
and uncertainty and contemplates the type of data required to make such a separation. Due
to the consideration of observability, the primary interest is in the decision maker’s preference
(hypothetically embodied by choice data), and how patterns in preference change in response
to the structure of awareness. I will show that unawareness produces distinct patterns, and
so, attempting to model unawareness with uncertainty, regardless of how complex, will fail.
As an example of when such issues may arise and how they might alter predictions, I con-
sider a simple contracting environment. When unawareness is taken into account, players
can have an incentive to conceal mutually beneficial information, leading to the optimality
of incomplete contracts.
To highlight the distinction between uncertainty and unawareness, consider Alyosha,
who will buy a new smartphone in six months. He will have three options at the time of
purchase: x, y, and z, but, of course, might not know now which phone he would most like
23This was first noted by Modica and Rustichini (1994).
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to purchase six months from now. This uncertainty could arise because he does not know the
technical specifications of the phones, their price, etc., and his true preference depends on
the realization of these variables. Contrast this to the case where Alyosha has never heard
of phone z. Here, he is unaware of z, and so naturally, of any preferences there regarding.
The key aspect, if Alyosha is unaware of a piece of information (the existence of phone z),
he is unable to make any choice based directly on this information.
More subtle, but just as fundamental, is our acknowledgement of our own unawareness.
Indeed, most people would readily admit to the possibility that they cannot conceive of
all future technologies or trends, or exhaustively list the set of possible occurrences for the
upcoming week. This recognition of unawareness is important because it suggests the things
a decision maker (DM) is unaware of may play an indirect role in her decision making, even
if they cannot be directly acted upon. Central to the analysis, then, is the DM who is (1)
unaware, (2) aware she is unaware, and (3) unaware about what she is unaware. A DM in
such an epistemic state is referred to as introspectively unaware. By contrast, a DM who
does not satisfy condition (2) would be referred to as naively unaware. In the presence of
introspective unawareness, Alyosha might envision a world in which he prefers something
other than x and y. Of course, he cannot know this something is z, since that would require
he is aware of it.
Notice, under either uncertainty or introspective unawareness, the DM has a natural
inclination to delay making her choice (i.e., if she cannot start using the phone for six
months, she might as well wait until then to choose). However, the motivation for delay is
different. Under uncertainty, she would like to wait so as to make a decision based on the
realization of the relevant variables (the technical specs, price, etc.). Under (introspective)
unawareness, she would like to wait in case she becomes aware of something better than
whatever she would have chosen today. Notice also, if the DM is unaware she is unaware,
she has no reason to delay; she does not consider the possibility she becomes aware of new
information.
Now, Alyosha is going to Father Zosima to purchase the phone on his behalf, and has
to instruct him today about which phone to purchase in six months. If Alyosha is either
uncertain or introspectively unaware of his preference, it will not be optimal for him to specify
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any single phone. In the case of uncertainty, however, he could leave detailed instructions for
Zosima to carry out the optimal choice: in the event the technical specs are (sx, sy, sz), and
the prices are ($x, $y, $z), purchase phone x, in the event ... etc. A commitment to consume
(in the future) a particular alternative given the state of affairs is referred to as a contingent
plan. Since Alyosha’s optimal decision depends on the realization of some variables,24 it is
enough for her to specify a contingent plan that depends on these variables. Contrast this
to the case in which Alyosha introspectively unaware. No plan, at least no articulable one,25
can carry out his optimal decision (this vignette is captured formally in Example 4.4.2). This
is because he would need to alert Zosima to events that are described by information he is
unaware of—to include such information in a contingent plan would require he is aware of
it.
The main result of this paper shows the behavioral condition for introspective unaware-
ness is a strict preference for delaying choices rather than committing to a contingent plan,
even when every possible articulable plan is offered. In particular:
F1 When the decision maker is fully aware, she is always willing to commit to some articu-
lable contingent plan. Intuitively, the DM’s language is rich enough that she can contract
on the resolution of any relevant uncertainty, effectively imitating whatever her dynamic
behavior would have been.
F2 Without full awareness, the DM might find every articulable contingent plan unacceptable.
A strict preference for delay (relative to all articulable contingent plans) is possible only
if the DM is not fully aware –this behavior is an indication of unawareness. Intuitively, if
DM believes she may become aware of new alternatives, she understands her future self
may have options better than any she could currently articulate in a contingent plan.
F3 If the DM does finds every articulable contingent plan unacceptable, she must be intro-
spectively unaware. Intuitively, the DM must be aware enough to come to the conclusion
that waiting might afford new possibilities. When she is ignorant of her own unawareness,
she cannot consider this possibility.
24Variables of which she is aware, of course.
25A contingent plan –a function from events to outcomes– is articulable if the DM is aware of its constituent
parts, its domain and image.
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So a preference for delay that cannot be appeased by the appeal to contingent planning is
the behavioral indication –in an exact sense– of introspective unawareness. The intuition is
exactly as in the above example: the DM’s language is not rich enough to specify the optimal
contingent plan (unawareness), but is rich enough that she knows this fact (awareness of
unawareness).
Directly incorporating unawareness into a decision theoretic model introduces subtleties
that need to be dealt with judiciously. First, one must take care to ensure the process of
eliciting preferences from a DM does not affect her preferences. While asking a DM to rank
risky prospects should not affect her risk preference, asking her to contemplate objects of
which she was formerly unaware certainty would affect her awareness (for a longer discussion
on this topic, see Section 4.1.1). Second, the type of unawareness considered (i.e., naive or
introspective, object-based or state-based, etc.) must be rich enough to produce observable
patterns, even when keeping in mind the pervious concern. Finally, Modica and Rustichini
(1994); Dekel et al. (1998) show that within the context of state space models, simply
assuming that the DM is unaware of certain states (while retaining desirable properties of
knowledge) is insufficient: the DM will either be fully aware or fully unaware.
To overcome these obstacles, I develop a logical framework that directly incorporates
the DM’s preference, as well as her knowledge and awareness thereof. This ensures that
my notion of awareness is well founded and rigorous, and allows me to directly verify that
the elicitation method does not require the DM to contemplate objects she herself could
not have articulated. Finally, this construction indicates that contingent plans are precisely
the type of data required to observe unawareness. Giving the DM either less flexibility (for
example, deterministic choice of a single element) or more flexibility (for example, choice
over incomplete contingent plans) fails to separate unawareness and uncertainty. Although,
in the end, choices will be observable, this more general framework will provide the tools to
analyze the epistemic conditions (i.e., knowledge and awareness) that generate the observable
patterns in choice data.
I begin with an epistemic modal logic, based on set of logical statements that include
a formal description of the DM’s preference, and adapted from Fagin and Halpern (1988),
Halpern and Reˆgo (2009) and Board and Chung (2011). Each state of the world is defined
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by a set of statements which are true: statements that include how the DM ranks objects
(for example, “x is preferred to y”), what the DM implicitly knows (for example “the DM
implicitly knows ‘x is preferred to y’ ”) and what the DM is aware of (for example “the
DM is aware of the statement ‘x is preferred to y’ ”). The intersection of implicit knowledge
and awareness is explicit knowledge. Implicit knowledge can be thought of as idealized
knowledge –what the DM would know if she was fully aware and logically omnipotent. In
contrast, explicit knowledge can be thought of as working knowledge, subject to cognitive
limitations. Then, on top of this logic, I build a decision theory. This allows me to speak of
a preference as true (irrespective of the DM’s epistemic state), implicitly known (if the DM’s
preference is the logical consequence of things she knows), and explicitly known (if the DM
implicitly knows her preference and is aware of it). If the DM is fully aware, her implicitly
and explicitly known preferences coincide. The characterization of unawareness arises from
the contrast between the structure of these different preferences.
Failing to account for the effect of unawareness can distort predictions. Specifically, ex-
ante solution concepts in dynamic environments.26 However, including the formal machinery
needed to deal appropriately with these concerns can impose a large cost in simple models,
and so, should not be done needlessly. This paper, therefore, provides a test for the presence
for introspective unawareness, so that economists might better understand in which context
unawareness is present and where it can be safely ignored.
To exemplify how introspective unawareness can alter behavior in economic settings, I
examine a highly stylized strategic environment in which a (fully aware) principal offers a
take-it-or-leave-it contract to a (introspectively unaware) agent. I show, when constrained to
offer complete contracts, the principal might have an incentive to conceal Pareto improving
information. Intuitively, this is because the introspectively unaware agent is unable to prop-
erly anticipate the value of the actions she is unaware of but might become aware of (i.e., her
value to not committing). By unveiling new actions by including them in his contract, the
principal alters the agent’s epistemic state –her perceived value of delay– potentially increas-
ing her aversion to commitment. When unconstrained, the principal can overcome this by
26For more concrete examples, the divergence from standard predictions in applications to game the-
ory Feinberg (2012), contract theory Filiz-Ozbay (2012), information economics Heifetz et al. (2013), and
mechanism design Auster (2013).
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leaving the contract incomplete. I show, because this behavior is motivated by the agent’s
fuzzy perceived value to delay, it arises only in the presence of introspective unawareness.
In addition, the epistemic preference framework relates to the decision theoretic litera-
ture on subjective state spaces, which began with Kreps (1979). I show that the Krepsian
paradigm, epitomized by DM who ranks menus of objects, and whose ranking respects set
inclusion (so that larger menus are preferred to their subsets), can be faithfully captured by
a special case of the models studied in this paper. Such behavior arises without the need to
appeal to unawareness. Intuitively, the flexibility that arises by appealing to menus is, just as
with contingent plans, bounded by the DM’s articulation. Hence, introspective unawareness
produces the same unwillingness to commit in this domain.
In particular, this characterization is of interest in relation to models of subjective learn-
ing. To identify what the DM believes she might learn, axiomatizations generally include
the requirement that any dynamic choice behavior is indifferent to some contingent plan –in
essence, assuming the existence of acceptable, and articulable, plans.27 As such, the results
of this paper mandate that a theory of subjective learning under unawareness cannot be
built on the same machinery. Put differently, current models of subjective learning necessar-
ily reduce all learning to resolution of uncertainty rather than from the arrival unanticipated
information.
4.1.1 Observability and Unawareness
Most decision theoretic models begin with the declaration of some set, X, over which the
DM’s preferences are described by a binary relation, < ⊆ X × X. Under the revealed
preference interpretation, the modeler precludes from the outset the possibility of alternatives
of which the decision maker is unaware. Indeed, if the modeler were to ask a person on the
street, or a subject in the lab, to choose between phone x and phone y, it is unreasonable to
believe, at the time of her answer, she is unaware of either x or y. The very act of asking
27The literature on learning has been principally interested in the case where the DM entertains a subjective
state space, and identification regards the set of events in this state space the DM believes she might learn.
Dillenberger et al. (2014, 2015); Piermont et al. (2016) have considered constructions that exactly correspond
to contingent plans in this paper. While Ergin and Sarver (2010) and Riella (2013) do not directly construct
such plans, the interpretation of both papers concerns a DM who constructs a contingent plan after observing
the menu they receive.
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forces the DM’s hand. When moving to the realm of contingent plans –functions from events
to consumption– this problem not only persists, but is compounded. Now, the modeler is
precluding unawareness both of the consumption space and the set of contingencies. Finally,
when trying to identify introspection, the problem becomes even more precarious. Any
question regarding even the existence of unforeseen objects has the potential to change the
DM’s epistemic state.
The decision theoretic literature has posited many different behavioral markers for un-
awareness: incomplete preferences, preference for flexibility Kreps (1979), reverse Bayesian-
ism Karni and Vierø (2016), unmeasurable states Kochov (2015); Minardi and Savochkin
(2015); Grant and Quiggin (2014), etc.28 However, these papers, formulated from a revealed
preference approach, must make restrictive (ex-ante) assumptions on the DM’s epistemic
state. For example, Kochov (2015) and Minardi and Savochkin (2015) assume the modeler
has a strictly more complete view of the world (is aware of more) than the agents within the
model. This means it is impossible to detect unawareness in agents who are more aware than
the modeler, severely narrowing the contexts in which these models can be applied. On the
other hand, Karni and Vierø (2016) and Grant and Quiggin (2014) allow the DM’s unaware-
ness to be largely unrestricted. They do, however, assume that the DM is introspectively
unaware, requiring her to rank objects explicitly containing surprising outcomes.
This paper asks the precedent question as to how such epistemic states might be iden-
tified. Such issues are dealt with by relaxing what is meant by the revealed preference
approach. Instead of providing the decision maker with a set and asking her to indicate
her preferences thereover, the modeler asks the DM to provide both the set of alternatives
and the list of preference restrictions between them. That is to say, the DM provides a set
of statements such as “x is preferred to y,” where x and y are object of which she herself
conceives. While this is clearly inadequate for some practical purposes, the complexity of
the DM’s task is no greater than in the standard model, and it does not beg the question of
awareness.
A crucial aspect to the identification of unawareness contained in this paper is that
28For a detailed account of these papers’ and how they relate to this one, see the literature review in
Section 4.7.
54
it never requires the DM to contemplate objects she herself could not have conceived. It
suffices for the modeler to consider the DM’s preference over the set of objects she herself
reported. The main contribution of this paper is, therefore, the assertion of a framework that
characterizes introspective unawareness from choices regarding only information of which the
DM is aware.
4.1.2 A (Far Too) Simple Model of Decision Making Under Unawareness.
Outside of the limits of real cognition, let X represent the objective set of all possible
alternatives in all possible worlds for all possible decision makers. Assume the modeler asks
the DM to report her personal set of preference restrictions (a set of ordered pairs of objects
the DM conceived of). Then, the reported preference restrictions are a subset of X ×X. If
the DM is unaware of some of the elements of X then she cannot include them in her report.
So, let < ⊆ X × X be the decision maker’s personal set of preference restrictions.29
The highest standard of rationality would dictate that < is a transitive, complete, and
reflexive relation. If we allow for unawareness, however, what properties should < possess?
Transitivity has no reason to be discarded; if the decision maker’s true preference is transitive
and she is aware x< y and y< z, then she has all the constituent parts to deduce that x< z.
[AX.4.1: Trv] For all x, y, z ∈ X, x< y and y< z then x< z.
Completeness, however, is clearly too strong; so too reflexivity. If the DM is unaware of
x, she cannot report x<x, even if it is true. However, if the DM is aware that x< y and
that her preferences are complete, she can deduce that x<x and y< y. Likewise if she is
aware of both x<x and y< y, she can deduce that there must be some preference between
x and y. This is the idea behind local completeness:
[AX.4.2: LCmp] For all x, y ∈ X, ‘x< y or y<x’ if and only if ‘x<x and y< y’.
Trv and LCmp provide enough structure to provide a basic, but mostly pointless, result.
There exists some A ⊆ X of objects the DM is aware of, and a utility function U : A → R
29For any relation <, let ∼ an  denote the symmetric and antisymmetric components.
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that represents <.30 If x /∈ A, then U(x) is undefined and there is no y ∈ X such that x< y
or y<x: the DM is unaware of x. In addition, LCmp can be weakened to local reflexivity,
to allow the decision maker to have incomplete preferences, even over objects she is aware
of:
[AX.4.3: LRfx] For all x, y ∈ X, if x< y then ‘x<x and y< y’.
Trv and LRfx provide the analog to discarding completeness (while retaining reflexiv-
ity) in the standard model Ok (2002). There exists some A ⊆ X and a set of utility functions
Uk : A → R such that x< y if and only if Uk(x) ≥ Uk(y) for all k.
These results show, in static contexts, unawareness has only trivial behavioral implica-
tions. Is there any economic content to considering X rather than A? The behavior is locally
identical –the patters of observable choice will be the same but for the inclusion or exclusion
of particular elements. As alluded to in the pervious section, to see the full effects of un-
awareness, dynamic environments are needed. Of course, even there, if the DM is unaware
she is unaware then she ignores the consequences of her limited understanding entirely; she
acts as in the static case outlined above. In light of this, my focus is the introspectively
unaware decision maker in a dynamic setting.
4.1.3 Organization
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the logical underpinnings of
the decision theory and expounds on the choice patterns based on implicitly known prefer-
ence. Section 4.3 formally introduces awareness structures and explicit knowledge. The main
results are contained in Section 4.4, which introduces contingent plans and the notions of
implicit and explicit acceptability. Section 4.5 show the connection to subjective state space
models and a preference for flexibility. Section 4.6 explores a simple strategic contracting
game. A survey of the relevant literature can be found in Section 4.7. Additional results
and proofs omitted from the text are contained in the appendix.
30Later, it is assumed that the set of consumable objects is denumerable. Here, however, if X is uncount-
able, the relevant continuity assumptions must also be made.
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4.2 LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS: PREFERENTIAL LOGIC
This section outlines the formal construction of the logic used in this paper. First Section
4.2.1 provides the syntax for well defined formulae. That is, a purely mechanical account
of which strings of characters will be well defined. Then Section 4.2.2 endows well defined
formulae with meaning by providing a semantic interpretation. This interpretation is the
standard possible worlds semantics adapted to consider preferential statements. Finally,
section 4.2.3, considers an axiomatization (a method of deriving new true statements from
old ones) corresponding to the semantic models.
4.2.1 A Syntactic Language: L(X )
Preferential choices will be described directly by an epistemic logic. To this end, for each
n ≥ 1, define a countable set of n place predicates denoted by α, β, γ, . . .. Assume the
existence of a countably infinite set of variables denoted by X = a, b, c . . .. Then, any n
place predicate followed by n variables is a well formed atomic formula. That is, if α is a
2 place predicate, then αab is a well formed atomic formula, with the interpretation that
a and b stand in the α relation to one another. For example, if α is “greater than”, then
αab states that a is greater than b. Also assume the existence of a distinguished predicate,
<, representing weak preference (where (a< b) is used rather than (<ab)). Take note that
variables are placeholders, and, until endowed with an interpretation, do not refer to any
specific object.
Define the set of well formed formulae recursively: for any well formed formulae, ϕ and
ψ, ¬ϕ, ϕ∧ψ and Ktϕ are also well formed (for t = 0 . . . T ). Kt represents implicit knowledge
at time t, the interpretation of which will be standard: the DM implicitly knows ϕ (at time
t) if ϕ is true in every state of affairs she considers possible (at time t).31 In addition, this
language allows for universal quantification, ∀. So for any well formed ϕ, ∀aϕ is well formed,
where a any individual variable. The resulting language is L(X ).
Taking the standard shorthand, ϕ ∨ ψ is short for ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), ϕ =⇒ ψ is short for
31The reason this type of knowledge is qualified as implicit, is in contrast to explicit knowledge that
requires the DM also be aware of ϕ.
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¬ϕ ∨ ψ, and ∃aϕ is short for ¬∀a¬ϕ. In addition, let Pt denote ¬Kt¬, with the intended
interpretation of Ptϕ as the DM considers ϕ possible; she does not know it is not the case.
Lastly, to expedite notation, for any ϕ let ∇tϕ denote ((ϕ =⇒ Ktϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ =⇒ Kt¬ϕ))
with the intended interpretation, the DM knows the truth value of ϕ at time t.
Per usual, an occurrence of a variable a is free in a formula ϕ if a is not under the scope of
a quantifier, and is bound otherwise. A formula with no free occurrences is called a sentence.
Two formulae ϕ and ψ are called bound alphabetic variants of one another if ϕ and ψ differ
only because where ϕ has well formed sub-formulae of the form ∀aζ where ψ has ∀bη and ζ
has free occurrences of a in exactly the same places as η has free occurrences of b.
If ϕ is a formula, then ϕ[a/b] denotes the formula created by replacing all (and possibly
no) free occurrences of a with b. Because this can change the interpretation of the formula
in unintended ways, (in particular, if there was a free a in ϕ that corresponds to a bound
b in ϕ[a/b]) I introduce the following notation: ϕ[[a/b]] denotes the formula created first by
taking a bound alphabetic variant of ϕ with no bound occurrences of b, and then replacing
every free a with b.
4.2.2 Semantics
I will work with a fixed domain model. This means the variables (and hence quantification)
range over the same domain in every possible world. A word should be said on this, as there
is considerable philosophical debate regarding constant domains. On one hand, it simplifies
matters considerably to assume the same objects hypothetically exist in each possible world.
One the other, the very intention that possible worlds be distinct means they might be defined
by different objects. Here, I take the view that different possible worlds are defined by the
different relation between objects (that may or may not exists, but always hypothetically
exist). This view coincides with the main emphasis of looking at different worlds primarily
as embodiments of different preferences. The DM conceives of possible worlds in which
she entertains different preferences (where these preferences may be the result of different
knowledge or awareness) – this is perfectly possible without the introduction of varying
domains.
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So, to begin, let X denote a domain of the individual variables, the class of all possible
values a variable might take. Elements of X are referred to using x, y, z . . .. Notice, this
is same notation as used for the domain of consumption alternatives in previous sections.
This is intentional, as I will interpret X as being a domain of consumable objects. Let an
assignment be a function from the set of individual variables into X. If µ and µ′ are both
assignments such that differ only in the object assigned to a then they are referred to as
a-variants, and related by µ ∼a µ′.
Then, for a given language, L(X ), each DM is characterized by the tuple
M = 〈S,X,V , {Rt}t≤T , {<s}s∈S〉.
M is referred to as a model (or, a model of decision making). S = {s, s′, . . .} is a set of states
of the world. {Rt}t≤T is a time indexed family of accessibility relations on S; as is standard,
the interpretation of Rt(s) = {s′|sRs′} is the states the DM considers possible when the
true state is s. Truth values will be assigned by V , a function that assigns to each n place
predicate and state of the world s, a class of n-tuples from X. The intended interpretation
is, for some 〈X,V〉, if (x1 . . . xn) ∈ V(α, s), with x1 . . . xn ∈ X, then αx1 . . . xn is true in that
model in state s.
LetM(X ) be the class of all models based on L(X ), and for a given domain, X, letMX
denote the subclass of models based on X. Then a DM, M , is represented semantically via
the operator |=, recursively, as
(M, s) |=µ αa1 . . . an iff (µ(a1) . . . µ(an)) ∈ V(α, s), for atomic formula (except <),
(M, s) |=µ (a< b) iff µ(a)<s µ(b),
(M, s) |=µ ¬ϕ iff not (M, s) |=µ ϕ,
(M, s) |=µ (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff (M, s) |=µ ϕ and (M, s) |=µ ψ,
(M, s) |=µ Ktϕ iff for all s′ ∈ Rt(s), (M, s′) |=µ ϕ,
(M, s) |=µ ∀aϕ iff for µ′ ∼a µ′, (M, s) |=µ′ ϕ.
A formula ϕ is satisfiable if there exists a M , and a state thereof, s, and an interpretation
µ, such that (M, s) |=µ ϕ. If a (M, s) |=µ ϕ for every assignment µ, write (M, s) |= ϕ. Given
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a DM, M , ϕ is valid in M , denoted as M |= ϕ, if (M, s) |= ϕ for all s. Likewise, for some
class of DMs, N , ϕ is valid in N , denoted as N |= ϕ, if N |= ϕ for all N ∈ N . Finally, ϕ is
valid (i.e., without qualification) if M |= ϕ, for all models M .
4.2.3 Axioms
Consider the following axiom schemata (and inference rules) regarding the language L(X ):
[AX.4.4: Prop] All substitution instances of valid formulae in propositional logic.
[AX.4.5: K] (Ktϕ ∧Kt(ϕ =⇒ ψ)) =⇒ Ktψ.
[AX.4.6: 1∀] ∀aϕ =⇒ ϕ[[a/b]]
[AX.4.7: Barcan] Kt∀aϕ =⇒ ∀aKtϕ
[AX.4.8: MP] From ϕ and (ϕ =⇒ ψ) infer ψ.
[AX.4.9: GenK] From ϕ infer Ktϕ.
[AX.4.10: Gen∀] From ϕ =⇒ ψ infer ϕ =⇒ ∀aψ, provided a is not free in ϕ.
Denote KT = (Prop∪K∪MP∪GenK) and ∀KT = KT ∪ (1∀∪Barcan∪Gen∀). It
is well known, ∀KT is a sound and complete axiomatization of the first order language L(X )
with respect to the M(X ) (for example see Chapters 13 and 14 of Hughes and Cresswell
(1996)).32 That is, the above axiom system exactly captures the semantic structure imposed
above.
Further axioms can impose structure on the DMs knowledge, and hence, semantically,
on the family of accessibility relations. Consider the following:
[AX.4.11: D] Ktϕ =⇒ Ptϕ.
[AX.4.12: T] Ktϕ =⇒ ϕ.
[AX.4.13: 4] Ktϕ =⇒ KtKtϕ.
32Given an axiom system AX, and a language L, we say that the formula ϕ ∈ L is a theorem of AX is it
is an axiom of AX or derivable from previous theorems using rules of inference contained in AX. Further,
AX is said to be sound, for the language L with respect to a class of structures N if every theorem of AX
is valid in N . Conversely, AX is said to be complete, for the language L with respect to a class of structures
N if every valid formula in N is a theorem of AX.
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[AX.4.14: 5] Ptϕ =⇒ KtPtϕ.
It is well known, in the presence of ∀KT , T, 4, and 5 correspond to the class of models
where {Rt}t≤T is a family whose members are reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean,33 respec-
tively (see Fagin et al. (2003) for the propositional case and Hughes and Cresswell (1996)
for a first order treatment). Of note is the system S5 = (∀KT ∪T ∪ 4 ∪ 5), corresponding
to the class of models where {Rt}t≤T is a family whose members are equivalence relations,
and therefore, partition the state space.
4.2.4 Implicit Preferences
Just as we can axiomatize the structure of knowledge, so to can we provide the structure to
preferences. Consider the following basic axioms:
[AX.4.15: Cmp] ∀a∀b(¬(a< b) =⇒ (b< a)).
[AX.4.16: Trv] ∀a∀b∀c((a< b) ∧ (b< c) =⇒ (a< c)).
Denote P = (Cmp∪Trv). In a similar spirit to the above results, Cmp, Trv correspond
to models where {<s}s∈S is a family whose members are complete and transitive, respectively.
Formally, denote by the superscripts, r, t, e, the classes of DMs such that {Rt}t≤T are
reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean, and by cmp, trv the class of DMs such that {<s}s∈S
that are complete, and transitive, respectively. For example, Mr,e,cmp,trv(X ) is the class of
DM for which Rt is reflexive and Euclidean for all t, and <s is complete and transitive for
all s ∈ S.
Proposition 4.1. Let C be a possibly empty subset of {T, 4, 5,Cmp,Trv}, and let C be the
corresponding subset of {r, e, t, cmp, trv}. Then ∀KT ∪ C is a sound and complete axioma-
tization of L(X ) with respect to MC(X ).
Proof. In appendix C.2.
Preferential axioms play the role of traditionally decision theoretic restrictions (i.e., com-
pleteness, transitivity, etc); any (satisfiable) theory including these restrictions will have a
33Recall, a relation is Euclidian if xRy and xRz imply yRz.
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model of decision making adhering to the corresponding decision theoretic framework. The
importance, therefore, of this framework is that it provides us a language to make a clean
distinction between non-modal preference and its epistemic counterpart and to analyze the
interplay there between. Specifically, the distinction between some elementary (read, true)
preference and the preference the decision maker knows or is aware of.
The discrepancy between the DM’s “true” preferences and her implicitly known prefer-
ences (and later, in the presence of unawareness, her explicitly known preferences), can be
made formal. To do this, define, in addition to <s, implicitly known preference, <Kt,s.
Definition. Let M be a model of decision making. Define the implicit preference relation,
as
<Kt,s =
⋂
s′∈Rt(s)
<s′ (4.1)
The interpretation is as follows: If the true state is s, then the DM is endowed with
the preference <s. However, she may not know this is her preference. In particular, if
(M, s) |=µ (a< b) ∧ ¬Kt(a< b), then in state s at time t, the DM prefers µ(a) to µ(b), but
does not (implicitly) know her preference. For the DM to make a report µ(a)<µ(y), or take
an action on the basis of said preference, she must, as a prerequisite, know she prefers µ(a)
to µ(b).
Remark 4.2. x<Kt,s y if and only if (M, s) |=µ Kt(a< b) holds for any µ such that µ(a) = x
and µ(b) = y.
If M models a theory that includes preferential axioms, then the DM knows these restric-
tions. For example, if M ∈ Mcmp,trv(X ), then the DM knows her preference are complete
and transitive (since every instance of Cmp and Trv hold at every state, as implied by
GenK). This observation implies that while the DM may not know her true preference,
(M, s) |=µ ¬Kt(a< b) ∧ ¬Kt(b< a), she nonetheless knows the structure of her true prefer-
ence, (M, s) |=µ Kt((a< b) ∨ (b< a)). As a result, structural ignorance, where the DM does
not know the structure of her preferences, cannot be captured here. This behavior can be
captured once awareness is introduced.
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When the decision maker’s true preferences are a weak order, her implicit preferences are
a preorder (i.e., reflexive and transitive). While the implicit preferences inherit reflexivity
and transitivity, the same can not be said about completeness. Even if the DM knows
her preferences are complete, she might not know what her preference is. The framework
takes a complete preference relation and returns an incomplete preference relation by nature
of introducing uncertainty about the true state of affairs. Indeed, consider the following
example.
Example 4.2. There is a single time period. There are two states of the world, S = {s, s′}
and two elements that can be consumed, X = {x, y}. The preference relations in each state
are given by <s = {(x, x), (x, y), (y, y)} and <s′ = {(x, x), (y, x), (y, y)} and the accessibility
relation is the trivial R = S2. So, <K,s = <K,s′ = {(x, x), (y, y)}, which are not complete.
So, M |=µ K((a< b) ∨ (a< b)) ∧ ¬K(a< b) ∧ ¬K(a< b), for any µ such that µ(a) = x and
µ(b) = y. Notice, the DM also satisfies negative introspection (i.e., 5), so she knows she
does not know her preference: M |=µ K
(¬K(a< b) ∧ ¬K(a< b)).
It is well known, in finite domains, incomplete preferences can be represented by family
of utility functions Ok (2002); Evren and Ok (2011). Multi-utility representations identify
a set of utility functions, U , such that x is preferred to y if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y) for all
u ∈ U . By nature of producing an incomplete preference relation, this framework also allows
such a representation. From the conceptual analogy between the representation and the set
U and the implicitly known preferences and the set R(s), it is clear this framework instills
the natural interpretation to the set of utility functionals.
Remark 4.3. Let M be a model of ∀KT ∪ P . For each s ∈ S, let,
Us,t = {us′ : X → R | us′ represents <s′ and s′ ∈ Rt(s)}. (4.2)
Then, for every s ∈ S and t ≤ T ,
1. <Kt,s is reflexive and transitive, and
2. x<Kt,s y if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y) for all u ∈ Us,t.
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Proof. Fix s ∈ S, and t ≤ T . By Proposition 4.1, (x, x) ∈ <s for all s ∈ S and x ∈ X. So
(x, x) ∈ ⋂s′∈Rt(s)<s′ = <Kt,s. <Kt,s is reflexive. Now let, (x, y), (y, z) ∈ <Kt,s. So, for each
s′ ∈ Rt(s), (x, y), (y, z) ∈ <s′ . By Proposition 4.1, <s′ is transitive, so (x, z) ∈ <s′ . Hence,
(x, z) ∈ ⋂s′∈Rt(s)<s′ = <Kt,s. <Kt,s is transitive.
Now, to establish the representation claim: u(x) ≥ u(y) for all u ∈ Us,t if and only if
us′(x) ≥ us′(y) for all s′ ∈ R(s), where us′ represents <s′ . By the definition of a representa-
tion, this is if and only if x<s′ y for all s′ ∈ Rt(s), the definition of implicit preference.
Moreover, any incomplete preference (over a finite domain) can be generated by preferen-
tial logical model. This can be seen by constructing, for each u ∈ U some su such that <s is
the order induced by u. Then any model such that S ⊇ {su|u ∈ U} and R(s) = {su|u ∈ U}
will suffice. As such, simple models of incomplete preferences can be seen as models of
epistemic uncertainty: a DM who is aware of all of her options but is unsure about the
true state of affairs. Her incompleteness is derived form a lack of knowledge, even though
her preferences exist and she knows her preferences exist. The set of preference relations
she considers in her multi utility model are her true preferences in each world she considers
possible.
4.3 AWARENESS STRUCTURES
To directly incorporate unawareness, add two time indexed modal operators, At and Et for
t = 1 . . . T , to the logic. Starting with the same set of atomic propositions as above, refer to
the resulting language as LA(X ). The interpretation of the modal operators is as in Fagin
and Halpern (1988). Kt is implicit knowledge at time t; an agent knows ϕ, denoted Ktϕ,
if ϕ is true in all state she considers possible at time t. At is awareness at time t; Atϕ
is interpreted as the DM is aware of ϕ at time t. Lastly, Et is explicit knowledge —the
conjunction of Kt and At. The DM explicitly knows ϕ if she implicitly knows it and is aware
of it: Ktϕ ∧ Atϕ. Set PEt as short hand for explicit possibility, or ¬Et¬.34
34Explicit possibility states the DM does not explicitly know the negation of a formula –hence she would
not act in response to its negation. Note that while explicit knowledge is a stricter requirement that implicit
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The choice of semantics for awareness in a first order model is non-trivial. One choice
is, for example, to assume awareness is comprised of some subset of the domain over which
variables range –implying if the decision maker is aware of all the objects specified in a
formula, she is aware of the formula itself (i.e., “Object Based Unawareness” investigated by
Board and Chung (2011); Board et al. (2011)). But this is very limiting, as it prohibits the
DM from from being aware of an object but unaware of some of its attributes –a necessary
feature to model many economic environments. For example, a DM is choosing between a
Mac and a PC, and currently does not know her preference. However, after learning that
her job requires her to use a particular piece of software, which runs only on Windows, and
which she had been unaware of, she prefers the PC.
Another option, as in the logic of Halpern and Reˆgo (2009), is that awareness is comprised
of some subset of the language (a set of formulae or sentences). This is closer to ideal but
still not exactly right. The reason being, I wish to interpret awareness semantically (i.e.,
by assigning meaning to the variables in a formula), rather than purely syntactically (i.e.,
leaving variables as variables). To see why, consider
A0∀a(a < a), (4.3)
A0∀a(a < b), (4.4)
where both a and b are variables. The first formula states the DM is aware < is a reflexive
relation. The assignment of variables plays no role in the interpretation of the first formula,
since the only variable, a, is under the scope of a quantifier. The second formula, however,
has a variable b that is not under the scope of any quantifier. To provide this formula with
semantic meaning, first b must be given a meaning via a semantic interpretation. The inten-
tion is that the DM is aware of information, statements that have specific interpretations,
and when b is left as a variable, (4.4) does not have a specific interpretation.
My approach strikes a balance between these two options. I formally construct the
awareness structure such that it ranges over formulae (unlike Board and Chung (2011);
Board et al. (2011)), but after they have been assigned a semantic meaning (unlike Halpern
knowledge, the opposite relation is true for possibly. For this reason, Remark 4.10 and Theorem 4.12 require
that the DM explicitly knows the explicitly possibility in question.
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and Reˆgo (2009)). This construction uses a second language intimately related to LA(X )
–the language is exactly LA(X ) but with free variables replaced with logical constants.
4.3.1 A Semantic Language: L(X)
The following is done with the intention of representing the DM’s awareness over semantic
statements, formulae that have interpretations –whose variables are assigned to elements
of X. Of course, in order to allow for introspection, the DM must be able to be aware of
formulae that contain bound variables. To do this, I define an auxiliary language L(X). The
construction of L(X) is as follows. First, any n place predicate followed by n members of
X is a well formed atomic formula. Then for well formed formulae, ϕ¯ and ψ¯, ¬ϕ¯, ϕ¯ ∧ ψ¯,
ϕ¯ are also well formed. Lastly for any formula ϕ¯, ∀aϕ¯[x/a] is well formed, where ϕ¯[x/a] is
the formula ϕ¯ with all (and possibly no) occurrences of x replaced with a, for some x ∈ X
and a ∈ X . Notationally, ϕ¯ (with a bar) will always denote a formula in L(X), whereas ϕ
(without a bar) will denote a formula in LA(X ).
The formulae of L(X) correspond precisely the formulae of LA(X ) but with semantic
interpretation attached to the free, and only free, variables. To see this, consider reduced
assignments, which are purely syntactic transformations of formulae. A reduced assignment
µ¯, which corresponds to the assignment µ, is a function that takes as an input a well formed
formula ϕ ∈ L(X ) and returns the string of characters created by taking ϕ and replacing
every free variable, a with µ(a). Lemma 8 states the output of a reduced assignment is
always in L(X), and every formula in L(X) is the output of some reduced assignment acting
on some formula of LA(X ).
This connection allows us to describe awareness as a set, A ⊆ L(X), and hence naturally
endowed with a semantic interpretation. Under a given assignment µ, A represents the DM’s
awareness of the formulae {ϕ ∈ L(X)|µ¯(ϕ) ∈ A}. Lemma 8, ensures this conception is not
limiting: for any Γ ⊆ L(X) there exist someA(Γ, µ) = {ϕ¯ ∈ L(X)|ϕ¯ = µ¯(ϕ), ϕ ∈ Γ} ⊆ L(X)
such that DM is aware of exactly Γ, given the semantic interpretation µ.
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4.3.2 The Semantics of Awareness
A DM with an awareness structure is described as M = 〈S,X,V , {Rt}t≤T , {<s}s∈S, {At}t≤T 〉,
where previously introduce components are as they were before and At : S → 2L(X) indicates
the set of propositions of which the DM is aware in state s at time t. The interpretation
is captured by the following semantics, which are added to the definition of |=, in Section
4.2.2:
(M, s) |=µ Atϕ iff µ¯(ϕ) ∈ At(s),
(M, s) |=µ Etϕ iff (M, s) |=µ Ktϕ and (M, s) |=µ Atϕ.
At times, it will be helpful to speak of the truth of a formula in L(X), provided M ∈ MX .
This will be represented by
(M, s) |=X ϕ¯ iff (M, s) |=µ ϕ, for some (µ, ϕ) such that µ¯(ϕ) = ϕ.
Lemma’s 8 and 9 guarantee |=X is well defined. Indeed, by Lemma 8, there always exists
a (µ, ϕ) that stands in the correct relation to ϕ¯ and by Lemma 9 the choice of such (µ, ϕ)
does not impact the truth value.
Notice, if ϕ is a sentence in LA(X ), then (M, s) |=µ ϕ implies (M, s) |= ϕ and (M, s) |=X
ϕ (where ϕ ∈ L(X) since it has no free variables). This is well known in general first
order modal logic, but it worth pointing out, the same holds in the presence of awareness
and explicit knowledge modalities. To see this note the only case not covered by previous
arguments is if ϕ = Atψ. Since ϕ is a sentence, so too must be ψ. But then, µ¯(ψ) = ψ for
all reduced assignments µ¯, and so, the truth of Atψ does not depend on the interpretation.
Fagin and Halpern (1988) showed this semantic structure of unawareness is captured
axiomatically by
[AX.4.17: A0] Etϕ ⇐⇒ (Kϕ ∧ Atϕ).
Axiom A0 simply states that explicit knowledge is the conjunction of implicit knowledge
and unawareness. Even with first order models and semantic awareness, this is in the only
additional axiom needed for general awareness structures.
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Proposition 4.4. ∀KT ∪A0 is a sound and complete axiomatization of LA(X ) with respect
to M(X ).
Proof. In appendix C.2.
Take note, Lemma’s 8 and 9 imply that ∀KT ∪A0 is also a complete and sound axiom-
atization of L(X) with respect to MX .
4.3.3 Explicit Preference
Just as implicit knowledge gave rise to the DM’s implicitly known preference, explicit knowl-
edge will likewise define her explicitly known preferences. As a prerequisite, define the pref-
erences of which the DM is aware.
Definition. Let M be a model of decision making. Define
<At,s = {(x, y)|(x< y) ∈ As(t)} (4.5)
Just as explicit knowledge is the intersection of knowledge and awareness, explicit pref-
erence is the intersection of implicit preference and awareness.
Definition. Let M be a model of decision making. Define the explicit preference relation,
as
<Et,s = <At,s
⋂
<Kt,s (4.6)
Remark 4.5. x<Et,s y if and only if (M, s) |=µ Et(a< b) holds for any µ such that µ(a) = x
and µ(b) = y.
Just as the DM could have a true preference and not implicitly know it, if (M, s) |=X
Kt(x< y)∧¬At(a< y), then at time t, in state s, the DM implicitly knows her preference but
is unaware of it, and hence does not explicitly know it. As argued earlier implicit knowledge is
necessary to act upon a preference. Similarly, when awareness is taken into account, the DM
must explicitly know her preference in order to act in accordance. The major contribution of
this paper, and what is meant as the behavioral implications of unawareness, is the contrast
between <Kt,s and <Et,s.
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Without further restrictions the sets <Et,s can any arbitrary subset of <Kt,s. However,
given the intent to describe a DM’s preferences under unawareness, there are several natural
assumptions on the structure of awareness. At this stage, I wish to examine the behavioral
implications of a DM who is unaware of some outcomes and contingencies, but acts as
rationally as possible with respect to those of which she is aware. In Section 4.1.2, without
the underlying epistemic framework, LCmp stated the DM was aware of some Y ⊆ X, over
which she had complete preferences. A similar restriction can be made in this environment.
For example, if the DM is aware of a preference ranking x weakly to y, At(x< y), it seems
only natural she is also aware of the preference ranking y weakly to x. Likewise, if the DM
is aware of rankings over x and y, and over z and w, she ought to be aware of rankings over
x and z.
[AX.4.18: A1] ∀a∀b(At(a< b) ⇐⇒ (At(a< a) ∧ At(b< b))).
This restriction does not say anything about the DM’s actual or implicitly known prefer-
ences –only about her awareness. Nonetheless, there is an intuitive connection between A1
and LCmp: there exists some Y ⊆ X, such that the DM is aware of all preference relations
among Y , and none outside of Y . This connection can be seen by the following result:
Proposition 4.6. Let M be a model of ∀K ∪P ∪A0∪A1, then <Et,s satisfies LRfx and
Trv.
Proof. Let (x, y) ∈ <Et,s. Then (x, y) ∈ <At,s: (M, s) |=X At(x< y). So by A1, (M, s) |=X
At(x<x), or, (x, x) ∈ <At,s. By Remark 4.3, (x, x) ∈ <Kt,s. So, (x, x) ∈ <At,s
⋂
<Kt,s =
<Et,s. The proof for transitivity similar.
4.3.4 The Structure of Awareness
By a similar motivation, if the DM is aware of the statement ϕ implies x is preferred to
y, At(ϕ =⇒ (x< y)), then reasonably she should be aware of the statement ϕ and the
preference (x< y). This is captured by the notion that A is closed under “subformulae”.
[AX.4.19: A↓]

(
(At¬ϕ) ∨ (Atϕ) ∨ (At(ϕ ∧ ψ)) ∨ (At(ψ ∧ ϕ))
)
=⇒ Atϕ
At∀aϕ =⇒ ¬∀b¬Atϕ[[a/b]]
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A↓ specifies the DM is able to extrapolate downwards: if the DM is aware of ϕ, her
understanding is full enough to contemplate on the constituent parts of ϕ. A↓ is not exactly
closure under subformulae, since this would entail At∀aϕ =⇒ ∀bAtϕ[[a/b]]: the DM is
aware of every instance embodied by ∀aϕ. This is clearly too strong, it implies the DM
who is aware her preferences are reflexive, is aware of every object of consumption. To
accommodate this subtly, the quantified case is relaxed so that the DM only need be aware
of some instance embodied by ∀aϕ. There are two notable consequences of A↓. First, the
DM’s explicit knowledge is closed under implication: (Etϕ ∧ Et(ϕ =⇒ ψ)) =⇒ Etψ.
Second, the DM is unaware of what she is unaware of.
The converse of A↓ can also be dictated.
[AX.4.20: A↑] (Atϕ∧Atψ) =⇒
(
(At¬ϕ)∧(Atϕ)∧(At(ϕ∧ψ))∧(At(ψ∧ϕ))∧At∀aϕ[[b/a]]
)
A↑ specifies the DM is able to extrapolate upwards: if the DM is aware of all of the
constituent parts of ϕ, her understanding is full enough to be aware of ϕ itself. While A↓
does not seem to be a particularly restrictive notion, A↑ is slightly more controversial as it
implies that the DM who is aware of anything is aware of formula of arbitrary complexity.
As in the propositional case, if both A↓ and A↑ are jointly satisfied then At is generated
by a set of primitive propositions (i.e., generated according to the construction rules of
L(X)). The unawareness of DM who satisfies A↓ and A↑ does not arise from cognitive
limitations (she is aware of all of the logical entailments of her own awareness). Instead, her
unawareness regards statements completely disjoint from her current world view, things she
has never heard of.
Lastly, consider the axiom that dictates the DM knows what she is aware of,
[AX.4.21: KA] ∇t(Atϕ).
It is well known that KA distinguishes models in which At(s) = At(s′) for all s′ ∈ Rt(s).
The interpretation here is that the DM can always (implicitly) reflect on her on awareness,
and therefore distinguish between states in which her awareness differs. Of course, this
delineation does not necessarily occur at the explicit knowledge level.
Finally, let A denote the axiom system A0 ∪A↓ ∪A↑ and A? as A ∪A1 ∪KA.
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4.4 CONTINGENT PLANNING, OR, FINALLY, THE BEHAVIORAL
IMPLICATION OF AWARENESS OF UNAWARENESS
With the requisite foundational matters taken care of, I turn to delineating the behavioral
effects of incorporating awareness structures. Because I would like to talk about maximality
of contingent plans, assume “utilities” are bounded from above by some outcome. This is
captured axiomatically by
[AX.4.22: Bnd] ∃a∀b(a < b).
and, when the DM’s preferences is to be bounded when considering the restriction to her
awareness set,
[AX.4.23: ABnd] ∃a∀b(At(a< a) ∧ (At(b< b) =⇒ (a < b))).
These axioms ensure the decision maker, when fully informed about her preference,
would have a optimal consumption choice –so any lack of maximality is not arising from a
lack of closure. Notice, also, in any model of full awareness, Bnd and ABnd are materially
equivalent.
4.4.1 Implicitly Known Contingent Plans
It is in this set up that I show awareness of unawareness produces a natural incompleteness
in rankings over contingent plans, in particular, even when states are fully contractable. A
mapping (ϕ¯ 7→ x)t, where ϕ¯ ∈ L(X) and x ∈ X, is the commitment to consume x in period
t if ϕ¯ is true. This is a partial contingent plan, since it does not specify what happens in
states where ϕ¯ is not true. Regardless, the following dictates when a rational DM would
refuse accept committing to (ϕ¯ 7→ x)t.
Definition. A partial contingent plan, (ϕ¯ 7→ x)t, is implicitly unacceptable to a decision
maker, M , in state s, if
(M, s) |=µ P0
(
ϕ ∧ ∃aKt(a  b)
)
, (4.7)
whenever µ¯(ϕ) = ϕ¯ and µ¯(b) = x.
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Parsing the above definition, a DM is unwilling to commit to (ϕ¯ 7→ x)t if at time 0 the
decision maker considers it possible ϕ¯ is true and by time t, she will know the existence of an
object y, such that y is preferred to x. There are three relevant outcomes at time t: (1) ϕ¯ is
not true, so her commitment does not bind, (2) ϕ¯ is true but she does not know any object
she prefers to x, or, (3) ϕ¯ is true and she knows an object she prefers to x. So, the DM is
unwilling to commit to (ϕ¯ 7→ x)t if she believes it is possible (3) might occur – by waiting
until time t and then making a decision she could be strictly better off. On the other hand,
say a contingent plan is acceptable if it is not unacceptable.
Definition. A partial contingent plan, (ϕ¯ 7→ x)t, is implicitly acceptable to a decision
maker, M , in state s, if
(M, s) |=µ K0
(
ϕ =⇒ ∀aP0(b< a)
)
(4.8)
whenever µ¯(ϕ) = ϕ¯ and µ¯(b) = x.
Parsing this formula, a DM is willing to commit if she knows at time 0, whenever ϕ¯ is
true she will consider it possible at time t that x is preferred to any other element. In other
words, she knows she will not know ϕ is true and an object y is preferred to x. If the DM
knows ¬ϕ then (ϕ =⇒ ∀aP0(b< a)) is always true and the DM finds the partial contingent
plan acceptable.
Stringing together these partial contingent plans can produce a complete contingent plan.
Of course, to be well defined the formulae ought to partition the state space.
Definition. A finite set of formulae, Λ ⊂ L(X), is a contractable set, or simply con-
tractable, for some class of models, N ⊆MX , if
1.
∨
ϕ¯∈Λ ϕ¯ is valid in N , and,
2. for any distinct ϕ¯, ψ¯ ∈ Λ, ϕ¯ ∧ ψ¯ is unsatisfiable in N .
Sometimes a contractable set will be referred to as (Λ,Γ, µ), under the acknowledgement
that Λ is contractable, Γ ⊂ L(X ) and µ¯ defines a bijection between Λ and Γ. An obvious
example of the basis for a contingent plan is {ϕ¯,¬ϕ¯} ⊂ L(X). Using Λ as a basis, a period t
contingent plan, ct, is a mapping from ct : Λ→ X. We can define implicit acceptability and
unacceptability of complete contingent plans by similar conditions as above.
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Definition. A contingent plan, ct : Λ → X, based on (Λ,Γ, µ), is implicitly acceptable
to a decision maker, M , in state s, if
(M, s) |=µ K0
∧
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ =⇒ ∀aPt
(
ct(ϕ)< a
))
(4.9)
whenever µ¯(ϕ) = ϕ¯ and µ¯(c(ϕ)) = c(ϕ¯), and provided there is no free occurrence of a in ϕ,
for all ϕ ∈ Λ. It is implicitly unacceptable, if, under the same conditions,
(M, s) |=µ P0
∨
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ ∧ ∃aKt
(
a  ct(ϕ)
))
. (4.10)
Intuitively, a contingent plan is acceptable if it provides outcomes that are no worse
than what could have been selected by the DM had she waited until time t and then made
a decision. It is unacceptable if this is not the case. Lemma 10 shows, in any model of
∀KT ∪ Cmp, in a given state, every contingent plan is either acceptable or unacceptable
(logically, (4.9) and (4.10) are material negations is such models).
Of course, for a contingent plan to be deemed acceptable, the set of formulae on which
it is based must be rich enough so that it could mimic any decision making process the
DM could have implemented without a contingent plan (i.e., by waiting until t and making
a single decision). If this condition is not met by a set Λ, then there may not exist any
acceptable contingent plan. Before formalizing this idea, consider the following example.
Example 4.3. Let T = 1. There are two states of the world S = {s, s′}. The domain
consists of 2 distinct objects, X = {x, y}. The preference relations, as induced by V(<),
in each state are given by <s = {(x, x), (x, y), (y, y)} and <s′ = {(x, x), (y, x), (y, y)}. The
accessibility relations are R0 = S
2, and R1 = {(s, s), (s′, s′)}; the DM is initially uncertain
about the state but will be able to distinguish in period 1. It is easily checked that this is a
model of S5 ∪ P ∪ ∀ ∪Bnd ∪ F ∪ S1.
For any ϕ¯ ∈ L(∆) let Λ = ψ¯ = (ϕ¯ ∨ ¬ϕ¯). Let µ be any assignment such that µ¯(ψ) = ψ¯
and µ¯(b) = x. Since, ψ is a tautology, and there are no two distinct elements of Λ, Λ is
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contractable. There are only two contingent plans that can be based on Λ, ψ¯ 7→ x, and ψ¯ 7→ y.
Now, notice
(M, s′) |=µ′ (a  b),
for the a-variant of µ where µ′(a) = y. Since, Rt(s′) = {s′},
(M, s′) |=µ′ Kt(a  b).
So, by definition, (and the fact that ϕ is tautological),
(M, s′) |=µ ϕ ∧ ∃aKt(a  b).
Now and finally, since s′ ∈ R0(s′′) for all s′′ ∈ S,
(M, s′) |=µ P0
(
ϕ ∧ ∃aKt(a  b)
)
.
But since µ was arbitrary, ψ¯ 7→ x is unacceptable in any state s′′ ∈ S. Of course the same
argument goes to show ψ¯ 7→ y is likewise unacceptable, and hence, there is no acceptable
contingent plan.
Example 4.4.1 raises the question as to the existence of restrictions on a contractable
set Λ that will guarantee the existence of an acceptable contingent plan. In Example 4.4.1,
no contingent plan allows the DM to consume different objects in different states, which of
course, she would want to do. If, however, she waited until period 1, she would be able
to make an informed decision and choose the optimal consumption. In order to ensure the
existence of acceptable contingent plans, I will consider contractable sets that are rich enough
that any decision making process the decision maker could implement without a contingent
plan can reproduced with one.
Definition. Fix a model M . Let sKt = {ϕ¯ ∈ L(X)|(M, s) |=X Ktϕ¯}. A contractable set Λ
is t-separable if whenever sKt 6= s′Kt then (M, s) |=X ϕ¯ implies (M, s′) |=X ¬ϕ¯, for any
ϕ ∈ Λ.
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Theorem 4.7. Let M be a model ∀KT ∪P ∪T∪Bnd. For any t-separable and contractable
set Λ, there exists a contingent plan, ct, based on Λ that is acceptable at every s.
Proof. In appendix C.3.
Theorem 4.7 states that so long as the contractable set is rich enough to allow the DM to
make decisions with at least as much distinction as if she had waited until time t, then she
will be willing to commit to something. The intuition is simple: there exists a contingent
plan that can implement her optimal choice behavior in time t, so the optimal contingent
plan must be weakly better. But since the optimal contingent plan weakly out preforms
waiting, she is willing to commit to it.
Without further qualification, Theorem 4.7 does not help to establish the existence of an
optimal contingent plan since it requires the existence of a t-separable contingent plan, itself
not guaranteed to exist. The next result mollifies this concern, at least in finite models.
Proposition 4.8. Let M be a model of ∀KT ∪ P ∪ T ∪ Bnd with a finite state space, S.
Then there exists a t-separable contractable set containing |S| formulae.
Proof. In appendix C.3.
Putting these two results together, provides a behavioral characterization for full aware-
ness regarding the acceptability of contingent plans.
Corollary 4.9. Let M be a model of ∀KT ∪P ∪T∪Bnd with a finite state space, S. Then
for all t, there exists a contractable set Λ(t) and a contingent plan there based, ct, that is
acceptable in every s ∈ S.
While t-separability is sufficient to ensure existence, it is not necessary. For example,
consider the case where preferences are constant across states, and so, fully known. Then,
even if Λ is a single formula, an acceptable contingent plan exists. This indicates that perhaps
the notion of t-separability can be weakened to provide a necessary condition. Indeed, this
can be done,35 but the resulting restriction is more convoluted than insightful. Further, in
light of Proposition 4.8, this additional complexity is superfluous. In particular, as it is
35Specifically, if two states, s and s′, can be separated via a contingent plan whenever the set of maximal
elements of <Kt,s and <Kt,s′ have an empty intersection.
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my focus to show explicit acceptability is harder to satisfy than its implicit counterpart,
it suffices to provide any weak condition that provides existence of implicitly acceptable
contingent plans in a large class of models.
4.4.2 Explicitly Known Contingent Plans
The takeaway from the previous section is that if the decision maker is acting according to her
implicitly known preference, then she is always willing to commit to something. There exists
an acceptable contingent plan based on any t-separable set of formulae, itself guaranteed
to exist in finite models. The intuition is clear: if a contingent plan can be written in a
sufficiently flexible way (i.e., such that it will allow the decision maker to use all available
information) there is no reason not to commit. Of course, this line of reasoning relies on the
dictate the DM knows what it is she might learn. In other words, the contingent plan allows
the DM to specify consumption in the event she learns a particular piece of information, and
so it is requisite she know (at time the contingent plan is written) every piece of information
she might learn. This is markedly impossible in the event she is unaware of things, and
aware of her unawareness!
This is, finally, the behavioral implication of unawareness: the unwillingness to commit
to any contingent plan, even under circumstances that make knowledge very well behaved.
The acceptance of a contingent plan is given by the following, in analogy to (4.9) and (4.10):
Definition. A contingent plan, ct : Λ→ X, based on (Λ,Γ, µ), is explicitly acceptable to
a decision maker, M , in state s, if
(M, s) |=µ E0
∧
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ =⇒ ∀aPEt
(
ct(ϕ)< a
))
(4.11)
whenever µ¯(ϕ) = ϕ¯ and µ¯(c(ϕ)) = c(ϕ¯), and provided there is no free occurrence of a in ϕ,
for all ϕ ∈ Λ. It is explicitly unacceptable, if, under the same conditions,
(M, s) |=µ PE0
∨
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ ∧ ∃aEt
(
a  ct(ϕ)
))
. (4.12)
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With implicit knowledge, DM a contact is either acceptable or unacceptable, as shown in
Lemma 10. With explicit knowledge, the relation is weaker. If a contingent plan is acceptable
it is not unacceptable, and if a contingent plan is unacceptable it is not acceptable (each
implies the negation of the other), but it is possible neither condition holds.36 As such, it is
not enough to show a contingent plan is not acceptable, instead, it is required to show (4.12)
holds.
There exists one additional concern when relaxing full awareness. It may be the DM is
unaware of some aspect of the contingent plan itself, and therefore could not make reasonable
choices regarding it. For instance, if the formulae on which the plan was based are not in the
DM’s awareness set. Therefore, it is necessary to impose that contingent plans are articulable
to the DM. That is to say, the DM is aware of the constituent parts of the contingent plan
(the contingencies, Λ, and the outcomes, Im(c)).
Definition. Given a DM, M , a contingent plan c : Λ→ X is articulable (in state s) if
1. Λ ⊆ A0(s).
2. (x< y) ∈ A0(s) for any x, y ∈ Im(c).
If a contingent plan is articulable, then DM is able to conceive of it at the time when
she would have to commit. If a DM was asked to report her set of potential contingent
plans, these are the contingent plans which she would be able to articulate; the contingent
plans that are constructible given the language of which she is currently aware. Under full
awareness, every contingent plan is articulable. As stated in the introduction, the behavioral
characterization relies only on rankings over objects the DM can articulate, and so I will
restrict my attention to articulable contingent plans.
The following example shows even under very well behaved knowledge, the existence
of unawareness can render every articulable contingent plan unacceptable. Of course, this
trivially holds whenA0 = ∅ (since there is no explicit knowledge and no articulable contingent
plans). Hence, to make a meaningful claim, I am obliged to show something more strict:
36In particular, this arises when a contingent plan is implicitly acceptable (therefore not explicitly unac-
ceptable), but the DM is unaware of the necessary statements for (4.11) to hold. This misalignment is a
consequence of the fact that the awareness modality, A, does not respect material equivalence (i.e., ϕ ⇐⇒ ψ
is a theorem does not imply Atϕ ⇐⇒ Atψ) is a theorem). Of course, this property is potentially desirable
as it is a very natural relaxation of logical omniscience.
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even when articulable contingent plans exist, they may all be unacceptable and the DM will
explicitly know this!
Remark 4.10. There exist models of S5 ∪ PA? ∪ Bnd, that admit articulable contingent
plans and such that the DM explicitly knows every articulable contingent plan is explicitly
unacceptable.
Proof. Example 4.4.2.
Example 4.4. Let S be a single state, s, assessable from itself in every period. Let X =
{x, y, z}, with <s defined by z s y s x. A0 be the closure (under the construction rules
for L(X)) of {{x, y}2}, At be the closure of {{x, y, z}2}. Let ϕ¯ be any statement of the form
(ψ¯ ∨¬ψ¯) for some ψ¯ ∈ A0. This defines a model of S5∪P ∪∀∪A? ∪Bnd∪F∪ St (note:
F and St are defined in Section 4.5).
Note, it is without loss of generality to consider contingent plans of the form ϕ¯ 7→ x or
ϕ¯ 7→ y; since there is only one state there will always be a unique element of the contractable
set that is satisfied in the model. Fix, (Λ,Γ, µ) such that µ¯(ϕ) = ϕ¯ and a does not occur free
in ϕ. And denote by a, b, c variables such that µ¯(a) = x, µ¯(b) = y, and µ¯(c) = z. We will
show ϕ¯ 7→ y is unacceptable (the argument for ϕ¯ 7→ x is the same).
By assumption (z  y) ∈ At(s):
(M, s) |=µ At(c  b)). (4.13)
Moreover, since both ϕ¯ and (x  y) are in A0 ⊂ At, PE0 (ϕ¯∧∃aEt(a  y)) is also in A0 ⊂ At:
(M, s) |=µ A0PE0 (ϕ ∧ ∃aEt(a  b)). (4.14)
By assumption (M, s) |=µ (c  b). Since Rt(s) = {s}, this implies, (M, s) |=µ Kt(c  b).
Combining this with (4.13), we have (M, s) |=µ Et(c  b). This means, for any µ′ ∼a µ such
that µ′(a) = µ(c), (M, s) |=µ′ Et(a  b). By definition,
(M, s) |=µ ∃aEt(a  b).
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Applying the fact Rt(s) = {s} twice, (and, ϕ is true at s) implies
(M, s) |=µ K0PE0
(
ϕ ∧ ∃aEt(a  b)
)
. (4.15)
Combining (4.14) and (4.15),
(M, s) |=µ E0PE0
(
ϕ ∧ ∃aEt(a  b)
)
.
as desired.
Example 4.4.2 shows once awareness is introduced, there is no longer a guarantee of
acceptability. The introduction of unawareness (and subsequent focus on explicit rather
than implicit acceptability) has fundamentally changed the behavior of the DM –creating
a preference for delay that cannot be assuaged by allowing the DM to make conditional
decisions. And, by Proposition 4.8, this behavior, unlike incompleteness or a preference for
flexibility, cannot be explained in a framework with full awareness, no matter how much
uncertainty exists. It is a behavioral trait that indicates the presence of unawareness.
Recall, unacceptability refers here only to articulable contingent plans. In the example,
all of the conditions for Proposition 4.8 are met; there exists an implicitly acceptable contin-
gent plan, namely ϕ¯ 7→ z. However, this contact is inarticulable because the DM is unaware
of z. If the modeler were to ask the DM about ϕ¯ 7→ z, she would, after some reflection, be
willing to accept it. Of course, in doing so, the modeler would have made her aware of z,
thereby changing the structure of the very entity whose identification is of interest. It is this
subtlety that motivates the departure from the standard revealed preference framework.
As informally argued in the introduction, an unwillingness to commit to any articulable
contingent plan is the result of a language that is not rich enough to specify the optimal
contingent plan (unawareness), but is rich enough to articulate this fact (awareness of un-
awareness). The following results formalize this intuition.
Theorem 4.11. Let M be a model of ∀KT∪P∪A?∪Bnd, such that (x<x), (y< y) ∈ A0(s)
for some x, y ∈ X. Then if c, based on (Λ,Γ, µ) is an articulable and implicitly acceptable
contingent plan in state s, it is explicitly acceptable in state s.
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Proof. In appendix C.3.
Theorem 4.11 states that if the DM can articulate an optimal contingent plan, she
will find it explicitly acceptable. Since the contingent plan is implicitly acceptable, the
consumption alternatives it specifies are optimal in each state. Moreover, since the DM is
aware of these alternatives, she is also aware of the statements professing their optimality
(by her ability to extrapolate from explicitly known statements, i.e., A↑). Putting these two
facts together delivers the result. This result shows the given formulation of awareness (to
wit, under A?), places clear limits on how unaware a DM can be. Because of the structure
of explicit knowledge, the DM cannot be explicitly uncertain if a consumption alternative, x,
is optimal: if ∀a(x< a) ∈ A and x is indeed optimal (at all s), the DM explicitly knows this.
More generally, unawareness, captured as in this paper, does not allow the DM to question
statements she implicitly knows. This limitation is discussed in more detail in Halpern and
Reˆgo (2013).
Theorem 4.11 places an upper-bound on the DM’s awareness such that she finds all
articulable contingent plans explicitly unacceptable; Theorem 4.12 places the corresponding
lower-bound.
Theorem 4.12. Let M be a model of ∀KT ∪P ∪T∪A? ∪ABnd with a finite state space.
Then if M admits articulable contingent plans in state s, and the DM explicitly knows every
articulable contingent plan is unacceptable, the DM explicitly knows it is possible she is
unaware. Specifically,
(M, s) |= E0PE0 (∃a (¬A0(a< a) ∧ At(a< a))) .
Proof. In appendix C.3.
A DM cannot be so unaware she is not even aware waiting will afford her a more complete
world view. That is, the DM must be introspectively unaware. The intuition of this result is
straightforward. The DM, acting on explicit knowledge, must explicitly know all contingent
plans are unacceptable and this requires she is aware she will have more choices if she does
not commit.
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4.5 A PREFERENCE FOR FLEXIBILITY
One interpretation of Kreps (1979) is the anticipation of learning induces a preference for
flexibility. That is, the DM’s preference over menus (i.e, subsets of X), respects set inclusion:
if m′ ⊆ m ⊆ X then m is preferred to m′. A DM who expects to learn her true preference, but
is currently uncertain, will prefer the flexibility to make choices contingent on the information
she learns. The Krepsian model has a clear connection to the notion of contingent planning
(a menu is a restriction on which contingent plans are feasible) as well as more generally
to the epistemic framework where the anticipation of learning can be defined precisely. In
this section, I will show that the Krepsian framework can be faithfully reproduced as a
special case of the general model outlined above. In particular, this special case is one of full
awareness; as such, the unforeseen contingencies interpretation is not strictly needed, and a
preference for flexibility in not alone the behavioral indication of unawareness.
To reproduce the anticipation of learning, two axioms are needed. First,
[AX.4.24: F] Ktϕ =⇒ Kt′ϕ for all t′ ≥ t.
The restriction F captures learning by ensuring the decision maker knows (weakly) more
at later time periods.
Proposition 4.13. ∀KT ∪F is a sound and complete axiomatization of LA(X ) with respect
to the class of models such that Rt′ ⊆ Rt for all t′ ≥ t (denoted Mf). Moreover, in the S5
framework, {Rt}t∈T is a filtration of S.
Proof. In appendix C.2.
Second, that all uncertainty will be realized by time t,
[AX.4.25: St] ∇t(x< y).
Axiom St dictates the DM implicitly knows her preference at time t. From a modeling
perspective St corresponds to the class of models such that <s = <s′ if s′ ∈ Rt(s).
Remark 4.14. Let M be a model of ∀KT ∪ P ∪ St. The implicit preferences in time t,
{<Kt,s}s∈S, are complete. Moreover, if M satisfies A0 ∪A1, then <Et,s satisfies LCmp.
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Proof. By Proposition 4.1, <s is a preference relation. By St, <Kt,s = <s, and so triv-
ially inherits completeness. Now, let x<Et,s y or y<Et,s x. By A0, this implies (M, s) |=X
At(x< y) ∨ At(x< y), and so, by A1, (M, s) |=X At(x<x) ∧ At(y< y). Moreover, since
<Kt,s is reflexive, (M, s) |=X Kt(x< z) ∧ Kt(y<u). Finally, this implies, (M, s) |=X
Et(x<x) ∧ Et(y< y), as desired. Conversely, let x<Et,s x and y<Et,s y. Then by A1,
(M, s) |=X At(x< y), and, switching the roles of x and y, (M, s) |=X At(y<x). The com-
pleteness of <Kt,s delivers the result.
To see how axiom F∪St can generate a preference for flexibility consider the simple two
period case; let T = 1. It is immediate that if <K0,s is complete for any s, it follows <K1,s is
likewise complete. The interesting case is when <K0,s is incomplete. So let x, y be elements
for which the DM does not have implicitly known preference at time 0 in state s. So:
(M, s′) |=X (x< y),
(M, s′′) |=X (y<x),
M |=X K1(x< y) ∨K1(y<x),
M |=X K0(K1(x< y) ∨K1(y<x)),
where s′, s′′ ∈ R0(s). The first two lines rely on Cmp, and the third from S1 (and Cmp).
The fourth line follows directly. This last line shows if the DM is going to learn her true
preference by time 1, then at time 0, she knows she will learn her true preference (this is
not the case once awareness is introduced). As such, she would like the option of choosing
either x or y, contingent on what she learns. A preference for flexibility is not the product of
learning alone, but requires also the DM acknowledge the possibility she will learn.37 Now,
consider the problem of a DM choosing a menu in period 0 to be the choice set in period
t. If the DM knows in period 0 she will know in period t one element of m is preferred to
every element in m′ then she prefers m to m′. This behavior is captured by the definition of
dominance.
37This sentiment is echoes the fact that unawareness alone in not sufficient to perturb behavior, and
introspective unawareness is required. A preference for flexibility could be seen as the behavioral marker of
introspective uncertainty.
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Definition. A menu, m, s-dominates a menu, m′, (at period t), if and only if
(M, s) |=X K0
∨
z∈m
Kt
∧
z′∈m′
(z, z′). (4.16)
Further, m strictly s-dominates m′, if it dominates m′ and m′ does not dominate m.
That is, m dominates m′ if the DM knows no matter what state of affairs is the true
state, she will choose out of the menu m rather than m′.38 Of course, she does not need to
know which element is the maximal one. For example:
Example 4.5. Let S = {s, s′} and X = x, y, z. Then, x s y s z and z s′ y s′ x.
R0 = S
2 and R1 = {(s, s), (s′, s′)}. M is a model of ∀K1 ∪ P ∪ F ∪ S1. Notice, {x, z}
strictly s-dominates {y}. Indeed, (M, s) |= K1(x< y) and (M < s′) |= K1(z< y). So, M |=
K0(K1(x< y) ∨K1(z< y)). So, the DM knows, in the true state of affairs, either x or z is
preferred to y, but does not know which preference is her true preference.
The dominance relation is generally incomplete. So, to connect this statement to previous
work on preference over menus, where the ranking is usually a weak ordering, s-dominance
must be extended to a complete and transitive relation.
Definition. A preference ≥ over menus (i.e., a subset of 2X × 2X) is FS1-generated if
≥ is complete and transitive and there exists some some model, M , of ∀K1 ∪ P ∪ F ∪ S1,
and some state s thereof, such that if m s-dominates m′ then m ≥ m′, and if m strictly
s-dominates m′ then m > m′.
The following result shows that beginning with the s-dominance relation, generated by
some epistemic model, and extending it to a weak order captures exactly the “preference
for flexibility” described in Kreps (1979). In fact, the converse it also true: every Krepsian
decision maker can be formulated as the extension of an s-dominance relation with respect
to some epistemic model.
38Under the restriction St, the DM’s knowledge (regarding her preference) in period t is exactly her
preference, and so inclusion of Kt in (4.16) is superfluous. It is included for conceptual reasons; the DM
must know her preference in order to act on it, so if she remains ignorant in period t, there is no reason to
desire non-singleton menus. This becomes important to the analysis when St is relaxed.
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Theorem 4.15. The preference ≥ satisfies Kreps (1979)’ axioms if and only if it is FS1-
generated. Moreover, for any FS1-generated ≥, there exists a strictly increasing aggregator
Γ : R|R0(s)| → R such that
m ≥ m′ ⇐⇒ Γ({max
x∈m
us′(x)}us′∈Us,0) ≥ Γ({maxx∈m′ us′(x)}us′∈Us,0), (4.17)
where Us,0 is as in (4.2).
Proof. In appendix C.3.
Notice that the dominance relation, projected onto singleton menus, produces a reflexive
and transitive relation on X. In fact, in such models, x<Ks,0 y if and only if {x} s-dominates
{y}. Hence a preference for flexibility can be seen as a natural extension of multi-utility
models.
Finally, I investigate the connection between implicit acceptability and the dominance
relation over menus defined in Section 4.5. Intuitively, when the menu is thought of as the
image of a contingent plan, then the contingent plan specifies how the DM will choose out
of the menu. Under this interpretation, Theorem 4.16 the provides the connection between
having a well defined preference over menus and being willing to accept a contingent plan.
Theorem 4.16. Let M be a model of ∀KT ∪P ∪ St ∪T∪F∪Bnd. A finite menu m ⊆ X
is not strictly s-dominated (with regards to time t consumption) if and only if it is the image
of an acceptable (in state s) contingent plan, ct : Λ→ X.
Proof. In appendix C.3.
If a menu is undominated (according to the definition given by (4.16)), one must be able
to construct an acceptable contingent plan from it, and if a contingent plan is acceptable it
must induce an undominated menu. This formally establishes the behavior being captured
by a preference for flexibility is exactly what facilitates a contingent plan as being acceptable
(or not) in models of full awareness. In fact, this result can prove Corollary 4.9 for the case
with finite X: since m = X must be undominated it must contain the image of an acceptable
contingent plan, and hence, such an object must exist. Conversely, this result suggests a
well defined preference (i.e., weak order) over menus is only sensible if acceptable contingent
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plans exist. It is this last observation (as well as Theorem 4.15) that serves as motivation
for moving away from a theory predicated on a preference over menus.
4.6 UNAWARENESS AND CONTRACTS
This section contains a simple example to show how the framework presented above could
be used in applications. Assume there are two players: a principal (player p), who is offering
a take-it-or-leave-it contract to an agent (player a). The model takes place in an interactive
awareness structure
M = 〈S,X,V , {Rt,i}t≤T,i=1,2, {<s,i}s∈S,i=1,2, {At,i}t≤T,i=1,2〉,
in which players’ knowledge and awareness are defined over atomic statements and both
their own and their opponents knowledge and awareness.39 It is in this framework that I will
show the principal has an incentive to conceal mutually beneficial information. The intuition
being that, although certain novel actions are Pareto improving in every ex-post scenario,
the agent will react to the discovery of novel information by becoming more sensitive to her
own unawareness, hence increasing her aversion to commitment. In other words, the display
of surprising outcomes indicates to the agent that the novel outcomes are more valuable than
she previously thought; the added value to waiting (and taking an outside option) is greater
than the value added by the novel outcome itself. Further, I will show that this incentive
can naturally lead to the optimality of incomplete contracts.
If M is any interactive model of decision making under unawareness, define Yt,s,i ≡
{x|(x<i x) ∈ As,i(t)} ⊆ X, the set of outcomes player i is aware of at time t is state s.
Further, to make matters simple and tractable, assume each player has a state dependent
(expected) utility index from us,i : X → R that represents <s,i, and µt ∈ ∆(S), such that
∑
s∈S
µt,s,i(s)us,i(x)
39It is clear that the same axiomatization will suffice, simply by adding additional indexes to the modalities.
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is a completion of <Kt,s,i . From Remark 4.3, we know µt,s,i must put positive probability
on s′ if and only if s′ ∈ Rt,i(s). Lastly, let u¯s,i ≡ us,i|Yt,s,i . Proposition 4.6 guarantees that∑
s∈S µt,s,i(s)u¯s,i(x) is a completion of <Et,s,i on Yt,s,i.
The timing is as follows. In period 0, the principal offers the agent a continent plan to
be executed in period 1, which I assume is simply a function from S to X. If the offer is
rejected the the agent can take an outside offer, some action in Q ⊆ X. If the contract is
accepted the principal’s and agent’s evaluations of contracts are based on their explicitly
known preferences:
∑
s′∈S
µ0,s,i(s
′)u¯s,i(c(s′))
If the contract is rejected, p gets a utility of 0, and a gets a utility according to her outside
option. Of course, to make our problem well defined, we also have quantify the agents
perceived value of the outside option. In the case of full awareness (or, naive unawareness,
as in Auster (2013)), the agent would have a well defined expected utility over the outside
option. This is not the case with introspective unawareness, as the DM is aware of the
possibility that waiting will afford novel actions. So consider a mapping δt,s,i : 2
L(X) → R
with the restriction that
δt,s,i(At,i(s)) ≥
∑
s∈S
max
x∈Q∩Y0,s,a
µt,s,i(s)u¯s,i(x), (4.18)
which, by the characterization in section 4.4, holds with equality if the DM is fully aware
or naively unaware. δ captures the DM’s attitude towards unawareness, her perceived value
to the objects that she is currently unaware of (also, implicitly, the likelihood of discovering
these novel actions).40
I focus on the case where actions are verifiable and the principal is fully aware. As such,
the principal’s problem is simply to offer the acceptable contract that maximizes his payoff.
That is, maximize his payoff subject to a participation constraint on behalf of the agent.
40δ is in principle elicitable via the method described in previous sections –the additional utility the DM
would require to accept some contingent plan–although certainty not for counterfactual worlds. Nonetheless,
behavioral and experimental data could easily capture the “shape” of δ. Also, under the interpretation of Q
as a menu of actions to be chosen from in period 1, the lower bound for δ is the value such a menu (assuming
awareness stays the same) as given by (4.17).
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Moreover, we will assume the agent explicitly knows the principal is fully aware. However,
and unlike prior application of awareness, the agent is introspectively unaware.
4.6.1 The Principal’s Problem
Let S = {s1, s2} and X = {x, y, z, w}, T = {0, 1}. Assume that neither agent knows the state
in period 0, but both will know the state in period 1 (this is a model of S5∪St ∪F∪Bnd).
Let Q = X. Assume that the belief in period 0, for both players and both states, is (1
2
, 1
2
),
and that utilities are given by,
us,p us,a
x y z w x y z w
s1 3 1 3 0 s1 3 1 3 6
s2 1 3 4 6 s2 1 3 4 0
Since we will only consider a limited number of awareness sets, let, for some D ⊆ X,
A(D) denote the awareness structure in which the agent is aware only (and all) statements
that contain objects in D. In period 0, let δ0(A(D)) = 3 if z, w /∈ D and δ0(A(D)) = 5
otherwise. Since the game ends after period 1, δ1 is given by (4.18), holding with equality.
Consider the case where the agent’s initial awareness is A({x, y}) and, if left unperturbed
by the principal’s offer, it remains her awareness in period 1. That is, without any outside
influence, the agent does not become aware of any new objects. However, if the principal
offers the contract c, then the agent’s awareness set in period 1 is A({x, y} ∪ Im(C)).
What is the principal’s optimal strategy, given that he is constrained to offer complete
contracts? Notice that if he offers the contract c = (x, y) (read: x in state 1, y in state 2), it
is accepted and the expected utility (for both players) is 3. It is accepted because the agent
is indifferent between accepting and rejecting, given that her perception of the value of the
outside option is also 3. It is easy to verify that this is the best the principal can do. To see
this, note that if the principal offers a contract containing either z or w, he must provide the
agent with a utility of at least 5 (the agent’s new value participation constraint). Clearly,
this is only possible with the contract c = (w, z). But this gives the principal an expected
utility of 2, worse than c = (x, y).
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Nonetheless, the contract c = (x, z) makes both players strictly better off, providing
a utility of 3.5. Hence, when the principal is constrained to offer a compete contract, he
willingly conceals a Pareto improving contract. The intuition is simple: expanding the
agent’s awareness makes her more aware of her own awareness, and hence she displays a
larger aversion to commitment. This second effect outweighs the first, so the principal
chooses not to disclose the information.
Now, consider the case where the principal can offer an incomplete contract. Such a
contract does not provide any alternative for a particular state, upon the realization of
which the players renegotiate. Now the principle can offer the contract c = (x, ·) (read: x in
state 1, re-negotiate in state 2). This is acceptable to the agent, since δ0,s1 = 3 = us1,a(x).
In period 1, if state s2 is realized, the principal offers the new contract c = z. This is again
acceptable since δ1,s2 = 4 = us2,a(z). Therefore by appealing to incomplete contracts, the
principal can implement his unconstrained optimal contract.
4.6.2 Incompleteness Requires Introspection
The above example, while highly stylized, is indicative of a general phenomena. Although
the effect of unawareness can be quantified via δ, and delay can be calculated, unawareness
introduces behavior that intrinsically different than uncertainty. Unlike in the more standard
framework, the value of delay (i.e., the outside option) changes with the agents epistemic
state, and therefore is itself a function of the contract being offered. As such, there may exist
feasible contracts which are initially individually rational, but cease to be so when offered.
It is this effect, driven by introspective unawareness, that can make incompleteness strictly
beneficial.
Remark 4.17. Assume the principal is fully aware. Further assume that contracts take the
form S → X \Q (that is, there are a distinct set of outside options). If there is an incomplete
contract c that is strictly better for the principal than any complete contract, then the agent
is introspectively unaware.
It is worth briefly addressing the relation between this environment and previous work
connecting awareness with incomplete contracts. There is a large body of literature on
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incomplete contracts arising from the indescribably of states, leading to the well known
discussion of Maskin and Tirole (1999). They show show, so long as players understand
the utility consequences of states, indescribability should not matter. Here, of course, the
unawareness is in the domain of actions rather than states, and so directly and intrinsically
regards the understanding of utility. In other words, the utility of the outside option is
defined in an articulable manner. Incompleteness, even in the single agent case (i.e., over
contingent plans) is welfare improving.
More specifically, when the stipulation that Q ∩ Im(c) = ∅ is dropped, naive awareness
can also induce the optimality of incomplete contracts. There, the principal may withhold
information strategically, as the novel outcomes may be of direct value as an outside option.
This is similar in spirit to the arguments put forth in Filiz-Ozbay (2012) and Auster (2013),
where the agents are naively unaware. However, leaving in the stipulation, we see that the
discovery of novel outcomes can effect the value of the outside option indirectly.
One obviously missing component from the above example, is how the agent’s perception
of unawareness reacts to the offer of an incomplete contract. It is reasonable to assume the
agent believes when such a contract is offered, it must be due to to strategic concerns relating
to options outside if her current awareness. Hence the offer of an incomplete contract is itself
reason to change her perception of the value of delay. This effect cannot be captured at all by
naive unawareness, and highlights the importance of creating a richer epistemic framework.
However, because this behavior is complicated, and the agent’s shifting perception is likely
subject to equilibrium effects, I leave any formal analysis to future work.
4.7 LITERATURE REVIEW
This paper is within the context of two distinct, albeit related, literatures: that on epistemic
logic and unawareness, and that on unawareness and unforeseen contingencies in decision
theory. Unawareness was first formalized within modal logic by Fagin and Halpern (1988),
who introduced the modal operator for awareness, A, and explicit knowledge, E. This was
extended later by Halpern and Reˆgo (2009) to include first order statements that allow for
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introspective unawareness, and extended further by Halpern and Reˆgo (2013), to allow the
agent to be uncertain about whether she has full awareness or not.
The structure of quantification and awareness in Halpern and Reˆgo (2009) is significantly
different than the one presented here. They use a logic where quantification is over formulae.
Because the foremost concern is over the alternatives that can be consumed, (and over which
preferences can be defined), I use a first order modal logic where the variables range only over
some fixed domain and are present in formulae only under the scope of predicates. Moreover,
I am interested in the awareness of particular objects and so explicitly consider awareness of
formula that contain free variables; awareness is a subset of the auxiliary semantic language
L(X).
Relatedly, Board and Chung (2011) and Board et al. (2011) propose an alternate structure
of awareness that is, like the one presented here, based on objects and predicates. They,
however, assume awareness is fully characterized by a set of objects. Then the DM is aware
of a statement like “phone x is preferred to phone y” if she is aware of x and y. This does
not allow, as I do, for the DM to be aware of an object but not some of its attributes; for
example, a DM cannot be aware of x and y but unaware of statements like “phone x has
a higher pixel density than phone y.” For many practical applications, it seems necessary
to disconnect the DM’s awareness of attributes of objects from her awareness of objects
themselves. Note, this issue cannot be resolved by a simple relabeling of alternatives: for
example, phone x′ is similar to phone x in all respects save its pixel density. This resolution
does not work because phone x has all of its properties regardless of the DM’s awareness –a
commitment to consume x is a commitment to the relevant properties.
The logic presented in this paper, is a happy medium between that of Halpern and Reˆgo
(2009) and of Board and Chung (2011). It allows for general awareness structures, ranging
over formulae, but after the formulae have been given semantic interpretations. Therefore,
we can speak of the DM’s awareness of particular objects, but not necessarily all of the
attributes, or relations between, these objects.
In economics, state space models –the semantic structure that include states, and define
knowledge and unawareness as operators thereon, as in this paper– have been of particular
interest. Modica and Rustichini (1994) and Dekel et al. (1998) both provide beautiful,
90
albeit negative, results in this domain. They show, under mild conditions, unawareness
must be in some sense trivial; the DM is either fully aware or fully unaware. While Modica
and Rustichini (1994) consider a specific awareness modality, Dekel et al. (1998) show, under
reasonable axioms, state-space models do not allow any non-trivial unawareness operator. As
stated, this would be a very damning result for this paper, as it would imply either <E = <K
or <E = ∅, either way, not making for an interesting decision theory. The resolution comes
from disentangling explicit and implicit knowledge. Considering these forms of knowledge
separately reasonably avoids ever simultaneously satisfying the necessary axioms for their
negative result. A far more succinct and intuitive discussion than I could hope to achieve is
found in Section 4 of Halpern and Reˆgo (2013), and so, I refer the reader there.
Beyond the separation of implicit and explicit knowledge, there have been other ap-
proaches to the formalization of unawareness that circumvent the problems outlined in the
pervious paragraph. Modica and Rustichini (1999) propose propose models in which the DM
is aware only of a subset of formulae (similar in spirit to the awareness sets proposed here, al-
beit necessarily generated by primitive propositions), and entertains a subjective state space
(a coarsening of the objective state space) in which the DM cannot distinguish between any
two states that differ only by the truth of a proposition of which she is unaware. Heifetz
et al. (2006) and Heifetz et al. (2008) consider a lattice of state spaces that are ordered
according to their expressiveness. In this way, unawareness is captured by events that are
not expressible from different spaces –events that are not contained in the event nor the
negation of the DM’s knowledge. Li (2009) also provides a model with multiple state spaces,
where the DM entertains a subjective state space (similar to the above papers, the set of
possible state spaces forms a lattice). This allows the DM to be unaware of events in finer
state spaces, while having non-trivial knowledge in coarser state spaces.
The decision theoretic take on unawareness is primarily based on a revealed preference
framework, and so, unlike its logical counterpart does not dictate the structure of awareness
but rather tries to identify it from observable behavior. The first account of this approach
(and which predates the literature by a sizable margin) is Kreps (1979). Kreps considers
a DM who ranks menus of alternatives, and whose preferences respect set inclusion. The
motivation being larger menus provide the DM with the flexibility to make choices after
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unforeseen contingencies. This interpretation, while not strictly ruled out by the model, is
certainly not its most obvious interpretation, especially in light of the titular representation
theorem. That Krepsian behavior can always be rationalized in a model without appealing
to unawareness is shown formally in Theorem 4.15; a longer discussion in relation to this
paper is found in Section 4.5.
More recently there has been a growing interest in modeling the unaware DM. Kochov
(2015) posits a behavioral definition of unforeseen contingencies. He considers the DM’s
ranking over streams of acts (function from the state space to consumption). An event, E,
is considered foreseen if all bets on E do not distort otherwise prefect hedges. That is to
say, an event is unforeseen if the DM cannot “properly forecast the outcomes of an action”
contingent on the event. Kochov shows the events a DM is aware of form a coarsening of the
modeler’s state space. In a similar vein, Minardi and Savochkin (2015) also contemplate a
DM who has a coarser view of the world than the modeler. This coarse perception manifests
itself via imperfect updating; the DM cannot “correctly” map the true event onto an event
in her subjective state space. The events that are inarticulable in the subjective language of
the DM can be interpreted as unforeseen. However, in these works, the objects of which the
DM is supposedly unaware are encoded objectively into the alternatives she ranks. Because
of this, I argue they are behavioral models of misinterpretation rather than unawareness.
Karni and Vierø (2016); Grant and Quiggin (2014) are more explicit about modeling
unawareness, and, along with their companion papers, are (to my knowledge) the only
decision theoretic paper that deals with unawareness of consumption alternatives, rather
than contingencies. They examine a DM who evaluates acts which may specify an alternative
explicitly demarcated as “something the DM is unaware of,” and who can be interpreted
as possessing probabilistic belief regarding the likelihood of discovering such an outcome.
They observe the DM’s preferences over acts, both before and after the discovery of a new
alternative. Of particular interest to the authors, is the process by which the DM updates her
beliefs; in particular they provide the axiomatic characterization of reverse Bayesianism first
developed by the same authors in Karni and Vierø (2013). The assertion of the existence of a
novel consumption alternative without dictating what that alternative is has clear parallels
with this paper: the DM in their paper is necessarily introspectively unaware. However,
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their framework takes as given the epistemic state of the decision maker –naive in Karni and
Vierø (2013) and introspective in Karni and Vierø (2016).
Grant and Quiggin (2012) develop a general model to deal with unawareness in games,
founded on a modal logic which incorporates unawareness in a similar way to Modica and
Rustichini (1994). They show that while this model is rich enough to provide non-trivial
unawareness, it fails to allow for introspective unawareness, even when first order quantifi-
cation is permitted. (This limitation arises because of the desired interplay between the
structure of knowledge and the structure of awareness as facilitated by the game theoretic
environment.) By relaxing the connection with the modal underpinnings, they then consider
possible heuristics that a player might exhibit when she inductively reasons that she is in-
trospectively unaware. In a companion paper, Grant and Quiggin (2014) provide a (decision
theoretic) axiomatization of such heuristics.
Several recent papers examine the value of information (and expanded awareness) when
agents have bounded perception. Quiggin (2015) defines the value of awareness, in analogy
to the value of information, and shows the two measures are perfectly negatively correlated.
Galanis (2015) examines the value of information under unawareness and shows, in contrast
to standard results, the value of information can be negative. Extending this line of thought
to the multi agent case (with risk sharing) Galanis (2016), shows, under unawareness, public
information might be treated asymmetrically, allowing some agents to prosper at the expense
of others.
There are also (very few) economic papers that directly investigate the connection be-
tween observable choice and the underlying logical structure. Morris (1996) works somewhat
in the reverse direction of the current paper, providing a characterization of different logical
axioms (for example, K, T, 4, etc) in terms of preferences over bets on the state of the world.
Schipper (2014) extends this methodology to include unawareness structures as described
in Heifetz et al. (2006). In a similar set up, Schipper (2013) constructs an expected utility
framework to elicit (or reveal) a DM’s belief regarding the probability of events (when she
might be aware of some events). Schipper concludes, the behavioral indication of unaware-
ness of event E is that the DM treats both E and its complement as null. This is a very
nice result, and the intuition maps nicely to the idea of unawareness. To achieve such a
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representation, the objects of choice are maps from the “true” state-space to outcomes, and
as such, raise the previously discussed issues of observability and the limits of an unaware
modeler.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 2
A.1 LEMMAS
Lemma 1. If {<A}A∈K(X) satisfies UV, then for all A ∈ K(X), NA = EA ∪N .
Proof. Fix some A ∈ K(X). By definition both EA and N are subsets of NA, so, EA ∪N ⊆
NA. Towards the opposite inclusion, let s ∈ NA. We will show that if s /∈ EA then s ∈ N .
So assume further, that s /∈ EA. Since s is null-A, x? ∼A x?. Since s is not e-null-A, for
every B ∈ K(X), x? ∼B x?. By the contrapositive of UV we have s ∈ NB. Since this holds
for all B, s ∈ N .
Lemma 2. Let {µAn ∈ ∆(S)}n∈N converge weakly to µA ∈ ∆(S). Endow [0, 1]S with the
|| · ||1 norm. Fix some β ∈ (0, 1). Then, the Kuratowski limit of
{
gˆ ∈ [0, 1]S|EµAn (gˆ) ≥ β
}
is
{
gˆ ∈ [0, 1]S|EµA(gˆ) ≥ β
}
.41
Proof. Define C˙(A, β) =
{
gˆ ∈ [0, 1]S|EµA(gˆ) ≥ β
}
. First, we show, gˆ ∈ C˙(A, β) =⇒ gˆ ∈
LI
n→∞
C˙(An, β). Indeed, assume gˆ ∈ C˙(A, β), and consider B(gˆ). Let in(gˆ) = {s ∈ S|gˆ(s) <
1}. Let M = ∑s∈in(gˆ) µA(s). There are two cases: where M = 0 and where M > 0.
41Recall, for a metric space Y the Kuratowski limit exists if and only if the Kuratowski limit superior and
Kuratowski limit inferior coincide. These are defined, respectively, as follows, (for some {Yn ⊆ Y}n∈N), as
LS
n→∞Yn = {y ∈ Y|∀B(y), B(y) ∩ Yn 6= ∅, for infinitely many n},
LI
n→∞Yn = {y ∈ Y|∀B(y), B(y) ∩ Yn 6= ∅, for sufficiently large n}
where B(y) is the ball or radius  around y. Note, these always exists and necessarily LI
n→∞Yn ⊆ LSn→∞Yn.
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First, let M = 0. Since S is a discrete space, and so the indicator functions for each state
are continuous, weak convergence implies strong convergence. Thus, limn µAn(in(gˆ)) →
µA(in(gˆ)) = 0: in particular, for sufficiently large n, µAn(in(gˆ)) < 1 − β, and so EµAn (gˆ) =
EµAn (gˆ|in(gˆ)) + EµAn (gˆ|in((gˆ))c) ≥ β.
So, let M > 0 and fix some  > 0. Let ′ =
min{,{1−gˆ(s)}s∈in(gˆ)}
|S| . Let, fˆ ∈ B(gˆ) be given
by
fˆ(s) =
gˆ(s) if s /∈ in(gˆ)gˆ(s) + ′ if s ∈ in(gˆ)
Let m ∈ N be such that for all n > m, |µA(s)− µAn(s)| < M′|S| . Then,
E
µAn
(fˆ) >E
µA
(fˆ)−
∑
s
M′
|S| fˆ(s)
>
∑
s/∈in(gˆ)
µA(s)gˆ(s) +
∑
s∈in(gˆ)
µA(s)gˆ(s) +
∑
s∈in(gˆ)
µA(s)
′ −M′
= β.
So, fˆ ∈ C˙(An, β) for all n > m.
Now, we show that gˆ ∈ LS
n→∞
C˙(An, β) =⇒ gˆ ∈ C˙(A, β). Indeed, assume gˆ ∈
LS
n→∞
C˙(An, β). Then, let nk denote a subsequence for which B 1
k
(gˆ) ∩ C˙(Ank , β) 6= ∅, with gˆk
a point in the intersection. Then lim
n→∞
(µAnk (s)gˆ
k(s)) = µA(s)gˆ(s) for all s ∈ S. So, EµAnk (gˆ)
converges to EµA(gˆ), and so, by the preservation of inequalities, gˆ ∈ C˙(A, β).
Therefore, C˙(A, β) ⊆ LI
n→∞
C˙(An, β) ⊆ LS
n→∞
C˙(An, β) ⊆ C˙(A, β); the Kuratowski limit
exists and is equal to C˙(A, β).
Definition. For a menu A ∈ K(X), define the equalizer of A, eA : NA ×NA → R++ as
eA(s, s
′) 7→

1
α
such that (x?)−s(αx? + (1− α)x?) ∼A (x?)−s′x? if (x?)−sx?<A(x?)−s′x?
α such that (x?)−s′(αx? + (1− α)x?) ∼A (x?)−sx? if (x?)−s′x? A (x?)−sx?
That eA is well defined follows from the following observation.
Lemma 3. Let {<A}A∈K(X) be represented by some (MBR), with beliefs {µA|A ∈ K(X)},
all of which have full support. Then, for all A ∈ K(X), eA(s, s′) = µA(s)µA(s′) .
Proof. If (x?)−sx?<A(x?)−s′x?, then for some α ∈ (0, 1), we have (x?)−s
(
αx?+(1−α)x?
) ∼A
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(x?)−s′x?. Using (MBR), we have that UA
(
(x?)−s′x?
)
= µA(s
′), and UA
(
(x?)−s
(
αx? + (1−
α)x?
))
= αµA(s). Setting eA(s, s
′) = 1
α
, delivers ther result. The other case is similar.
Lemma 4. Let {<A}A∈K(X) be represented by some (MBR) with beliefs {µA|A ∈ K(X)},
all of which have full support. Then {<A}A∈K(X) satisfies IID if and only if, for all x ∈ X
and A,B ∈ K(X) with x /∈ A ∪B, and states s, s′ ∈ S, we have
eA(s, s
′)
eA∪x(s, s′)
=
eB(s, s
′)
eB∪x(s, s′)
. (A.1)
Proof. Necessity. Assume that (A.1) holds, with x ∈ X, A,B ∈ K(X), and s, s′ ∈ S
satisfying the relevant constraints. Denote by A′ and B′, A ∪ x and B ∪ x, respectively.
Towards a contradiction, assume that there exists some piA, ρA,∈ ∆(A), piB, ρB,∈ ∆(A),
and α = (0, 1) be such that,
(x?)−spiA ∼A (x?)−s′ρA, implying µA(s)
µA(s′)
=
(ρA · u)
(piA · u) , (A.2)
(x?)−spiB ∼B (x?)−s′ρB, implying µB(s)
µB(s′)
=
(ρB · u)
(piB · u) , (A.3)
(x?)−spiA<A′(x?)−s′(αρA + (1− α)x?), implying µA
′(s)
µA′(s′)
≥ α (ρ
A · u)
(piA · u) , (A.4)
(x?)−spiB ≺B′ (x?)−s′(αρB + (1− α)x?), implying µB′(s)
µA′(s′)
< α
(ρB · u)
(piB · u) (A.5)
Dividing the implications of (A.2) by (A.4) and (A.3) by (A.5), and applying Lemma 3,
we get a direct contradiction to (A.1).
Sufficiency. Assume IID holds. Let x ∈ X, A,B ∈ K(X), and s, s′ ∈ S satisfy the
relevant constraints for IID. Let M = max{ µA(s)
µA(s′)
, µB(s)
µB(s′)
, 1}. Finally, for any β ∈ [0,M ], and
s ∈ S, let f ∗(s, β) = (x?)−s( βM x? + (1− βM )x?). Using (MBR), we have
UA
(
f ∗(s, 1)
)
= UA
(
f ∗(s′,
µA(s)
µA(s′)
)
)
=
µA(s)
M
, and (A.6)
UB
(
f ∗(s, 1)
)
= UB
(
f ∗(s′,
µB(s)
µB(s′)
)
)
=
µB(s)
M
. (A.7)
Let α =
µA(s
′)µA′ (s)
µA(s)µA′ (s′)
. Case: α ≤ 1. Applying (MBR) again delivers,
UA′
(
f ∗(s, 1)
)
= UA′
(
f ∗(s′, α
µA(s)
µA(s′)
)
)
=
µA′(s)
M
.
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By (A.6) and (A.7), we can apply IID, so,
UB′
(
f ∗(s, 1)
)
= UB′
(
f ∗(s′, α
µB(s)
µB(s′)
)
)
. (A.8)
Expanding (A.8) according to (MBR):
µB′(s) = µB′(s
′)
µA(s
′)µA′(s)
µA(s)µA′(s′)
µB(s)
µB(s′)
,
which by Lemma 3, is equivalent to (A.1). In the case where α > 1, consider f ∗(s, 1
α
) and
f ∗(s′, µA(s)
µA(s′)
), and proceed in a similar manner.
A.2 PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Part (a), necessity. The necessity of EU, MC, UV are obvious
from the inspection of the representing functionals. CC follows from the continuity of µ(·).
Fix some {An}n∈N with limit point A. Notice that F? is homeomorphic to [0, 1]S (endowed
with the || · ||1 norm), via the identification of f =
(
(α1x
? + (1− α1)x?), . . . , (α|S|x? + (1−
α|S|)x?)
)
with fˆ = (αs1 , . . . , αs|S|). Fix some β ∈ (0, 1). Then, by the representation, we
have, for every B ∈ K(X),
C˙(B, β) = {g ∈ F?|g<B βx? + (1− β)x?} ∼=
{
g ∈ F?|E
µB
(gˆ) ≥ β
}
. (A.9)
As µ· is continuous, we can apply Lemma 2: the Kuratowski limit of C˙(An, β) is C˙(A, β).
Since for all An, C˙(An, β) is convex, they are connected. By the equivalence of Kuratowski
convergence and convergence in Hausdorff metric for sequences of connected sets (Salinetti
and Wets (1979), Corollary 3A), we are done.
Part (a), sufficiency. It is a direct application of the expected utility theorem that
EU delivers for each A the existence of some continuous and bounded w : S ×X → R such
that
UV NMA (f) =
∑
s
(
E
f(s)
(wA(s, x))
)
,
represents <A. Moreover, if wA(s, x) and wˆA(s, x) both represent <A, then wA(s, x) =
aAwˆA(s, x) + bA(s) where aA ∈ R++ and bA(s) ∈ R for all s ∈ S.42
42For a reference using the same framework, see “NM Theorem” of Karni et al. (1983).
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By exploiting the degrees of freedom from the scalars bA(s), we can set wA(s, x?) = 0,
for all A and all s ∈ S. The resulting functionals are unique up to linear transformations.
Note, this implies that for all s ∈ NA, wA(s, ·) is identically 0.
For each A ∈ K(X), let uA(s, x) : N cA × A→ R be the mapping
uA : (s, x) 7→ wA(s, x)
wA(s, x?)
,
and µA ∈ ∆((EA ∪N)c) as the distribution defined by
µA(s) =
wA(s, x
?)∑
swA(s, x
?)
.
Notice, µA is well defined and has full support, since by the non-triviality of <A, NA 6= S,
and for each s ∈ (EA ∪N)c, s ∈ N cA (Lemma 1), and so by UV, wA(s, x?) > wA(s, x?) = 0.
Define,
UMDA (f) =E
µA
(
E
f(s)
(uA(s, x))
)
. (A.10)
Following standard algebraic manipulations, we can see µA(s)uA(s, x) =
1∑
s wA(s,x
?)
wA(s, x),
and therefore UMDA represents <A.
Let D =
{
(s, x) ∈ S ×X | ∃A ∈ K(X), x ∈ A, s /∈ NA
}
. For each (s, x) ∈ D, let As,x be
any menu such that x ∈ As,x and s /∈ NAs,x . Define the mapping u : D → R as,
u : (s, x) 7→ uAs,x(s, x).
and extend u to S ×X, by defining u(s, x) = 0 for all (x, s) ∈ Dc.
We now claim, for any A ∈ K(X), s /∈ NA and x ∈ A, we have u(s, x) = uA(s, x). Indeed,
for every such A,B ∈ K(X) and s /∈ NA ∪NB. Let <A|B|s ⊆ (∆(A ∩B))2 be defined by:
pi<A|B|s ρ ⇐⇒ E
pi
(uA(s, x)) ≥E
ρ
(uA(s, x)).
Since <A|B|s is represented by a linear utility function, it satisfies EU, and so, by the expected
utility theorem, uA(s, ·) is the unique utility index, up to affine transformations.
Fix some A and s /∈ NA, and x ∈ A. By (A.10), Epi(uA(s, x)) ≥ Eρ(uA(s, x)) holds if and
only if, for all f ∈ FA, f−spi<A f−sρ. Applying MC, we immediately have g−spi<As,x g−sρ for
any g ∈ FAs,x (here we use the fact that s /∈ NAs,x). From (A.10) again, <A|As,x|s = <As,x|A|s.
So uA(s, ·) is an affine transformation of uAs,x(s, ·). Moreover, both are twice normalized:
uA(s, x
?) = uAs,x(s, x
?) = 1 and uA(s, x?) = uAs,x(s, x?) = 0. Hence they must coincide on
A ∩ As,x. Finally, since x ∈ A ∩ As,x, we have uA(s, x) = uAs,x(s, x) = u(s, x). Clearly, since
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uA = u|A and uA is continuous and bounded, u|A is continuous and bounded.
Because it eases exposition, we well prove that µ(·) : K(X) → ∆(S) is continuous after
we have shown that it is unique.
Part (b). Uniqueness results are standard. It is clear from the argument above that
u(·, ·) is unique (given the normalization on F), as it must represent <As,x|As,x|s. With
regards to beliefs, assume to the contrary, for some A ∈ K(X), µ and ν both represent (in
conjunction with u, as in (MBR)) <A. Then there must be some s, s′, such that µ(s) < ν(s)
and µ(s′) > ν(s′). Assume (with loss of generality, but the other case follows from the
reflected argument) that µ(s) ≤ µ(s′). Set pi as the probability distribution given by,
pi(x) =

µ(s)
µ(s′) if x = x
?,
1− µ(s)
µ(s′) if x = x?,
0 otherwise.
Given that (µ, u) represents <A, it follows from (MBR) that (x?)−s′pi ∼A (x?)−sx?. But,
since (ν, u) also represents <A: (x?)−s′pi ≺A (x?)−sx?, a clear contradiction.
Part (a), sufficiency continued. Assume, by way of contradiction, that µ(·) : K(X)→
∆(S) was not continuous. Then there exists some {An}n∈N converging to A, such that
{µAn}n∈N does not converge to A. This implies that there exists some bounded and contin-
uous function, fˆ : S → R such that EµAn (fˆ), does not converge to EµA(fˆ), say it is strictly
above (if it is below, or does not exist, the arguments are essentially the same). Since f is
bounded, it is without loss of generality that we consider fˆ : S → [0, 1]. Let β = EµA(fˆ).
Then for some  > 0 and all m ∈ N, there is some n > m, such that EµAn (fˆ) > β + .
Hence, there is some subsequence, Ank such that fˆ ∈ C˙(Ank , β + 2), and fˆ /∈ C˙(A, β + 2)
(notice, C˙(·, ·) is defined in (A.9)). But, C˙(A, β+ 
2
) is closed by EU. Hence, C˙(Ank , β+

2
) is
bounded away from C˙(A, β+ 
2
), completing the proof as it is tantamount to a contradiction
of CC.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. This follows directly from Lemma 1 of Shmaya and Yariv (2015)
which states (in the language of this paper) that such a given a prior µ and a set of posteriors
{µA}A∈K(X) one can find a generating signal structure, that transforms µ into {µA}A∈K(X), so
100
long as the prior beliefs lie in the relative interior of the convex hull of the set of posteriors,
i.e., µ ∈ ri(Conv({µA}A∈K(X))). Given the additional flexibility in choosing the prior, and the
fact the relative interior of a non-empty convex set is non-empty, we can always find such a µ.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. Necessity. Assume there was some (µ, l,K(X)/∼˙), satisfying
the relevant assumptions, that generates {µA|A ∈ K(X)}. Let A,B ∈ K(X) such that
N cA ∩ N cB 6= ∅. Let s ∈ N cA ∩ N cB. Thus, it must be that l([A], s) 6= 0 and l([B], s) 6= 0,
implying that [A] = [B]. But then, l([A], ·) ≡ l([B], ·). Therefore, µA = µB. Clearly, these
induce the same preferences over the intersection of A and B, and PS is satisfied.
Sufficiency. Assume PS holds. By assumption N = ∅, so, for each s ∈ S, choose some
menu A(s) such that s /∈ NA. Define µ ∈ ∆(S) as
µ(s) =
µA(s)(s)∑
s′∈S µA(s′)(s
′)
.
Define ∼˙ over K(X)2, by A∼˙B if and only if NA = NB. It is obvious that ∼˙ is a equivalence
relation, and so, let K(X)/∼˙ be the resulting quotient set. For each [A] ∈ K(X)/∼˙ and
s ∈ S, set
l([A], s) =
1 if s /∈ NA,0 if s ∈ NA.
Now, notice that if l([A], s) = l([B], s) = 1, then N cA ∩ N cB 6= ∅. So by PS the projections
of <A and <B onto FF must coincide. Therefore, it must be that µA = µB, implying that
[A] = [B].
Finally, pick some A in K(X). Now notice that for all s ∈ N cA, s ∈ N cA(s) and so, by the
above line of reasoning µA = µA(s). Clearly, since l([A], s)|NcA ≡ 1, (2.2) holds.
Proof of Theorem 2.6. Necessity. Assume there exists some (µ, l,X), with l(x, s) ∈ (0, 1)
for all (x, s) ∈ X × S, that generates {µA|A ∈ K(X)}. For some A that does not contain x
and s, s′ ∈ S, we have eA(s, s′) = µA(s)µA(s′) , and eA∪x(s, s′) =
µA∪x(s)
µA∪x(s′)
. Using (2.3), we have
µA∪x(s) =
µA(s)
l(x,s)
1−l(x,s)
EµA
(
l(x,s′)
1−l(x,s′)
)
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for all s ∈ S. So,
eA∪x(s, s′) =
µA(s)
l(x,s)
1−l(x,s)
µA(s′)
l(x,s′)
1−l(x,s′)
,
=
l(x,s)
1−l(x,s)
l(x,s′)
1−l(x,s′)
eA(s, s
′).
Hence the ratio of equalizers does not depend on the menu. By Lemma 4, IID holds.
Sufficiency. Assume IID holds. Let α(x, s) =
µ{F∪x}(s)
µF(s)
, set
l(x, s) =
α(x, s)
1 + α(x, s)
, (A.11)
for all (x, s) ∈ X \F × S and l(x?, ·) ≡ l(x?, ·) ≡ 1. Let γ(s) =
∏
x∈X\F
(1 − l(x, s)). Define
µ ∈ ∆(S) by,
µ(s) =
µF(s)
γ(s)
EµF
(
1
γ(s′)
)
By construction, µF is generated according to (2.3).
We will now show that as defined, (µ, l,X) generates the remainder of {µA|A ∈ K(X)}.
We proceed by induction on the cardinality of A.
Define νx ∈ ∆(S)
νx(s) =
µF(s)
l(x,s)
1−l(x,s)
EµF
(
l(x,s′)
1−l(x,s′)
)
Now, using the algebraic identity
α
1+α
1− α
1+α
= α, we have l(x,s
′)
1−l(x,s′) = α(x, s) =
µ{F∪x}(s)
µF(s)
. Therefore
νx(s) = µ{F∪x}(s). This completes the base case (for |A| = 3).
Now assume that (µ, l,X) generates {µA|A ∈ K(X), |A| ≤ n}. Fix any A with n ele-
ments, and x /∈ A. Let A′ denote A ∪ x. Set,
νA′ =
µA(s)
l(x,s)
1−l(x,s)
EµA
(
l(x,s′)
1−l(x,s′)
)
Towards a contradiction, assume that uA′ 6= νA′ . Therefore, there must exist some s such
that uA′(s) > νA′(s), and s
′ such that uA′(s′) < νA′(s′). Therefore we have:
eA(s, s
′)
eA∪x(s, s′)
=
µA(s)
µA(s′)
µA′ (s)
µA′ (s′)
<
µA(s)
µA(s′)
νA′ (s)
νA′ (s′)
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=l(x,s′)
1−l(x,s′)
l(x,s)
1−l(x,s)
=
eF(s, s
′)
eF∪x(s, s′)
Which, by Lemma 4 is a contradiction to IID. Therefore, the inductive step holds, and
(µ, l,X) generates {µA|A ∈ K(X)}.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF PLANS.
Generalized Plans. We will begin by constructing a more general notion of Plans (remi-
niscent of IHCPs, first constructed in Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), and then refine our notion
to capture only the elements of interest. This methodology serves two purposes. First, the
more general approach allows us to use standard techniques for the construction of infinite
horizon choice objects. Second, generalized plans may be of direct interest in future work,
when, for example, denumerable support is not desirable. To begin, let Q0 = ∆
B(A) and,
for define recursively for each n ≥ 1
Qn = ∆
B(A×K(X ×Qn−1)).
Finally, define Q∗ =
∏
n≥0Qn. Q
∗ is the set of generalized plans.
Consistency. For the first step, we will follow closely GP of consistent IHCPs, but with
enough difference that it makes sense to define things outright. Formally, let G1 : A ×
K(X × Q0) → A as the mapping (a, {x, q0}) 7→ a. Let F1 : Q1 → Q0 as the mapping
F1 : q1 7→
(
E 7→ q1(G−11 (E))
)
, for any E ∈ B(A). Therefore, for any E ∈ B(A), F1(p1)(E)
is the probability of event E in period 0 as implied by p1; F1(p1) is the distribution over
period 0 actions implied by p1. From here we can recursively define Gn : A×K(X ×Qn)→
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A×K(X ×Qn−1) as:
Gn : (a, {x, qn−1}) 7→ (a, {x, Fn−1(q0)}))
and Fn : Qn → Qn−1 as:
Fn : qn 7→
(
E 7→ qn(G−1n (E))
)
for any E in ∆B(A×K(X ×Qn−1)). A consistent generalized plan is one such that
Fn(qn) = qn−1,
for all n. Let Q denote all such generalized plans.
B.1.1 Construction Proofs
Lemma 5. There exists a homeomorphism, λ : Q→ ∆B(A×K(X ×Q)) such that
margA×K(X×Qn−1)(λ(q)) = qn. (B.1)
Proof. [Step 1: Extension Theorem.] Let Cn =
{
(q0, . . . qn) ∈
∏n
k=0Qk|qk = Fk+1(qk+1),∀k =
1 . . . n−1}, and Tn = K(X×Cn) for n ≥ 0. Let T ∗ = ∏∞n=0 Tn and T = {t ∈ T ∗|(projTntn+1 =
tn
}
. Let Y0 = ∆
B(A) and for n ≥ 1 let Yn = ∆B(A×T0× . . .×Tn)). We say the the sequence
of probability measures {νn ∈ Yn}n≥0 is consistent if margA...Tn−1νn+1 = νn for all n ≥ 0. Let
Y c denote the set of all consistent sequences. Then we know by Brandenburger and Dekel
(1993), for every {νn} ∈ Y c there exists a unique ν ∈ ∆B(A × T ∗) such that margAν = ν0
and margA...Tnν = νn. Moreover, the map ψ : Y
c → ∆B(A× T ∗):
ψ : {νn} 7→ ν
is a homeomorphism.
[Step 2: Extending Backwards.] Let Dn =
{
(t0, . . . tn) ∈ ×nn=0Tn|tk = projTn(tk+1),∀k =
1 . . . n − 1}. Let Y d = {{νn} ∈ Y c|νn(A ×Dn) = 1,∀n ≥ 0}. For each q ∈ Q, there exists
a unique {νn} ∈ Y d, such that ν0 = q0 and margA×K(X×Qn−1)(margA×Tn−1(νn)) = qn for all
n ≥ 1. Indeed, let m0, m1 be the identify function on A and A×K(X ×Q0), respectively.
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Then for each n ≥ 2 let mn : A×Dn−1 → A×K(X ×Qn−1) as follows:
mn+1 : (a, {x0, q00}, {x1, q10, q11} . . . {xn, qn0 . . . qnn}n) 7→ (a, {xn, qnn}).
Note: for n ≥ 0, each mn is a Borel isomorphism. Indeed, continuity of mn is obvious, and
measurability follows immediately from the fact that canonical projections are measurable in
the product σ-algebra. It is clear that mn is surjective, and —since (given Fk for k ∈ 1 . . . n)
qn uniquely determines q0 . . . qn−1, which, (given the projection mappings) uniquely deter-
mines T0 . . . Tn−1— mi is also injective. As for, m−1n , continuity follows from the continuity
of Fk for k ∈ 1 . . . n and the projection mappings. Lastly, measurability of m−1n comes from
the fact that a continuous injective Borel function is a Borel isomorphism (see Kechris (2012)
corollary 15.2).
So, let ψ : Q→ Y d as the map
ϕ : q 7→ {En 7→ qn(mn(En))}n≥0,
for any En ∈ B(A × T0 × . . . × Tn). The continuity of ϕ and ϕ−1 follow from the fact that
they are constructed from the pushforward measures of m−1n and mn, respectively, which are
themselves continuous (or, explicitly, see GP lemma 4).
Finally, let Γn = A × Dn ×∞k=n+1 Tk. Let ν = ψ({νn}) for some {νn} in Y d. Then
ν(Γn) = ν(A × Dn) = 1. So, ν(A × T ) = ν(∩n≥0Γn) = lim ν(Γn) = 1. Also, note, if
ν(A× T ) = 1, then ν(Γn) = 1 for all n ≥ 0. So, ν ∈ Y d if and only if ν(A× T ) = 1, i.e., if,
ψ(Y d) =
{
ν ∈ ∆B(A× T ∗)|ν(A× T ) = 1}.
[Step 3: Extending Forwards.] Let τ denote the map from A×K(X ×Q)→ A× T as
τ :
(
a, {x, q}) 7→ (a, ({x, q0}, {x, q0, q1}, . . .))
That τ it is a bijection follows from the consistency conditions on Q, T , and Cn for n ≥ 1.
Now takes some measurable set E ⊆ T . Then τ−1(E) = ⋂n≥0 {{x, q0, . . . qn ×k=n∞1 Qk} ∈
K(X ×Q∗)}, the countable intersection of measurable sets, and hence measurable. That τ
and τ−1 are continuous is immediate. Therefore, by the same argument as in [Step 2], τ is
a Borel isomorphism and κ : ∆B
(A× T)→ ∆B(A×K(X ×Q)),
κ : ν 7→ (E 7→ ν(τ(E)))
for all E in ∆B
(A × K(X × Q)). margA(κ(ν)) = margA(ν) and margA×K(X×Qn−1)(κ(ν)) =
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margA×K(X×Qn−1)(margA×Tn−1(ν)) for all n ≥ 1.
Behold, λ = κ ◦ ψ ◦ ϕ is the desired homeomorphism.
Definition. Let R0 = Q0 and R1 = {r1 ∈ Q1|r1(A ⊗ R0) = 1}. Then, recursively let
Rn = {rn ∈ Qn|rn(A⊗Rn−1) = 1}. Set R =
∏∞
n=0Rn.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We show that λ is a homeomorphism between R and ∆B(A⊗R).
Identify ∆B(A ⊗ R) with {ν ∈ ∆B(A × K(X × Q))|ν(A ⊗ R) = 1}. Let r ∈ R. For
each n ≥ 0 let Γrn = {(a, {x, q}) ∈ A ⊗ Q|qk ∈ Rk, k = 0 . . . n}. Then λ(r)(Γrn) =
margA×K(X×Qn)(λ(r))(A ⊗ Rn) = rn+1(A ⊗ Rn) = 1 for all n ≥ 1. So λ(r)(A ⊗ R) =
λ(r)(∩n≥0Γrn) = limλ(r)(Γrn) = 1. Now, fix q ∈ Q with λ(q)(A⊗R) = 1, then qn(A⊗Rn−1) =
margA×K(X×Qn−1)(λ(q))(A⊗Rn−1) = λ(r)(Γrn) ≥ λ(r)(A⊗R) = 1 for all n ≥ 0 and so q ∈ R.
Definition. For a metric space, M , let ∆(M) ⊆ ∆B(M) denote the set of all distributions
with countable support. I.e., for all ν ∈ ∆(M), there exists a countable set Sν such that
m /∈ Sν =⇒ ν(m) = 0, and
∑
m∈Sν ν(m) = 1.
Definition. Set W : P(R)→ P(R) as the function:
W : E 7→ {r′ ∈ R|r′ ∈ Im(f) for some (a, f) ∈ supp(λ(r)), r ∈ E}
Definition. Let P0 = ∆(A) and P1 = {p1 ∈ R1|p1 ∈ ∆(A⊗P0)}. Then, recursively let Pn =
{pn ∈ Rn|pn ∈ ∆(A⊗ Pn−1)}. Set P =
{
p ∈∏∞n=0 Pn|∏∞n=0 λ(W n(r)) ⊂∏∞n=0 ∆(A⊗R)}.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We show that λ is a homeomorphism between P and ∆(A⊗P ). First
note, by construction, for all r ∈ R, λ(r) ∈ ∆B(A ⊗W (r)). Let p ∈ P ; by the conditions
on P , λ(p) ∈ ∆(A ⊗ R). Therefore, it suffices to show that for any p ∈ P , and r ∈ W (p),
r ∈ P . So fix some r ∈ W (p). It follows from an analogous argument to Corollary 3.1 that
r ∈∏∞n=0 Pn. Finally, note that W n−1(r) ⊆ W n(r), for all n ≥ 2.
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B.2 LEMMAS
Lemma 6. If <h satisfies vNM and IT, then <h satisfies the sure thing principal:
[AX. B.1: STP] For all a ∈ A and f, f ′, g, g′ : X → P , such that, for all x ∈ X, either (i)
f(x) = f ′(x) and g(x) = g′(x) or (ii) f(x) = g(x) and f ′(x) = g′(x). Then,
(a, f)<h(a, g) ⇐⇒ (a, f ′)<h(a, g′).
Proof. Assume this was not true and, without loss of generality, that (a, f)<h(a, g) but
(a, g′) h (a, f ′). Now notice, when mixtures are taken point-wise, 12f + 12g′ = 12g + 12f ′.
Therefore, (1
2
(a, f) +
1
2
(a, g′)
) h (1
2
(a, g) +
1
2
(a, f ′)
)
∼h (a, 1
2
g +
1
2
f ′) = (a,
1
2
f +
1
2
g′)
∼h
(1
2
(a, f) +
1
2
(a, g′)
)
,
where the first line follows from vNM, and the indifference conditions from IT. This is a
contradiction.
Lemma 7. If <h satisfies vNM and IT for all h ∈ H, then, if h A∼ h′ then <h = <h′.
Proof. We will show the claim on induction by the length of the history. So let h, h′ ∈ H(1)
such that h
A∼ h′. Therefore, h = (p, (a, f), x) and h′ = (p′, (a, g), x). Notice, by definition
we have, p = α(a, f) + (1 − α)r and p′ = α′(a, g) + (1 − α′)r′, for some α, α′ ∈ (0, 1] and
r, r′ ∈ P .
Let q, q′ ∈ P ; we want to show that q<h q′ ⇐⇒ q<h′ q′. So let q<h q′, or by definition,
p−hq< p−hq′, which by the above observation is equivalent to
α(a, f)−((a,f),(a,f),x)q + (1− α)r<α(a, f)−((a,f),(a,f),x)q + (1− α)r.
By independence (i.e., vNM) this is if and only if (a, f)−((a,f),(a,f),x)q<(a, f)−((a,f),(a,f),x)q′,
which by STP is if and only if (a, g)−((a,g),(a,g),x)q<(a, g)−((a,g),(a,g),x)q′. Using independence
again, this is if and only if p′−h′q< p′−h′q′. This completes the base case.
So assume the claim holds for all histories of length n. So let h, h′ ∈ H(n+ 1) such that
h
A∼ h′. Therefore, h = (hn, p, (a, f), x) and h′ = (h′n, p′, (a, g), x), for some hn, h′n ∈ H(n)
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such that hn
A∼ h′n. By the inductive hypothesis <hn = <h′n .
Let q, q′ ∈ P , and q<h q′, or by definition, p−(p,(a,f),x)q<hn p−(p,(a,f),x)q′. By independence
and the sure thing principle this is if and only if (a, g)−((a,g),(a,g),x)q<hn(a, g)−((a,g),(a,g),x)q′,
which by independence again (and the equivalence of <hn and <h′n), is if and only if
p′−(p′,(a,g),x)q<h′n p′−(p′,(a,g),x)q′.
B.3 PROOF OF MAIN THEOREMS
Proof of Theorem 3.3. [Step 0: Value Function.] Since <h satisfies vNM, there exists a
vh : A⊗ P → R such that
Uh(p) =E
p
[
vh(a, f)
]
(B.2)
represents <h, with vh unique un to affine translations.
[Step 1: Recursive structure.] To obtain the skeleton of the representation, lets consider <ˆ,
the restriction of < to Σ (i.e., using the natural association between streams of lotteries and
degenerate trees). The relation <ˆ satisfies vNM (it is continuous by the closure of Σ in P ).
Hence there is a linear and continuous representation: i.e., an index uˆ : X × Σ → R such
that:
Uˆ(σ) =E
σ
[
uˆ(x, ρ)
]
(B.3)
unique upto affine translations.
Following Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), (henceforth GP), fix some (x′, ρ′) ∈ Σ. From
SEP we have Uˆ(1
2
(x, ρ) + 1
2
(x′, ρ′)) = Uˆ(1
2
(x, ρ′) + 1
2
(x′, ρ)), and hence, uˆ(x, ρ) = uˆ(x, ρ′) +
uˆ(x′, ρ)− uˆ(x′, ρ′). Then setting u(x) = uˆ(x, ρ′)− uˆ(x′, ρ′) and W (ρ) = uˆ(x′, ρ), we have,
Uˆ(σ) =E
σ
[
u(x) +W (ρ)
]
(B.4)
Now, consider p′ = (x′, ρ). Notice that p′ has unique 1-period history: h = (p′, p′, x′). By
NT, h cannot be null. So, by SST, <ˆh = <ˆ. This implies, of course that W = δUˆ + β for
some δ > 0 and β ∈ R. Following Step 3 of Lemma 9 in GP exactly, we see that δ < 1 and
109
without loss of generality we can set β = 0:
Uˆ(σ) =E
σ
[
u(x) + δUˆ(ρ)
]
(B.5)
Both representing <ˆ and being unique up to affine translations, we can normalize each Uh
to coincide with Uˆ over Σ.
[Step 2: The existence of subjective probabilities.] For each a ∈ A consider
F(a) = a⊗ Σ
i.e., the elements of Pˆ that begin with action a and from period 2 onwards are in Σ. Associate
F(a) with the set of “acts”: f : Sa → Σ, in the natural way. For any acts f, g let f−xg
denote the act that coincides with f for all x′ ∈ Sa, x′ 6= x, and coincides with g after x. For
each h ∈ H, and acts f, g ∈ F(a), say f <˙h,a g if and only if (a, f)<h(a, g).
It is immediate that <˙h,a is a continuous weak order (where, as before, continuity follows
from the closure of F in P ). Further, <˙h,a satisfies independence. Indeed: fix f, g, h ∈ F(a)
with f <˙h,a g. Then
f <˙h,a g =⇒ (a, f)<h(a, g)
=⇒ α(a, f) + (1− α)(a, h)<h α(a, g) + (1− α)(a, h)
=⇒ (a, αf + (1− α)h)<h(a, αg + (1− α)h)
=⇒ αf + (1− α)h <˙h,a αg + (1− α)h,
where the third line uses IT. Lastly, <˙h,a satisfies monotonicity, a direct consequence of SST
and STP. Hence, we have state-independence which gives us the full set of Anscombe and
Aumann (1963) axioms for an SEU representation of <˙h,a with state space Sa. That is, a
belief µh,a ∈ ∆(Sa) and a utility index from Σ → R (which is of course, Uˆ , and so will be
denoted as such), such that
Vˆh,a(f) =E
µh,a
[
Uˆ(f(x))
]
(B.6)
represents <˙h,a.
[Step 3: Proportional Actions.] Now, fix some h ∈ H and consider an arbitrary (a, f) ∈
A ⊗ P . Let ρ ∈ Σ be such that margXρ = µh,a. We claim, (a, f) and ρ are h-proportional.
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Fix some g, g′ : X → Σ. From (B.6), we know
(a, g)<h(a, g′) ⇐⇒ E
µh,a
[
Uˆ(g(x))
] ≥E
µh,a
[
Uˆ(g′(x))
]
(B.7)
From (B.5) we have
Uˆ(ρ.g) =E
ρ
[
u(x) + δUˆ(g(x))
]
=E
margXρ
[
u(x) + δUˆ(g(x))
]
=E
µh,a
[
u(x)
]
+ δE
µh,a
[
Uˆ(g(x))
]
In corresponding fashion we obtain the analogous representation for Uˆ(ρ.g′), and hence
ρ.g<h ρ.g′ ⇐⇒ E
µh,a
[
Uˆ(g(x))
] ≥E
µh,a
[
Uˆ(g′(x))
]
(B.8)
Combining the implications of (B.7) and (B.8), we see that (a, f) and ρ are h-proportional.
[Step 4: Proportional Plans.] We now claim that for any h ∈ H and p ∈ P there exists some
σ ∈ Σ such that p ∼h σ. Fix some p ∈ P , and for each n ∈ N define pn to be any PoA
that agrees with p on the first n periods, then provides elements of Σ unambiguously. Note
that pn → p point-wise and hence converges in the product topology. Therefore, the claim
reduces to finding a convergent sequence {σn}n∈N ⊂ Σ such that σn ∼h pn, as continuity
ensures the limits are indifferent.
We will prove the subsidiary claim by induction. Consider p1, for each (a, f) ∈ supp[p1],
note, by assumption, f : X → Σ. Let τ 1,(a,f) ∈ Σ be such that margXτ 1,(a,f) = µh,a. By
[Step 3], (a, f) and τ 1,(a,f) are h-proportional. And thus, τ 1,(a,f).f ∼h (a, f).f = (a, f), by
PRP. Let σ1 ∈ Σ be such that σ1[E] = p1[{(a, f)|τ 1,(a,f).f ∈ E}]. Therefore,
Uh(p
1) =E
p1
[
vh(a, f)
]
=E
p1
[
Uˆ(τ 1,(a,f).f)
]
=E
σ1
[
Uˆ(ρ)
]
= Uˆ(σ1)
where the third line comes from the change of variables formula for pushforward measures.
This completes the base case.
Now, assume the claim hold for all h and m ≤ n− 1 for some n ∈ N. Consider pn. Note
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that for all h′ of the form h(x) = (h, pn, (a, f), x), the implied continuation problem pn(h′)
satisfies the inductive hypothesis. Therefore, there exists a σn−1,h
′ ∼h′ p(h′) for all such h′.
Let ? denote the mapping: (a, f) 7→ (a, f)? = (a, x 7→ σn−1,h(a,x)), where h(a, x) =
(h, pn, (a, f), x). By construction, for each (a, f) in supp(pn), and x ∈ Sa we have (a, f) ∼h
(a, f−xσn−1,h(a,x)) (using the notation from [Step 2]). Employing STP we have (a, f) ∼h
(a, f)? (i.e., enumerating the outcomes in Sa and changing f one entry at a time, where STP
ensures that each iteration is indifferent to the last).
Let pˆn ∈ P be such that pˆn[E] = pn[{(a, f)|(a, f)? ∈ E}]. So,
Uh(p
n) =E
pn
[
vh(a, f)
]
=E
pn
[
vh((a, f)
?)
]
=E
pˆn
[
vh(b, g)
]
= Uh(pˆ
n)
Applying the base case to pˆn concludes the inductive step. Notice also, the convergence of
{σn}n∈N is easily verified, following the fact that the marginals on pn are fixed for any σm
with m ≥ n.
[Step 5: Representation.] Consider any (a, f) ∈ A ⊗ P . We claim that there exists an
(a, f ′) ∈ F(a) such that (a, f) ∼h (a, f ′). Indeed, by [Step 4], for any x ∈ Sa, there
exists some ρ(a, x) such that ρ(a, x) ∼h(a,x) f(x), where h(a, x) = (h, (a, f), (a, f), x). Define
f ′ ∈ F(a) as x 7→ ρ(a, x). It follows from STP that (a, f) ∼h (a, f ′).
We know by [Step 3] that there exists a ρ ∈ Σ, h-proportional to (a, f), with margXρ =
µh,a. Hence (a, g) = (a, f).g ∼h ρ.g for all g : X → Σ. We have,
vh(a, g) = Uˆ(ρ.g)
=E
µh,a
[
u(x) + δUˆ(g(x))
]
,
and so, for (a, f ′):
vh(a, f
′) =E
µh,a
[
u(x) + δUˆ(ρ(a, x))
]
.
By the indifference condition ρ(a, x) ∼h(a,x) f(x),
vh(a, f) =E
µh,a
[
u(x) + δUh(a,x)(f(x))
]
. (B.9)
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Notice, h(a, x)
A∼ h′(a, x) = (h, p, (a, f), x), so by Lemma 7, <h(a,x) = <h′(a,x). Applying this
fact, and plugging (B.9) into (B.2) provides
Uh(p) =E
p
[
E
µh,a
[
u(x) + δUh′(a,x)(f(x))
]]
(B.10)
as desired.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. First we show, if a strongly exchangeable process ζ over S is induced
by an i.i.d distribution D over SA, then it must be that the marginals of D (on {Sa}a∈A)
are independent, that is D ∈ ∆IN . Indeed, consider two non-empty, disjoint collection of
actions, Aˆ, Aˆ′ ⊂ A. Let E,F ∈ SAˆ, E ′, F ′ ∈ SAˆ′ , be measurable events. Identify En with
the cylinder it E generates in S when in the nth coordinate: En = {s ∈ S|sn,B ∈ E}. Since
ζ is strongly exchangeable we have that
ζ
(
En ∩ E ′n ∩ F n+1 ∩ F ′n+1) = ζ (En ∩ F ′n ∩ F n+1 ∩ E ′n+1) . (2Sym)
We will refer to the latter weaker property as two symmetry. Now, since ζ is i.i.d generated
by D, we have that (abusing notation by identifying E with the cylinder it generates in SA)
D(E ∩ E ′) ·D(F ∩ F ′) = D(E ∩ F ′) ·D(F ∩ E ′).
Substituting via the rule of conditional probability:
D(E|E ′) ·D(E ′) ·D(F |F ′) ·D(F ′) = D(E|F ′) ·D(F ′) ·D(F |E ′) ·D(E ′).
This implies that
D(E|E ′)
D(E|F ′) =
D(F |E ′)
D(F |F ′) .
Since this is true for all events, we have that D(E|E ′) = D(E|F ′) for every E ∈ SAˆ and
E ′, F ′ ∈ SAˆ′ , implying Aˆ and Aˆ′ are independent.
We now move to show that strong exchangeability is sufficient for the representation
specified in the statement of the result. Since strong exchangeability implies exchangeability,
we can apply de Finetti’s theorem and represent the process ζ by
ζ(·) =
∫
∆(SA)
Dˆ(·)dψ(D).
We need to show that ψ’s support lies in ∆IN .
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For s ∈ S and t ∈ N let st be the projection of s into the first t periods. Now, let
ζ(·|st) : SA → [0, 1] be the one period ahead predictive probability, given that the history
of realizations in the first t periods is st. Since ζ is exchangeable, ζ(·|st) converges (as
t → ∞) with ζ probability 1. Moreover, the set of all limits is the support of ψ. Denote
the limit for a particular s by Ds. Of course, the exchangeability of ζ also guarantees that
ζ(·, ·|st) : SA × SA → [0, 1], that is the two period ahead predictive probability, converges to
Ds ×Ds. Furthermore, ζ is strongly exchangeable; the limit itself satisfies (2Sym), and the
arguments above imply that Ds ∈ ∆IN with ζ probability 1.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. Fix an SEE belief structure {ζT}T∈T . We first construct a pre-
measure ζˆ on the semi-algebra of cylinder sets. Fix any ordering over A. Set ζˆ(ø) = 0 and
ζˆ(S) = 1. Let E 6= S be an arbitrary cylinder, i.e., E = ∏n∈N∏a∈AEn,a, such that for
only finitely many (n, a), is En,a 6= Sa. Clearly, there are a finite number of a ∈ A such
that Ek,a 6= Sa for any k. By the ordering on A denote these a1 . . . an. For each ai let mi
denote the number of components such that Ek,ai 6= Ssi , and for j = 1 . . .mi, let ki,j denote
the jth such component. Finally, for each ai, let piai denote any permutation such that
piai(ki,j) = j +
∑
i′<imi′ . Consider Eˆ =
∏
n∈N
∏
a∈AEpia(n),a, where pia = piai if a ∈ a1 . . . an
and the identity otherwise. That is, for n ∈ 1 . . .m1, Eˆn,a = Sa for all a except a1, for
n ∈ m1 . . .m1 + m2, Eˆn,a = Sa for all a except a2, etc. Let T(E) denote the sequence such
that Tn = Si for
∑
i′<imi′ < n ≤
∑
i′≤imi′ . Again that is, for n ∈ 1 . . .m1, Tn = Sa1 , for
n ∈ m1 . . .m1 +m2, T2 = Sa2 , etc.
For the remainder of this proof, for any cylinder E, Eˆ denotes the corresponding cylinder
generated by the above process, in which at most a single action is restricted in each period.
Let T(E) denote any observable process which observes the sequence of restricted actions.
Finally, for any cylinder, E, which is restricted in most one action each period, and any
T which observes each restricted set, identify E the relevant event in T. So, Set ζˆ(E) =
ζT(E)(Eˆ).
To apply the Carathe´odory extension theorem for semi-algebras, we need to show that
for any sequence of disjoint cylinders {Ek}k∈N such that E =
⋃
k∈NE
k is a cylinder, ζˆ(E) =∑
k∈N ζˆ(E
k). Towards this, assume that E,E ′ are disjoint cylinders such that E ∪ E ′ is a
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cylinder. Then it must be that there exists a unique (n, a) such that En,a ∩E ′n,a = ø and for
all other (m, b), Em,b = E
′
m,b. Indeed, if this was not the case, then there exists some (m, b)
and some x such that (WLOG) x ∈ Em,b \ E ′m,b. But then, for all s ∈ E ∪ E ′, sm,b = x =⇒
sn,a ∈ En,a 6= (E ∪E ′)n,a a contradiction to E ∪E ′ being a cylinder. But this implies Eˆ and
Eˆ ′ induce the same sequence of restricted coordinates, differing on the restriction of single
coordinate, and therefore, T(E) = T(E ′). This implies that Eˆ ∪ Eˆ ′ ⊆ T(E). Since ζT(E) is
finitely additive, so therefore ζˆ(E∪E ′) = ζT(E)(Eˆ∪Eˆ ′) = ζT(E)(Eˆ)+ζT(E)(Eˆ ′) = ζˆ(E)+ζˆ(E ′).
Since ζˆ is finitely additive over cylinder sets, countable additivity follows if we show that
for all decreasing sequences of cylinders {Ek}k∈N, such that infk ζˆ(Ek) =  > 0, we have⋂
k∈NE
k 6= ø. But this follows immediately from the finiteness of Sa. Since Ek+1 ⊆ Ek, it
must be that Ekn,a ⊆ Ekn,a. But each Ekn,a is finite, hence compact, and nonempty, because
ζ(Ek) ≥ . Therefore ⋂k∈NEkn,a 6= ø. The result follows by noting that the intersection of
cylinder sets is the cylinder generated by the intersection of the respective generating sets.
Let ζ denote the unique extension of ζˆ to the σ-algebra on S.
That ζ is consistent with {ζT}T∈T is immediate. We need to show that ζ is strongly
exchangeable. Let E be a cylinder. Let p¯ia denote a finite permutation for each a ∈ A. Let
F =
∏
n∈N
∏
a∈AEp¯ia(n),a. Let piai denote the permutation given by the construction of Fˆ .
Then Fˆ =
∏
n∈N
∏
a∈AEpia(p¯ia(n)),a. In particular, this implies there exists some permutation
pi∗ such that Fˆ =
∏
n∈N
∏
a∈AEpi∗(n),a. By AA-SYM, ζT(Eˆ)(Eˆ) = ζpi∗T(Eˆ)(pi
∗Eˆ) = ζT(Fˆ )(Fˆ ).
Therefore, ζ(E) = ζ(F ) and so, by Theorem 3.6, ζ is strongly exchangeable.
Finally, the similar logic show that ζ is unique. Towards a contradiction, assume there
was some distinct, strongly exchangeable ζ ′, also consistent with {ζT}T∈T . Then, since the
cylinder sets form a pi-system, there must be some cylinder such that ζ(E) 6= ζ ′(E). But, by
strong exchangeability, ζ(Eˆ) = ζ(E) and ζ ′(Eˆ) = ζ ′(E), so ζ(Eˆ) 6= ζ ′(Eˆ) –a contradiction
to their joint consistency with {ζT}T∈T .
Proof of Theorem 3.8. Let {µh,a}h∈H,a∈A be an SEE structure for < that satisfies AA-
SYM. Let {ζT}T∈T be the associated family of observable processes. Fix T and some n
period history h ∈ T. Let, (a1, x1) . . . (an, xn), where for each i ≤ n let ai is such that
Ti = Sai and xi is the i
th component of h. This represents an A-equivalence class of decision
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theoretic histories. In out standard abuse of notation, let h also denote this class of histories.
Following this abuse, when it is not confusing to do so, let pih denote both the permuted
statistical history and the A-equivalence class represented by (api(1), xpi(1)) . . . (api(n), xpi(n)).
Fix some n-permutation pi. Let p denote the PoA that assigns ai in the i
th period with
certainty. Let p′ be the pi-permutation of p. We have
α = ζT(h) = µ∅,a1(x1) · µ(a1,x1),a2(x2) · · ·µ(a1,x1,...,an−1,xn−1),an(xn.
Let σ, σ′ ∈ Σ be such that Uh(σ) = 1 and Uh(σ′) = 0. Then, by (SEE) we have
p−n(ασ + (1− α)σ′) ∼ (p−nσ′)−hσ
so, by AA-SYM, we have,
p′−n(ασ + (1− α)σ′) ∼ (p′−nσ′)−h′σ
which implies, again by (SEE),
α = µ∅,api(1)(xpi(1)) · µ(api(1),xpi(1)),api(2)(xpi(2)) · · ·µ(api(1),xpi(1),...,api(n−1),xpi(n−1)),api(n)(xpi(n)) = ζpiT(pih).
Hence, ζT(h) = ζpiT(pih) as desired.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 SUPPORTING RESULTS
Lemma 8. ϕ¯ ∈ L(X) if and only if there exists some reduced assignment µ¯ and formula in
ϕ ∈ L(X ) such that ϕ¯ = µ¯(ϕ).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the construction of ϕ¯. First enumerate the elements of
X . Assume ϕ¯ is atomic in L(X). Then ϕ¯ = αx1 . . . xn, for some (not necessarily distinct)
x1 . . . xn ∈ X. So let ϕ be the formula α = a1 . . . an, with a1 . . . an (note, the ai’s are distinct
elements); and µ, any assignment that extends the mapping µ : ai 7→ xi for i = 1 . . . n. It
is immediate that ϕ¯ = µ¯(ϕ). In the other direction, if for some assignment µ, ϕ¯ = µ¯(ϕ) =
αµ(a1) . . . µ(an), then ϕ¯ is an atomic L(X).
So assume the theorem holds for arbitrary ϕ¯ and ψ¯, with corresponding formulae ϕ, ψ,
and assignments µ and ν. Then ¬ϕ¯ = ¬µ¯(ϕ) = µ¯(¬ϕ) and ϕ¯ = µ¯(ϕ) = µ¯(ϕ), by
nature of the fact that µ acts only on variables. Proving both directions.
Next, let k(ϕ¯) be the number of occurrences of elements of D in ϕ¯ and k(ψ¯) the number of
occurrences of elements of D in ψ¯. Then, let τ be any assignment that extends the mapping
τ :
ai 7→ µ(ai) for i = 1 . . . k(ϕ¯)ai 7→ ν(ai) for i = k(ϕ¯) + 1 . . . k(ϕ¯) + k(ψ¯).
Then, ϕ¯ ∧ ψ¯ = τ¯(ϕ ∧ τ [ai/ai+k(ϕ¯)]). In the other direction, assume there exists some assign-
ment µ and η ∈ L(X ) such that µ¯(η) = ϕ¯ ∧ ψ¯. Since, µ acts only on variables and one
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character at a time, it is immediate that η must be for the form ϕ ∧ ψ where ψ and ψ are
such that µ¯(ϕ) = ϕ¯ and µ¯(ψ) = ψ¯ and so, by the inductive hypothesis, ϕ¯, ψ¯ ∈ L(X) and
therefore so is ϕ¯ ∧ ψ¯.
Finally, let C = {c ∈ X |µ(c) = x, c occurs in ϕ} (if x appears in ϕ¯, then by the inductive
hypothesis, C is non empty). Let ζ ∈ L(X ) be the formula that coincides with ϕ except all
(and possibly no) free occurrence of a are replaced with free occurrences of b ∈ X , where b
does not occur (free or bound) in ϕ, and all (and possibly no) free occurrence of any c ∈ C
are replaced with free occurrences of a (notice there are no free occurrences of any c ∈ C in
ζ (except possible if a ∈ C)). Then let τ be an assignment that coincides with µ everywhere
but for a and b, where τ(a) = x and τ(b) = µ(a). Then,
τ¯(∀aζ) = ∀aτ¯(ζ)[τ(a)/a]
= ∀aµ¯(ϕ)[τ(a)/a]
= ∀aϕ¯[τ(a)/a]
= ∀aϕ¯[x/a],
where the first equality is definitional, since τ acts only on free variables and there are no free
c ∈ C in ζ, the second follows from the construction of ζ and τ , which ensures µ¯(ϕ) = τ¯(ζ),
the third from the inductive hypothesis, and the fourth since τ(a) = x.
In the other direction, assume there exists some assignment µ and η ∈ L(X ) such that
µ¯(η) = ∀aϕ¯[x/a]. Since, µ acts only on variables and one character at a time, it is immediate
that η must be for the form ∀aϕ, were µ¯(ϕ) = (ϕ¯[x/a])[a/µ(a)]. So let τ ∼a µ and τ(a) = x.
Then, τ¯(ϕ) = (ϕ¯[x/a])[a/τ(a)] = (ϕ¯[x/a])[a/x] = ϕ¯. So ϕ¯ ∈ L(X), by the inductive
hypothesis, and so, ∀aϕ¯[x/a] ∈ L(X).
Lemma 9. Fix some ϕ¯ ∈ L(X). Let (ϕ, µ) and (ϕ′, µ′) be such that µ¯(ϕ) = µ¯′(ϕ′) = ϕ¯.
Then (M, s) |=µ ϕ if and only if (M, s) |=µ′ ϕ′
Proof. The proof is by induction. First, assume ϕ¯ is an atomic proposition, i.e., ϕ¯ =
αx1 . . . xn. Then ϕ = αa1 . . . an and ϕ
′ = αb1 . . . bn, where µ(ai) = µ′(bi) = xi. Then
(M, s) |=µ ϕ if any only if (µ(a1) . . . µ(an), s) = (x1 . . . xn, s) = (µ′(b1) . . . µ′(ban), s) ∈ V(α),
if and only (M, s) |=µ′ ϕ′.
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So assume the result holds for all formulae of order n. Since reduced assignments preserve
the structure of ¬,∧,, we need only consider the case of ∀aϕ¯[x/a]. So let µ¯(∀aϕ) =
µ¯′(∀aϕ′) = ∀aϕ¯[x/a], and (M, s) |=µ ∀aϕ. Then for any µa ∼a µ, (M, s) |=µa ϕ. Let µ′a ∼ µ′
be such that µa(a) = µ′a(a). Then notice µ¯a(ϕ) = µ¯′a(ϕ′) (this follows from the fact that
when µa(a) = µ′a(a) = x, it must be that µ¯a(ϕ) = µ¯′a(ϕ′) = ϕ¯). So by the inductive
hypothesis, (M, s) |=µ′a ϕ′, for all a-variants of µ′.
Lemma 10. Let M be a model of ∀KT ∪ P . Then for any contingent plan, ct, based on
the contractable set (Λ,Γ, µ), in each state, ct is either implicitly acceptable or implicitly
unacceptable.
Proof. Assume ct is not implicitly acceptable in state s. Then,
(M, s) |=µ ¬K0
∧
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ =⇒ ∀aPt(b< a)
)
.
Utilizing ψ ≡ ¬¬ψ, we have
(M, s) |=µ P0¬
∧
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ =⇒ ∀aPt(b< a)
)
.
Applying De Morgan’s Law, and the definition of =⇒ ,
(M, s) |=µ P0
∨
ϕ∈Γ
¬(¬ϕ ∨ ∀aPt(b< a)),
and De Morgan’s once more, and ¬∃a ≡ ∀a¬,
(M, s) |=µ P0
∨
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ ∧ ∃a¬Pt(b< a)
)
.
Then, since, ¬Pt ≡ Kt¬,
(M, s) |=µ P0
∨
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ ∧ ∃aKt¬(b< a)
)
.
and lastly, from the material equivalence of ¬(b< a) and (a  b) (under P , by Proposition
4.1), and the fact that Kt respects material equivalence,
(M, s) |=µ P0
∨
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ ∧ ∃aKt(a  b)
)
,
as desired.
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C.2 SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS RESULTS
Because propositions 4.1, 4.4, and 4.13 all relate to the soundness and completeness of
particular axiomatizations they are grouped together. Moreover, since Proposition 4.4 is
the most general result, it is proven first. The notation there introduced is used without
reintroduction in the subsequent proofs.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. The proof of soundness is standard (with perhaps the A0 as
the exception, which is immediate). Towards completeness, we will construct a canonical
structure. To this end, define L+(X ,Y) and the extension of LA(X ) that contains as atomic
formulae exactly the same predicates, and a set of variables that contains X but, in addition,
countably many variables, Y , not in X . A set, Λ ⊂ L+(X ,Y) is admissible if for every ϕ ∈
L+(X ,Y) for every a ∈ X∪Y , there exists some b ∈ X∪Y such that (ϕ[[a/b]] =⇒ ∀aϕ) ∈ Λ.
Now, let Sc be the set of all admissible and maximally ∀KT ∪ A0 consistent sets of
formulae in L+(X ,Y). Note, by Theorem 14.1 of Hughes and Cresswell (1996), if ∆ ⊂
L(X ) is consistent then there exists an s ∈ S such that ∆ ⊆ s. Also, define sKt = {ϕ ∈
L+(X ,Y)|Ktϕ ∈ s} and sAt = {ϕ ∈ L+(X ,Y)|Atϕ ∈ s}.
Define the canonical model M c = 〈Sc, Xc,Vc, {Rct}t≤T , {<cs}s∈Sc , {Act}t≤T 〉, where Sc
is defined as above, Xc = X ∪ Y , Vc is defined by (a1 . . . an, s) ∈ Vc(α) if and only if
αa1 . . . an ∈ s, Rct is defined by sRcts′ if and only if sKt ⊆ s′, <cs = {(a, b)|(a< b) ∈ s}, and
Act(s) = sAt for all t. Finally, define the conical assignment as the identity, µc : a 7→ a.
We will now show, for any s ∈ Sc and ϕ ∈ L+(X ,Y), (M c, s) |=µc ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ S.
This will complete the proof, because any ∀KT ∪ A0 consistent ϕ ∈ L(X ) is contained in
some s ∈ Sc, and hence satisfiable. The proof is by induction on the construction of ϕ. For
the base case, note, for any atomic αa1 . . . an we have (M
c, s) |=µc αa1 . . . an if any only if
(µc(a1) . . . µ
c(an), s) ∈ Vc(α) if and only if (a1 . . . an, s) ∈ Vc(α) if and only if αa1 . . . an ∈ s,
as desired. Likewise, for any (a< b), (M c, s) |=µc (a< b) if any only if µc(a)<cs µc(b) if and
only if a<cs b if and only if (a< b) ∈ s.
Assume this holds for arbitrary ϕ and ψ. The inductive step for the cases of ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ,
Ktϕ and ∀aϕ are exactly as in the proof of Theorem 14.3 of Hughes and Cresswell (1996).
So assume (M c, s) |=µc Atϕ. This is if and only if µ¯c(ϕ) ∈ Act(s). Since µ is the identity, so
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is µ¯, and therefore, this is if and only if ϕ ∈ Act(s) = sAt which is if and only if Atϕ ∈ s.
Lastly, let (M c, s) |=µc Etϕ. This is if and only if (M c, s) |=µc Ktϕ and (M c, s) |=µc Atϕ, so,
by the induction hypothesis, if and only if Ktϕ ∈ s and Atϕ ∈ s. By the properties of max-
imally consistent sets, (Ktϕ∧Atϕ) ∈ s, which by the validity of A0 is if and only if Etϕ ∈ s.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The evaluation of propositions in X × X via of the semantic
structure {<s}s∈S imposes no additional restrictions (namely, no restrictions on R); we
could just as well begin with V and derive {<s}s∈S there from. In addition, Cmp and Trv,
do not involve statements regarding Kt and so impose no restrictions on KT , and therefore
{Rt}t≤T . Hence, the result when C is restricted to be in {T, 4, 5} is as in the well known
case (see for example Hughes and Cresswell (1996)).
So let {Rt}t≤T be arbitrary. Let M ∈ Mcmp. Let µ be arbitrary. Assume (M, s) |=µ
¬(a< b). By definition (µ(a), µ(b)) /∈ <s, and by the completeness of <s this implies
(µ(b), µ(a)) ∈ <s, so, (M, s) |=µ (b< a): since µ was arbitrary, Cmp is valid in Mcmp.
So K ∪Cmp is sound with respect to M cmp.
To show completeness, we construct the canonical structure, M c:cmp. To this end, let
Sc:cmp denote the set of all maximally ∀KT ∪Cmp consistent sets of formulae in L+(X ,Y).
Let the rest of the canonical model be defined as in the proof of Proposition 4.4. The result
follows if <c:cmps is complete for all s, since then M c:cmp ∈Mcmp, implying any ∀KT ∪Cmp
consistent formula is satisfiable in Mcmp. Fix, (a, b) ∈ Xc × Xc. Since s is maximally
consistent it contains Cmp and either (a< b) or ¬(a< b). If (a< b) ∈ s then a<c:cmps b and
we are done. If ¬(a< b) ∈ s, then, since s contains Cmp and every instance of 1∀ it contains
¬(a< b)∧(¬(a< b) =⇒ (b< a)) ∈ s and consequently, (b< a). Therefore, b<c:cmps a. <c:cmps
is complete, as desired.
Now, let M ∈ Mtrv, and µ be arbitrary. Assume (M, s) |=µ (a< b) ∧ (b< c). By
definition, this implies (µ(a), µ(b)), ((µ(b), µ(c)) ∈ <s; by the transitivity of <s this implies
(µ(a), µ(c)) ∈ <s, so, (M, s) |=µ (a< c). Since µ was arbitrary, ∀K ∪ Trv is sound with
respect to M trv.
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Again, we construct the canonical structure, M c:trv, as usual. Assume a<c:trvs b and
b<c:trvs c. So, (a< b), (b< c) ∈ s. Since s is maximally ∀K ∪Trv consistent it contains Trv
and every instance of 1∀, therefore ((a< b)∧ (a< b))∧ (((a< b)∧ (b< c)) =⇒ (a< c)) ∈ s.
This implies, (a< c) ∈ s. Therefore, <s is transitive, as desired.
Proof of Proposition 4.13. Let M ∈ Mf , and µ be arbitrary. Let t ≥ t′. Assume
(M, s) |=µ Ktϕ. So, (M, s′) |= ϕ for all s′ ∈ Rt(s). In particular, (M, s′′) |=µ ϕ for all
s′′ ∈ Rt′ ⊆ Rt. By definition, (M, s) |=µ Kt′ϕ. F is valid in Mf ; ∀KT ∪ F is sound with
respect to M .
Towards completeness, we construct the canonical structure, M c:f , as usual. The result
follows if Rt′(s) ⊆ Rt(s) is true for all Sc:f , and t ≤ t′. So fix some s ∈ Sc:f , and let s′ be such
that sRc:ft′ s
′. By definition this implies sKt′ ⊆ s′. Now, let ϕ ∈ sKt : by definition Ktϕ ∈ s.
Since s contains every instance of F, (Ktϕ =⇒ Kt′ϕ) ∈ s, and consequently, Kt′ϕ ∈ s. By
definition ϕ ∈ sKt′ Since ϕ was arbitrary, sKt ⊆ sKt′ ⊆ s′, implying sRc:ft s′, as desired.
C.3 PROOFS OMITED FROM THE MAIN BODY OF TEXT
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Let Λ ⊂ L(X) be t-separable and contractable, and (Γ, µ) be
such that Γ ⊂ L(X ) and µ¯ defines a bijection between Λ and Γ such that there is no free
occurrence of a in any formula of Γ. For each state s, let x(s) denote any <s maximal
element, guaranteed to exists by Bnd. Denote by Λ¯ the subset of Λ that are satisfied in
some state: Λ¯ = {ϕ¯ ∈ Λ|(M, s) |=X ϕ¯, s ∈ S}. For each ϕ¯ ∈ Λ¯, define, c¯t(ϕ¯) to be any
element of {x(s)|s ∈ S, such that (M, s) |=X ϕ¯}. Finally, let ct be any extension of c¯t to Λ.
It remains to show ct is acceptable.
It suffices to show there no state such that (M, s) |=µ ¬
∧
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ =⇒ ∀aP0(ct(ϕ)< a)
)
.
So assume to the contrary, this was true for some state s′. Applying De Morgan’s, (M, s′) |=µ∨
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ ∧ ∃aKt(a  ct(ϕ))
)
. By the definition of contractable, there is a unique ψ¯ ∈ Λ
(with corresponding ψ ∈ Γ) such that (M, s′) |=X ψ¯, and so, it must be that (M, s′) |=µ
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ψ ∧ ∃aKt(a  ct(ψ)). Therefore, for some µ′ ∼a µ,
(M, s′) |=µ′ Kt(a  ct(ψ)), (C.1)
Further, by T, (M, s′) |=µ′ (a  ct(ψ)). i.e., ct(ϕ¯) is not <s maximal.
By the construction of ct, (and the fact that ψ¯ ∈ Λ¯) there must be some other state,
s′′, such that ct(ϕ) is <s′′ maximal and (M, s′′) |=X ψ¯. But then, by (the contrapositive of)
t-separability, s′Kt = s′′Kt . So, by (C.1), (M, s′′) |=µ′ Kt(a  ct(ψ)), a contradiction, via T,
to the <s′′ maximality of ct(ϕ).
Proof of Proposition 4.8. Let M be such a model. Let ∼Kt be the equivalence relation on S
defined by s ∼Kt s′ if sKt = s′Kt . Let S/∼Kt denote the resulting quotient space of S, with
elements [s]. Enumerate the elements of S/∼Kt . The proof is by induction on the number
of elements in S/∼Kt . If S/∼Kt contains a single element, any single tautological statement
provides t-separable contractable set.
Assume the result hold for n, with the corresponding set Λn = {λ¯1,n . . . λ¯n,n}. Finally,
let S/∼Kt contain n + 1 elements. By definition of S/∼Kt , it must be that for each [si],
i ≤ n, there exists some statement ϕi, such that (abusing notation: [s] denoting any of its
elements),
1. ϕ¯i ∈ [si]Kt \ [sn+1]Kt , or,
2. ϕ¯i ∈ [sn+1]Kt \ [si]Kt .
So, for each i ≤ n, define ψ¯i = ¬Ktϕ¯i if (1) holds, and ψ¯i = Ktϕ¯i if (2) holds. Define,
λ¯n+1,n+1 =
∧
i≤n
ψ¯i,
λ¯i,n+1 = λ¯i,n ∧ ¬λ¯n+1,n+1,
for i ≤ n. We claim Λn+1 = {λ¯1,n+1 . . . λ¯n+1,n+1} is a t-separable contractable state. So let
(Γ, µ) be any set such that Γ ⊂ L(X ) and µ¯ defines a bijection between Λ and Γ. Let λi,n+1
be the corresponding element to λ¯i,n+1. It must be that λn+1,n+1 is of the form
∧
i≤n ψi, and
from the properties of µ, we know µ¯(ψi) = ψ¯i.
Towards contractibility, let M ′ be any model satisfying the conditions of the theorem,
and s′ any state thereof. We claim (M ′, s′) |=µ ¬(λj,n+1 ∧ λk,n+1) for j 6= k and j 6= n + 1.
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Indeed, if k = n + 1 this is immediate. If k 6= n + 1 then the fact that the conjunction
of any two distinct formulae in Λ(n) is unsatisfiable provides the claim. Further, we claim
(M ′, s′) |=µ
∧
j≤n+1 λj,n+1. If (M
′, s′) |=µ λn+1,n+1 we are done, if not, then the validity of
the disjunction of all formulae of Λ(n) provides the claim.
Towards t-separability, assume ψ¯i is of the form ¬Ktϕ¯i (i.e., (1) holds), and let ϕ be
the corresponding formula of LA(X ) such that ψi = ¬Ktϕ. Then ϕ¯ /∈ [sn+1]Kt . So there
does not exist any assignment µ′ and ϕ′ such that µ¯(ϕ′) = ϕ¯i and (M, [sn+1]) |=µ′ Ktϕ′. In
particular, this is true for µ and ϕ; therefore (M, [sn+1]) |=µ ψi. Now, assume ψ¯i is of the
form Ktϕ¯i (i.e., (2) holds), again with corresponding ϕ. Then ϕ¯ ∈ [sn+1]Kt . So there exists
some µ′ and ϕ′ such that (M, [sn+1]) |=µ′ Ktϕ′. But, µ′(ϕ′) = ϕ = µ(ϕ), so by lemma 9,
(M, [sn+1]) |=µ ψi. Hence,
(M, [sn+1]) |=µ λ¯n+1,n+1
A similar logic applies to show, for each i ≤ n, (M, [si]) |=µ ¬ψi, and so, by the inductive
hypothesis,
(M, [si]) |=µ λ¯i,n+1
so Λ(n+ 1) is t-separable.
Proof of Theorem 4.11. Let ct be articulable and implicitly acceptable –so (4.9) holds. So
for every s′ ∈ R0(s),
(M, s′) |=µ
∧
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ =⇒ ∀aPt(ct(ϕ)< a)
)
Since possibility implies explicit possibility, (i.e., Ptϕ =⇒ PEt ϕ is a theorem), we have
(M, s′) |=µ
∧
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ =⇒ ∀aPEt (ct(ϕ)< a)
)
which implies,
(M, s) |=µ K0
∧
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ =⇒ ∀aPEt (ct(ϕ)< a)
)
. (C.2)
Now, notice, (M, s) |=µ A0(a< a) and (M, s) |=µ A0(b< b) (by the assumption there are two
distinct elements of D of which the DM is aware), and (M, s) |=µ A0ϕ for every ϕ ∈ Γ since
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ct is articulable. This implies by A↑, and A1,
(M, s) |=µ A0
∧
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ =⇒ ∀aPEt (ct(ϕ)< a)
)
. (C.3)
Combining (C.2) and (C.3), provides the result.
Proof of Theorem 4.12. Assume this was not true. First note, since M admits articulable
contingent plans, there must be at least some x ∈ X such that (x<x) ∈ A0(s). Let µ(a) = x.
By A↑ and KA this implies that, for all s′ ∈ R0(s)
(M, s′) |=µ A0PE (∃a (¬A0(a< a) ∧ At(a< a))) ,
Hence, by our hypothesis, and A0, we have, for some s′ ∈ R0(s)
(M, s′) |=µ Et¬ (∃a (¬A0(a< a) ∧ At(a< a))) ,
so by A0 again, we have, for all s′′ ∈ R0(s′),
(M, s′) |=µ ¬ (∃a (¬A0(a< a) ∧ At(a< a))) ,
Clearly, this implies
{(x<x) : (x<x) ∈ At(s′′)} ⊆ A0(s′′) = A0′ = A0(s), (C.4)
where the last two equalities come from KA and the fact that s′ ∈ R0(s′) for all s′ ∈ R0(s),
by T.
Order the states in R0(s), s1 . . . sn. So, for each si ∈ R0(s), let x(si) denote any <si
maximal element of {x : (x<x) ∈ At(s′)} guaranteed to exist by ABnd. Let µ be such that
µ(ai) = x(si) for each i ≤ n. By (C.4), we have (M, s) |=µ A0(ai< ai) and so by A1,
(M, s) |=µ A0(ai< aj), (C.5)
for any i, j ≤ n.
Now define for each i ≤ n, define recursively ϕ¯i =
∧
j≤n(x(si)<x(sj)) ∧ ¬
∨
j<i ϕ¯j. By
Proposition 4.1, <s is a weak order and so clearly, Λ = {ϕ¯i|i ≤ n} forms the a contractable
set. Moreover, by (C.5) and A↑, ct : ϕ¯i 7→ x(si) is articulable. But, by construction, is clear
ct is explicitly acceptable, a contradiction.
125
Proof of Theorem 4.15. First, fix some any model, M of ∀K1 ∪ P ∪ F ∪ S1. Note, by
the completeness of ≥ we have m ≥ m for all m, so in order for the definition of an FS1
generated preference to be well defined, we need dominance to be reflexive. Indeed, for
each s ∈ S, <s is a preference relation by Proposition 4.1. So for each s ∈ S let m¯(s) be
the <s-maximal element of m. So by definition of <s-maximal, and S1, we have, for all
s ∈ S, (M, s) |=X K1
∧
z∈m(m¯(s)< z). Since this holds for all s ∈ S (in particular, for all
s′ ∈ R0(s)), and
⋃
s∈S m¯(s) ⊆ m, it follows that (M, s) |=X K0
∨
y∈mK1
∧
z∈m(y< z).
Now, to show sufficiency, we will prove that the representation (4.17) holds. Since ≥ is
complete and transitive, there exists some V : 2X → R that represents it. Define ξ(m) ≡
{max
x∈m
us′(x)}us′∈Us,0 . So let Γ be any strictly increasing extension of the map: ξ(m) 7→ V (m).
It remains to show that Γ is well defined. Indeed, if ξ(m) = ξ(m′), then for all s′ ∈ R0(s),
we have m¯(s′) ∼s′ m¯′(s′), implying (via S1),
(M, s′) |=X K1
∧
z′∈m′
(m¯(s′)< z′) ∧K1
∧
z∈m
(m¯′(s′)< z).
It follows that m s-dominates m′ and that m′ s-dominates m, so by the requirements of
an FS1 generated preference, V (m) = V (m
′). Now if ξ(m) > ξ(m′) (i.e,. component wise
inequality with some strict), we have likewise have for all s′ ∈ R0(s), m¯(s′)<s′ m¯′(s′), (with
some strict preference) implying (via S1),
(M, s′) |= K1
∧
z′∈m′
(m¯(s′)< z′),
and for at least one state s′′ ∈ R0(s),
(M, s′′) |= ¬K1
∧
z∈m
(m¯′(s′′)< z′).
It follows that m strictly s-dominates m′, so by the requirements of an FS1 generated pref-
erence, V (m) > V (m′), as desired.
Towards necessity, we will construct the FS1 model that generates ≥. So let ≥ satisfy
the axioms of Kreps (1979), and so, the representation therein holds, (i.e., of the form of
(4.17), with an arbitrary state space, Ω). It is easy to check the following model suffices,
S ∼= Ω, V can be arbitrary, R0 = Ω2, R1 =
⋃
ω∈Ω(ω, ω), and for each ω, let <ω be the order
generated by uω in the initial representation.
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Proof of Theorem 4.16. First, assume m is the image of such a contingent plan: m = Im(ct),
with ct based on (Λ,Γ, µ). By way of contradiction, assume m is strictly dominated by m
′.
So,
(M, s) |=µ ¬K0
∨
b∈µ−1(m)
Kt
∧
a∈µ−1(m′)
(b< a),
which implies for some s′ ∈ R0(s), and all b ∈ µ−1(m) we have
(M, s′) |=µ ¬Kt
∧
a∈µ−1(m′)
(b< a),
which in turn implies, for some s′′ ∈ Rt(s′) and some a ∈ µ−1(m′) and all b ∈ µ−1(m), we
have (M, s′′) |=µ (a  b). Now St implies
(M, s′) |=µ Kt(a  b).
or, (M, s′) |=µ ∃aKt(a  b). Let ψ¯ (with ψ = µ¯−1(ψ¯)) denote the unique element of Λ such
that (M, s′) |=X ψ¯. By assumption, ct(ψ¯) ∈ µ−1(m), so, (M, s′) |=µ ψ ∧ ∃aKt(a  (ct(ψ)).
This clearly implies
(M, s′) |=µ
∨
ϕ∈Γ
ϕ ∧ ∃aKt(a  ct(ϕ)).
Lastly, since s′ is assessable from s at 0, we have a contradiction to the acceptability of c.
Now, assume m is an undominated menu. For each s ∈ S, let x(s) denote any <s
maximal element in m. Let Λ be a t-separable set. The proof proceeds as in Theorem 4.7.
Denote by Λ¯ the subset of Λ that are satisfied in some state: Λ¯ = {ϕ¯ ∈ Λ|(M, s) |=X ϕ¯}.
For each ϕ¯ ∈ Λ¯, define, c¯t(ϕ¯) to be any element of {x(s)|s ∈ S, such that (M, s) |=X ϕ¯}.
Finally, let ct be any extension of c¯t to Λ. It remains to show ct is acceptable.
Assume it was not. Then there exists some s′ ∈ R0(s) such that,
(M, s′) |=µ
∨
ϕ∈Γ
(
ϕ ∧ ∃aKt(a  ct(ϕ))
)
. (C.6)
By the definition of contractable, there must be some ϕ ∈ Γ such that (M, s′) |=µ ϕ. As
shown in Theorem 4.7, it must be ct(ϕ¯) is <s′ maximal element in m. By (C.6), there must
be some µ′ ∼a µ such that (M, s′) |=µ′ (a  ct(ϕ)), and so, by St, (M, s′) |=µ′ Kt(a  ct(ϕ)).
It is immediate that m ∪ µ¯′(a) strictly s-dominates m, a contradiction.
N.B. this argument only shows that m contains the image of an acceptable contingent
127
plan. However, we can always add a list of logical contradictions to Λ in order to exhaust
the remainder of m (which is finite by assumption).
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